Palestine human development report 1998-1999 by Birzeit University. Development Studies Program
Palestine  Human Development Report 1998-1999
PALESTINE
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1998-1999
This Report was undertaken in coordination and cooperation with UNDP and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation’s
Department of Human Development and Institution Building, and with funding from the Government of Japan. The views expressed
here are solely those of the researchers and do not necessarily represent those of the institutions to which they are affiliated.
BIRZEIT UNIVERSITY
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES PROGRAMME
April 2000
Copyright c  2000
Development Studies Programme
Tel: (972) 2 - 295 - 9250
Fax: (972) 2 - 295 - 8117
P. O. Box 1878, Ramallah
e-mail: dsp@birzeit.edu
             dsp@palnet.com
Homepage: www.birzeit.edu/dsp
Cover Design: M. Baroud & A. Falah
Layout & Printing Supervision: Al-Nasher Advertising Agency
Palestine  Human Development Report 1998-1999
The Palestinian Authority
Ministry of Planning & International Cooporation
Minister's Office
Dr. Nabil Sha’ath
Minister of Planning and International Cooperation
Foreword
It is with pleasure that I introduce the first Palestine Human Development Report, 1998-1999. With this
Report, Palestine takes its place among country human development reports issued by the United Nations
Development Programme.
The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation is proud to be a partner in this pioneering national
effort. The Ministry, which contributed to the preparation of the Palestine Human Development Profile,
1996-1997, coordinated the work of the Ministerial Committee, the governmental committee that
supervised the different stages in the preparation of the Report. We also took part in supervision of the
research and community-based processes, in cooperation with the Development Studies Programme at
Birzeit University and the United Nations Development Programme, on which the Report depended.
The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation holds human development among its top priorities,
and has established a special Directorate for Human Development and Institution-Building. The Palestinian
National Authority has introduced concepts of comprehensive and long-term development in its
development plans and strategies. To implement this human development approach, the Palestinian
National Authority and its various institutions are devoting extensive efforts to eradicate poverty, integrate
marginalized areas in the development process and empower women. These efforts are part of the process
of national liberation, which comes at the forefront of all priorities, and includes continuing the work to
establish the independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital, and arriving at a just solution
for the Palestinian refugee question.
We hope this Report will have the positive impact that it deserves. I would like to take this opportunity to
thank the teams that prepared the Report, including the researchers, ministerial committees and advisory
committees, and wish them success in their efforts.
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Executive Summary
and empowering people and institutions
expresses the participatory methodology
used in its preparation, in itself a
reflection of the increasing cooperation
between academic institutions,Palestinian
National Authority (PNA) institutions,
NGOs and the private sector. This
cooperation was tangibly demonstrated
by the extent of public participation in
the workshops that were convened in all
parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
(WBGS) in the course of preparing the
Report.
This work also reflects a concern that
the viewpoints of all parties in the
development process should be
represented objectively, supported by
the necessary evidence, data and
analysis. The importance and
credibility of the Report is enhanced
by the fact that it has been an academic
research endeavor, characterized by
objectivity and a balanced analysis of
actual conditions and prospects for the
future, and supported by scientific
evidence.
The official statistics issued by the
Palestinian Central Bureau of
Statistics (PCBS) provided the basic
data on which the findings of the
Report are based. The Report was
enriched by the  series of studies and
polls carried out by the Development
Studies Programme (DSP) through
which thousands of Palestinians in
various regions were interviewed.
Specialized studies on PNA institutions,
This Report is
a report for all
Palestinians
The official
statistics issued by
the Palestinian
Central Bureau of
Statistics (PCBS)
provided the basic
data on which the
findings of the
Report are based
Introduction
This Palestine Human Development
Report 1998-1999, is the most
comprehensive report to date on the
status and needs of human
development in Palestine. It examines
the factors that are necessary in order
to maintain positive change, and to
meet the many challenges facing the
establishment of a modern Palestinian
state, where sustainable human
development can be achieved. This
Report is a report for all Palestinians.
It is presented at this particular time
in order to contribute to the
foundation of the modern Palestinian
state, and to document for history
where we stand at present and what
we aspire for the future.
The Report represents a major effort
by hundreds of researchers, experts,
representatives of official and
nonofficial institutions, and
representatives of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and political
parties for a comprehensive view of
human development in Palestine.
However, more specialized focused
studies are now needed to provide
clearly defined and detailed programs
of action for each sector. This Report
in itself cannot achieve the desired
outcomes unless decision-makers at
all levels make use of its
recommendations in formulating their
strategies and policies.
The focus of the Report on strengthening
Executive Summary2
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civil society organizations and the
private sector were also employed.
The preparation of the Report took
place under the supervision of a group
of committees and specialized
experts, among them the Technical
Advisory Committee and the
Ministerial Committee representing
eighteen Palestinian ministries. These
committees reviewed the report
during the various stages of its
preparation. Thus the present Report
represents a genuine Palestinian
endeavor, rooted in the demands of the
Palestinian public and representing a
grass-roots appeal for development
and progress at all levels.
º Significance and
   conclusions of the
   Report
æ The Palestine Human Development
  Report presents a comprehensive
æview of the stage through which the
æPalestinian people are living, and
æoffers integrated recommendations
æfor the roles of all sectors of society,
æand the general framework
ægoverning their relationship, with a
æview toward achieving optimal
æhuman development.
æ The Report presents a holistic
æconcept of development that
æcombines social, cultural, economic
æand political dimensions and places
æthe human being at the center, as the
æinitiator of the development process
æand the beneficiary of its results. It
æcalls for expanding life
æopportunities and for achieving the
æhighest degree possible of social
æjustice, while strengthening resolve
æto contribute to the process of
ædevelopment through practical
æmeasures on both the local and
ænational levels.
æ The Report calls for continued
æefforts to expand the scope available
æfor development in Palestine.
æAmong the most vital tasks on the
æagenda of the Palestinian negotiator
æis to expand the scope of collective
æchoices for the Palestinian people  in
æthe context of achieving their
ænational project.
æ In this context, the Report calls for
æstrengthening all efforts to achieve
ænational unity and to exploit all
æavailable (although limited)
æresources in order to achieve a
ædevelopment structure character-
æized by institutions based on rational
æand objective thinking, and  governed
æby the rule of law.  This requires
æintegrated and fully developed
æorganizational structures and job
ædescriptions for institutions,
ædepartments and staff, and a move
æaway from personalized admini-
æstrative systems in favor of institutions
æbased on order and accountability.
æ The Report calls for institutionaliz-
The present Report
represents a
genuine Palestinian
endeavor, rooted in
the demands of the
Palestinian public
and representing a
grass-roots appeal
for development and
progress at all levels
3
æ ing relations among the different
æ sectors of society within the concept
æ of full and effective partnership
æin the development process. The
æ Report also stresses the importance
æ of providing the suitable political
æ and social environment that will
æ draw in all parties to participate in
æ the development process, according
æ to the principle that sustainable
æ participation is participation that
æbenefits people. Such participation
æ depends on the degree of
æcommitment people have in their
æsystems of social and political
æorganization, in the absence of any
æ form of internal or external coercion,
æbe it political, social or economic.
æ Various studies have indicated a
æwidespread desire among the public
æto participate in the development
æprocess, as well as an awareness that
æconstraints of a general nature, both
æinstitutional and economic, hinder
æthe participation of individuals in the
ædevelopment process.
æ The Report underlines the impor-
ætance of establishing a balance
æbetween external funding, which
æcontinues to be a vital and necessary
æsource for the development process
æin Palestine, and self-financing. It
ædemonstrates that there are
æpossibilities for enhancing self-
æreliance by improving the
æmechanisms for retrieving taxes
æcollected by Israel from Palestinian
æworkers working inside Israel, and
æby implementing a taxation system
æprepared by the Finance Ministry for
æbetter collection of taxes. In
æaddition, citizens will be motivated
æto pay their taxes once they are
æconvinced that they are the
æbeneficiaries of PNA budgets and
æthat this revenue will be spent for
æthe benefit of society as a whole.
æ Activating the domestic role of
æbanks also is an important part of the
æprocess. In addition, revenue from
æpublic authorities and the levying of
ætaxes on monopolistic companies
æcould also constitute an important
æincome source for the Finance
æMinistry. This should be
æaccompanied by sound utilization of
æpublic funds, and avoidance of
æbureaucratic excess and non-
ærationalized expenditure. Most
æcertainly, the creation of an
æatmosphere of belonging, the
æpromotion of the feeling of
æcitizenship, and implementation of
ærationalized public fiscal policies
æapproved by the Legislative Council
æare all measures that would further
æself-reliance.
º Our rank in the     º
    world
 æ Palestine’s development status can
æbe measured and compared with that
æof other countries, keeping in mind
Executive Summary4
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æthat its standing is influenced by
æadditional historical and political
æfactors. Upon examining the Human
æDevelopment Index (HDI), which
æmeasures income, educational
æattainment and life expectancy, from
æa relative and approximate
æperspective, we find Palestine in the
æbottom half of countries in the
æMedium Human Development
æranking (ranking 100 out of 175
æcountries). On the other hand,
æPalestinians have been able to
æachieve results during recent
ædecades with limited economic and
æadministrative resources, demon-
æstrating that with due attention to
æeducation and health issues within
æa community-based orientation, and
æwith civil society taking an effective
ærole, the potential for balanced
æhuman development can be
æenhanced and risks of deterioration
æmitigated.
æ This also reinforces the importance
æof making additional efforts in the
æfields of education, health, and
æsocial programs, and towards the
æfair distribution of power and wealth
æ(Palestine is ranked as follows: 94
æin education; 74 in life expectancy;
æand 115 in income level, out of 175
æcountries).1 This data indicates that
æPalestine ranks higher with human
ædevelopment measurements rather
æthan with economic development
æindicators. It also indicates that,
ædespite the importance of economic
ægrowth as a main catalyst in the
ædevelopment process, the rational
æand effective use of resources may
æbe the more important factor.
æDevelopment does not depend
æsolely on allocated sums, but also
æon their distribution among the
ævarious budgetary items. Thus it is
æimperative to increase the share of
ævarious human development areas in
æthe public budget. The data also
æunderlines the necessity of
æreviewing some prevailing
æhypotheses on Palestinian human
æresources, and developing them in
æa manner suitable for the
ærequirements of the 21st century.
º Warning of
   deterioration
æ After examining the various indic-
æators, the Report warns of the risk
æof deteriorating conditions,
æparticularly in the main human
ædevelopment areas. On one hand,
æthere is regression in the real value
æof the per capita gross domestic
æproduct (GDP), an increase in
æpoverty rates and a perception of
ærelative deprivation in marginalized
æareas and among vulnerable groups.
æIn relative terms, budget allocations
æfor education and health tend to be
æreduced over time. Despite an
æincrease in the numbers of schools,
Palestine is in the
bottom half of
countries in the
medium human
development
ranking
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æclinics and hospitals, these absolute
æincreases do not correspond to the
æsize and nature of population
æincrease: over 47% of the
æPalestinian population is under 15
æyears of age, and fertility rates,
ælinked to population increase, are
æamong the highest in the world. The
ænumbers of students per classroom
æand per teacher are rising, and
æuniversity lecture halls are
æovercrowded. All of these pressures
æare accompanied by long-term
æchallenges on social security
æsystems, especially on old-age and
æpension schemes, as the coming
ædecades will witness a major
æincrease in the percentage of elderly
æin the population.
æ Over and above all these factors,
æeconomic crisis looms if current
æconditions continue to prevail, for
æthese indicators all point to the
ædanger of a rise in unemployment
ærates unless investment is promoted
æto create jobs in Palestine itself. The
æpublic sector is nearing saturation in
æemployment, and it is not expected
æto expand further. Government
æemployment constituted the main
æmeans of addressing unemployment
æproblems in Palestine over the last
æfive years; the government sector
ætoday employs over 20% of the
ælabor force. The Israeli market is
æalso not expected to absorb more
æworkers than it does at present, and
æpressure will likely continue to
æreplace Palestinian labor with
æinternational manpower.
æ Economic growth, both in quantity
æand quality, in Arab Gulf countries
æwill not enable them to provide more
æthan a partial solution, assuming
æcertain political arrangements are
æreached. In this case, economic
ægrowth in the Palestinian Territories
æoriented towards the Arab world
æcould become the main way to
æaddress the unemployment problem,
æbut this can only be achieved if
æstudied efforts and political will are
ædevoted towards that end. With
ærising unemployment rates, poverty
ærates will also increase and social
æproblems will multiply in
æPalestinian society. When
æPalestinians were asked to assess
ætheir economic conditions and levels
æof living over time, the majority
æexpressed the view that their
æconditions have worsened or
æremained the same during the last
æfew years.
º Economic growth
æ In view of the kind of economic
ægrowth currently taking place in
æPalestine, the Report, using the
æstandards of human development,
æcautions against the emergence of
æthe following characteristics:
Executive Summary6
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Growth without job opportunities
Economic growth is not always
accompanied by sustainable job
opportunities, since growth can affect
the overall economy but does not
necessarily lead to an increase in jobs.
In Palestine, the apparent decrease in
unemployment rates for the year 1998
was accompanied by an increase in the
absolute numbers of those seeking
work (the unemployed), a decrease in
real wages of the employed and an
increase in their work hours. The
projections for job creation are not
encouraging, since employment in the
public sector has started to decrease,
and employment rates have become
more stabilized. The public sector will
clearly not be able to alleviate future
economic crises through employment.
At the same time, there has been a
decrease in women’s labor force
participation rate. In a sample survey
carried out by the Development
Studies Programme of 1,200
Palestinians, more than 75% of those
interviewed believed that job
opportunities were not available to
those seeking them. The percentage
was significantly higher in the Gaza
Strip compared to the West Bank.
Growth without mercy
A merciless growth is one where
benefits accumulate for the rich and
exclude the poor. In Palestine the
number of poor is increasing and
poverty is concentrated in areas where
public and private investments should
be centered. The average consumption
for the poor in goods and services does
not exceed 9%, while the poor
represent 25% of the population. In
an opinion poll, 73% affirmed that the
gap between rich and poor was
increasing; the percentage of those
who believed this was higher in the
Gaza Strip than in the West Bank.
About 55% of those interviewed
considered that the development
projects implemented by the PNA do
not benefit all sectors of society, while
61% stressed that geographical
regions benefit unequally from
development projects. A greater
percentage, 76%, stressed that
international assistance does not bring
equal benefit to all Palestinians.
Growth that disempowers people
Human development requires growth
that empowers people, enhances their
capabilities and promotes democracy
in principle and in practice. Political
repression and favoritism amosng the
economic and political elite constitute
the gravest dangers to the stability and
very existence of society. Monopolies
should be dealt with as undemocratic
phenomena, counter to basic
economic wisdom. The opinion
sample demonstrated that 93% of
Palestinians considered difficult
economic conditions to be an
important factor obstructing their
participation in the development
process.
7
Rootless growth
This is the opposite of deeply-rooted
growth that benefits from continuity
with the past and from the lessons and
examples of the collective experience.
This is particularly the case in the
Palestinian context where the
experience of development, while
under different rubric, did not begin
only with the establishment of the
PNA, but has roots that go deep into
the struggles of the Palestinian people
and the central role played by its
dynamic civil society.
Perhaps the most important lesson to
be gained from this experience is that
limited economic resources cannot
destroy the determination of a society
to improve to the maximum its own
human development levels. A
developing society is one that can use
its resources to create a life that is
qualitatively better, especially in the
fields of health, education and social
welfare.
Growth that sacrifices the rights of
future generations
Desired development is one that
safeguards the rights of future
generations. Development becomes
mere futureless growth without
clearly-defined policies to conserve
limited economic resources, without
measures to protect the environment
from pollution and collapse, and
without balanced population policies.
º The bases of a
   development
   perspective
Perhaps the most important
contribution of the Report is providing
the bases of a Palestinian development
perspective, a perspective that is based
on a comprehensive concept of
development and the vital synergy
between the general national interests
and developmental concerns.
The outcomes of numerous studies
carried out by the Development
Studies Programme in PNA
institutions, in civil society
organizations  and in the private sector
have all demonstrated a common
factor which limits their capacities to
achieve target development ceilings:
the lack of a development vision
which could determine the orientation,
unify efforts and guide the process of
decision-making within a set of
considered priorities and common
values representing the broadest
framework of consensus. The most
important elements of such a
development perspective, as
introduced by the Report, are the
following:
æ An emancipatory concept of develop-
æ ment that places the Palestinian
æ human being, Palestinian national
æ issues and the rights of future
æ generations at the center of the
æ development process in the effort to
æ achieve Palestinian rights according
Executive Summary8
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æ to the principles of international law.
æ It underlines the interconnection
æ between the right to self≠determi-
 æn ation and the right to development
æ (which is both a collective and an
æ individual right at the same time),
æ and the implications of the connec-
æ tion between the process of national
æ liberation and the building of
æ society.
æ A perspective which deals with all
æ the main elements impacting the
æ nature of the development environ-
æ ment in Palestine, including Israeli
æ occupation, the policies of the PNA
æ and the role of donor countries. To
æ improve the development environ-
æ ment means to broaden collective
æ and individual options for people in
æ general. It requires a clear Palestin-
  ian agenda, and national unity in
æ support of that agenda.
æ The opportunity to participate in
æ development and to benefit fromits
æ fruits is a human right. From this
æ standpoint, the Palestinians can
æ depend on their long-standing
æ history of popular participation, and
æ the spirit of collective development
æ and the creative skills gained from
æ the experience. In order to promote
æ participation in the development
æ process there has to be a democratic
æ environment that encourages eco-
æ nomic initiatives by individuals,
æ community participation in deci-
æ sion-making and funding (on the
æ principle of decentralized govern- æ
ment), and makes use of pluralism æ
and diversity in society for the             æ
purpose of upgrading the level of       æ
development. Thus development is æ
linked to the process of democratic æ
transformation, to the expansion of æ
participation in developmental           æ
decision-making, and to the bal-         æ
anced division of roles within the      æ
concept of the social contract, in
æ recognition of the importance of
æpluralism, and dangers of
æ authoritarianism.
æ Development in Palestine is linked to
æ  the dgree of achievment of instiution-
æbuilding where government
æ institutions are regulated on the basis
æ of people-friendly regulations,
æ transforming  institutions into
æ mechanisms for service to citizens,
æ and for protection of their rights
æ rather than deprivation of rights.
æ Institutional regulations rather than
æ personal subjective judgments
æ should arbitrate in disputes. Such a
æ process requires the rule of law and
æ fair application of the law,
æ and will result in the human being
æ becoming the focus of all institution-
   al work.
æ PNA institutions are responsible for
æ drawing up strategies, and for
æ providing the suitable development
æ environment and funding for the
æ development process. In order to do
æ that they have to take the lead in the
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æ development process, and become
æ a responsible leadership based on
æ persuasion, dialogue and fulfillment
æ of development needs.
æ Civil society is considered the best
æ guarantor for providing outreach to
æ marginalized groups and areas, to
æ alleviate poverty and to consolidate
æ democracy. Civil society
æ organizations, and especially
æ political parties, need to overcome
æ their current crisis and become main
æ actors in the development process
æ in order to promote a comprehensive
æ vision of the process of national
æ struggle, based on a grass-roots
æ constituency and broad participation.
æ The private sector constitutes an
æ important support in the develop-
æ ment process by contributing
æ reliable and balanced economic
æ growth. It requires a favorable
æ development environment and a
æ clear idea of its sectoral role to
æ encourage more responsibility
æ toward community issues.
æ The synergy in the roles of these
æ sectors in working together is
æ extremely vital, for it is a synergy
æ based on mutual respect and on
æ partnership between them without
æ any single sector predominating
æ over others, provided modern
æ legislation is in place to regulate the
æ relationship.
æ Among the most important elements
æ in the initial perspective proposed
æ by the Report is the mainstreaming
æ of important marginalized groups,
æ which make up the overwhelming
æ majority of society, and investing
æ in their capacities. This can be
æ accomplished by enacting laws that
æ abolish discrimination against these
æ groups, and by devoting attention to
æ remote areas facing pressures as a
æ result of political conditions, due to
æ their proximity to Israeli settlements
æ or because of restrictions imposed
æ by the agreements, especially in
æ Jerusalem and in Areas “C”, (under
æ complete Israeli control).
æ Genderize the development per-
æ spective: Development should also be
æ viewed from the perspective of
æ Palestinian women and their interests
æ in the process. The incorporation of
æ their interests and role in the process
æ would strengthen the possibilities of
æ alternative development to the
æ advantage of society as a whole.
æ In considering these proposals, the
æ development process can be transformed
æ into an integrated project of civiliz-
æ ation. It requires an understanding
æ of the vital interrelation between the
æ different elements of development,
æ with a focus on people and their
æ awareness of the importance of
æ participation in the development
æ process, and the rights they are
æ entitled to. The Report calls for
æ starting work on what is possible,
The development
process can be
transformed into an
integrated project of
civilization
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æ while raising the ceiling of possi-
æbilities: government institutions with
æ good governance, an active civil
æ society, merciful economic growth,
æ wide-scale grassroots participation,
æ mainstreaming of marginalized
æ groups, devoting greater attention to
1. The reader will notice minor changes in the international ranking of Palestine in comparison with the contents of
     the Summary of the Report that was published earlier. The data in the present Report are the final outcome.
æ modern education and healthcare in
æ a comprehensive way, and to poverty
æeradication programs,and guaran-
æteeing the best investment of
æavailable human and material
æresources.
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Chapter One:  General framework for human development in Palestine
The HDR: Themes and objectives
Methodology for preparing the Report: A participatory methodology
Sustainable human development: Conceptual problems
Measuring development
Participation as a strategy for human development
The Development environment in Palestine
The declaration of a Palestinian
State and its concrete establishment
has become an achievable goal. To
actually accomplish it will require
the development of Palestinian
institutions compatible with
"modern state" structures, both in
form and in content. Their develop-
ment must safeguard the principles
of the rule of law, and the separation
of the three powers while main-
taining balance and complemen-
tarity in their tasks. The establish-
ment of the hoped-for Palestinian
state and the development of its role
will require transforming the work
methodology developed during the
"transitional stage" into a new work
methodology guided by a holistic
and liberating development perspec-
tive, based on partnership and
balance among the different sectors
of society.
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Introduction
Public participation in the develop-
ment process1 is of vital importance
for the achievement of integrated and
sustainable human development. On
the Palestinian level, there is a dire
need to develop the concept of parti-
cipation and the capabilities of people
to participate and to defend their
rights, to stimulate their motivation
and increase their productivity levels,
and to activate their role as change
agents on the national level in the
political, economic and social fields.
The development process is activated
and strengthened under a system that
allows and encourages individuals
and groups to participate by creating
an empowering environment. Such an
environment would expand the
choices before the individual by
providing real life opportunities, and
by developing sufficient capacities, to
empower individuals to invest in these
options in the best manner possible.
In this way they participate in
developing society and in benefiting
from the fruits of development.
Participation implies that people
become involved in the economic,
social, and political processes
affecting their present and devise
plans for the future of coming
generations.2
In order to make the Palestinian
individual the target of development
benefits, it is necessary to begin with
a community foundation, capable of
responding to the needs of the current
transitional stage. Such a foundation
would provide the necessary elements
to achieve the overall national goals
of the Palestinian people, and to free
the individual from the restrictions
limiting his/her political, economic,
and social opportunities.
To achieve comprehensive develop-
ment requires an effective interaction
between human resources and social
institutions, including PNA institu-
tions, the private sector and civil
society organizations. For these
institutions to succeed in integrating
the individual in the development
Box 1-1: Sustainable human development is not possible under
                occupation
The transitional stage under which Palestinian society has been living since
1993 still continues. Despite achievements that took place in recent years,
namely the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) on
Palestinian land, and Palestinian takeover of responsibility for social and
economic development, the Israeli occupation continues to maintain its
control, in different ways and to varying degrees. Over more than 85% of the
lands of the WBGS (about 90% of West Bank lands) remains under Israeli
control, and Israel continues to isolate the two regions from each other while
closing off Jerusalem to both regions. Moreover, Israel continues to control
natural resources, including water and nature preserves. Israel has also
maintained its military control over the borders and border crossings, thus
perpetuating the dependency of the Palestinian economy on the Israeli
economy, and preventing the building of an independent Palestinian economy,
subject to responsible and sound planning. The achievement of sustainable
human development in Palestine is conditioned on a crucial factor: putting
an end to Israeli occupation and Israeli control over Palestinian resources,
and enabling the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self-determination
and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state.
15
process, it will be necessary to
institutionalize authority in a balance
between the three powers in
government, executive, legislative,
and judicial. This would facilitate a
complementary partnership that
would allow positive interaction
among the components of society as
both a possible and rational option.
º The Human
    Development Report:
    Theme and objectives
The Palestine Human Development
Report focuses on the reciprocal
relations between people and the
available opportunities for building
institutions that allow for effective
participation in the development
process. The Report analyzes the
stage through which the Palestinian
people in the WBGS are living,
focusing on the processes and
cumulative experiences of recons-
truction. During this stage, the
features of a "state" are emerging as
work proceeds on building the
Palestinian state and strengthening
and regulating what is necessary to
move from a reactive approach
towards a pro-active approach in the
development process. For this reason,
it is necessary to present an analysis
of the three pillars of society: PNA
institutions (Chapter 3), the private
sector (Chapter 4), and civil society
organizations (Chapter 5). The
Report looks to the future by presen-
ting a set of recommendations for a
framework for a comprehensive
Box 1-2: The Palestine Human Development Profile, 1996-1997
Both in conception and in methodology, the Palestine Human Development Profile,1996-1997, was modeled primarily on the
human development reports published by the UNDP. However, the Profile devoted attention to the conditions or characteristics
of the transitional stage following the establishment of the PNA. Through description and analysis, the Profile explored the
then current problems facing human development in Palestine. At the same time, it attempted to provide an initial mapping of
development institutions, both governmental and non-governmental, and of problems and issues requiring additional in-
depth studies. It highlighted a number of problems facing development after the establishment of the PNA, most prominent
among them: economic dependency, the continuing occupation and the restrictions of the transitional stage, the nascent
experience of the PNA and the overlap of authorities between it and the  Israeli government, the dependence of the PNA on
assistance from donor countries that was aimed, primarily, at maintaining the negotiating process and mitigating the negative
impact of Israel’s security and economic policies.
The Profile also pointed out the oscillation of the Palestinian regime between institution-building based on the separation of
powers and respect for the rights of the citizen, and the lack of democratic conditions in practice. The Profile also drew
attention to the uneven development between one Palestinian region and another, as demonstrated by various indicators. It
pointed out the importance of PNA institutions devising comprehensive and clear development policies with the participation
of different sectors of the public in order to achieve a higher degree of human development and social justice, and to contribute
to the achievement of the national goals of Palestinian society.
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Palestinian vision of development. It
also presents recommendations in
various areas related to completing the
reconstruction process (Chapter 6).
The transition from the Profile format
to the Report format was not an easy
one for the research team and the
specialized committees preparing the
Report. The new format was chosen
in view of interrelated conceptual and
practical considerations, most
importantly:
The research experience accumu-
lated during preparations for the
Profile in identifying constraints
and problems of development in
the WBGS. Thus the Human
Development Report represents an
advance on the Human Develop-
ment Profile in more than one area.
Availability of new statistical and
qualitative data during the year
1998, in addition to the PCBS’s
Population, Housing and Establish-
ments Census, published in late
1997.
Adopting the development of
human and institutional resources
in Palestine as a defining theme of
the Report. This theme, which
requires in-depth analysis and not
the mere description that was
predominant in the Profile format,
was approved after extensive
discussions and based to a large
extent on the results of
participatory research.
Even with the continuing high
levels of political and economic
uncertainty, the format of the
Report allows policy recommen-
dations to be presented. The
present Report is the first of a
planned series that will address
develop-ment issues in Palestine
over time, measuring variables,
that reflect different aspects of the
Palestinian situation.
Adopting the Report format also
carried a political meaning since,
in addition to its research function,
it places Palestine oamong country
development reports issued by the
Box 1-3: Population, Housing and Establishments Census
The PCBS conducted a Population, Housing and Establishments Census, the first ever under a Palestinian national authority.
The efforts of thousands of researchers, administrative staff, volunteers, political and social groups and governmental and
non-governmental organizations contributed to the success of the survey. Surveys such as this, which provide basic data on
demographic, social and economic conditions, are considered to be developmental imperatives since they facilitate the
monitoring of the development status of Palestinian society. As reports on the census findings are published in sequence,
Palestinian decision-makers will be able to plan development policies on an accurate statistical basis. The census was a major
data source for the present Report.
3.
5.
4.
The Report places
Palestine among
country development
reports issued by the
UNDP
1.
2.
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UNDP. Even though at the present
stage the Report is not capable of
addressing all the detailed
requirements for the establishment
of the state, it does discuss the main
elements necessary for the
transition from a situation of
uncertainty to social and
institutional stability. For this
reason, the Report has focussed on
providing analyses of the main
institutions of society: institutions
of the public sector (the PNA),
institutions of the private sector
(the market) and institutions of
civil society and its non-
governmental organizations. To
develop the work of these
institutions, and to explore ways
for them to coordinate and
participate in order to achieve an
atmosphere that enables
development, constitutes the
framework for the establishment of
the modern state.
The present Report conforms to the
methodology of international
country reports, but maintains its
unique character. Even though a
Palestinian national authority has
been established, enjoying powers
and responsibilities affecting
various aspects of the social,
economic and political life of the
Palestinians in the WBGS, it
continues to be restricted by the
ceilings imposed in the agreements
for the transitional stage that
terminated on May 4, 1998, but
without the Israeli side having
fulfilled its obligations. This
situation maintains the
complications and barriers
imposed on the planning and
implementing capacities of the
PNA institutions and other
institutions in society. These
limitations are visible in the
continuing foreign control of
natural resources, external trade
and border crossings, and imposed
separation between the WBGS, and
between these two areas and
Jerusalem. Obviously, this
specificity  impacts on the concept
of development in the WBGS, its
progress and its potential.
The specificity of Palestinian
conditions also present, over and
above the general problems, a
problem related to the conditions of
Palestinian development strategy, and
the extent of its ability to encompass
the majority of the Palestinian people
(whether in Areas "A", "B" or "C", or
in the diaspora). Even though the
present Report pertains to that part of
the Palestinian people living under a
Palestinian authority (in the WBGS),
it bears in mind the strategic
importance (both in developmental
and political terms) of including the
Palestinian people as a whole in all
conceptual activities on human
development. This goal should
continue to guide all future reports.
6.
There is a problem
related to the ability
of a Palestinian
development
strategy to
encompass the
majority of the
Palestinian people
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Generally, the present Report seeks to
urge the various parties in the
development process in Palestine to
make the changes necessary for the
transition towards an institution-based
development environment, with
stronger participation and account-
ability. The analyses and recommen-
dations presented in the Report
emanate from the recognition of the
importance of the human development
concept. This concept  advocates the
expansion of the scope of choices and
capacities of people by investing in
social capital. This will enable the
needs of the current generation to be
met with the highest degree possible
of fairness and social participation
without compromising the rights of
future generations. Meanwhile the
relationship between motivation and
productivity should be reinforced, and
a harmonious environment for the
various sectors of society (whether
public or not) and the basis for common
action among them should be created,
in order to guide Palestinian society
towards improved development.
º Methodology for
   preparing the
   Report: A
   participatory
   methodology
In line with the position advocated by
the Report to strengthen participation
in development activities, a
methodology of broad participation
was adopted in the preparation of this
Report. The Report is regarded as the
outcome of efforts made by a large
number of Palestinians through their
participation in the Technical Advisory
group and Ministerial committee, or in
conducting or reviewing research
activities. The viewpoints of
Palestinians on the issues addressed in
the Report were gathered through
interviews, workshops and focus
research group meetings, with
government officials, non-govern-
mental experts and activists, and
representatives of grassroots organiza-
tions, the poor, "job-seekers," youth,
children and residents of marginal
areas.
Changes are
necessary for
transition to an
institution-based
development
environment, with
stronger
participation and
accountability
A methodology of
broad participation
was adopted in the
preparation of this
Report
Box 1-4: Strong desire to participate in the development process
In an opinion survey conducted by DSP, the great majority of Palestinians (87%) expressed a strong desire to participate in
developing their society. At the same time, about 50% of individuals considered themselves influential in their local
communities. About 58% considered that general conditions do not allow them to participate in developing their community,
while 50% said that personal circumstances (marriage and children for women, advanced age for men and women, or physical
disability) play a role in hindering their participation in development. There was the belief on the part of 79% that participation
in important decision-making is limited to a small group of people. The feeling that the benefits from development are not
distributed equitably may lead to the non-participation of others; 55% of those surveyed said that the different sectors of
society do not equally benefit from economic development projects.
DSP, Public Opinion Poll, June 1999.
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The preparation process of the Report
demonstrated the increasing
cooperation between academic
institutions, PNA institutions, NGOs
and the private sector. It also showed a
concern that the viewpoints of all
parties in the development process
should be represented, supported by
evidence, analyses and data. Most
importantly, the Report has been an
academic research endeavor,
characterized by objectivity and a
balanced analysis of actual conditions
and prospects, supported by scientific
evidence.
The Report relied mainly on official
statistics provided by the PCBS. In
some instances, it also made use of the
statistics published by PNA ministries
and agencies, as indicated in the
relevant footnotes, the Statistical
Appendices, the List of References and
in the Appendix "Notes on
Methodology." A series of studies,
prepared by specialists in various fields
and reviewed by sector specialists,
provided the background papers for the
preparation of the Report. When
necessary, and where official figures
were lacking, the Report also gathered
data by using the survey method to
canvass about important issues, or used
data produced by local non-
governmental organizations, or by
international institutions.
A large number of specialized
committees and experts supervised the
preparation of the Report. The
Technical Advisory Group and the
Ministerial Committee, representing
eighteen Palestinian ministries,
reviewed the Report at different stages
of its preparation. Special research
groups were established to conduct
studies and individuals with long-
standing experience in development
provided advice and guidance during
the preparation and reviewed the final
draft. Thus, hundreds of Palestinians
took part in the discussion of the many
issues addressed by the Report, issues
which were expanded on through the
studies published separately by the
Development Studies Programme.
º Sustainable
  human development:
  Conceptual issues
Human development involves
expanding choices for people and
building their capacities so that they
may better use these choices. From
this perspective, the concept of
development is taken beyond the
economic approach, which looks at
development in terms of economic
growth as measured by Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) or other
similar indicators. The concept of
sustainable human development
reinstates the necessary interrelation-
ship between economic, social,
political, cultural and environmental
General framework20
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a specific social formation, with its
own particular political, economic,
cultural and historical structure.
Indigenizing the concept:
Even though the concept rejects those
ideas that regard non-European
cultures and social values as obstacles
in the path of economic development,
it does not sufficiently address the
international and regional reality of
these societies and their political
systems. This becomes clear in the
case of Palestine, and has been also
true with numerous other societies.
The vital importance of social capital:
The concept of sustainable human
development considers "social
capital" to be vital for conserving,
developing and sustaining other forms
of capital.
development and its relationship to
the rights of future generations, while
directing attention to issues of
equality, social justice, civil liberties
and human rights.
In spite of the progress achieved in
furthering the concept of sustainable
human development, we can make a
number of observations surrounding
the use of this concept in the literature
produced by the UNDP:
The possibility of overlooking power
relations:
Some of the terminology used in
defining the concept, such as
expanding the choices of people and
participation, could be applied in a
way that ignores the reality of power
relations in society: the distribution of
authority, wealth and influence. It
could also be interpreted as endorsing
inequality, with all that encompasses
in the form of discrimination and
marginalization on the basis of gender,
class, race and other grounds.
Moreover, the terminology that is
used does not suggest mechanisms on
how to avoid imperatives (be they
governmental, institutional or
international) that are implicit, in one
way or the other, in planned
development models.3
Ambiguity of policy-related content:
 The concept of human development
presents problems when used as a
guide to devise concrete policies for
Box 1-5: The importance of Palestinian specificity
Adopting the concept of sustainable human development
theoretically and practically requires taking the following
unique factors into consideration: continued Israeli
occupation, the nature of the transitional stage, the
importance of linking human development with the right
to self-determination, conditions of dispersion under which
the Palestinian people are living, the incomplete process
of PNA institution-building and of defining their
authorities, the depth of the Palestinian development
experience undergone by various social institutions, and
the statistical nature of the data. Even though external
factors are important, there should be a distinction made
between them and the internal factors that can be addressed
within the process of self-development.
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exercise its right to self-determination,
as stipulated by international
resolutions. For it to do so would
necessitate an end to the occupation,
and compensation for all the
violations endured as a result of
dispossession, displacement, de-
development, coercion and the
expropriation of its resources. In the
context of the WBGS, the concept
would involve economic restructuring
away from relations of dependency,
regaining control over natural
resources, border crossings, and other
functions, and possessing the freedom
to forge relationships at the Arab and
international levels on new bases.
Expanding choices:
A broader framework
A liberating concept of human
development does not end with the
right to self-determination and
political independence, but involves,
as a necessary condition, the
eradication of all forms of local
oppression and coercion. In other
words, human development means
generating democratic structures on
the political, social, and economic
levels, including the right to exercise
freedom of expression, opinion, and
association, the right to equality and
to social justice. This concept implies
a new mode of power relations in
society, within the institutions of
government and the state, between the
Human development and
the right of
self-determination
The Palestine Human Development
Profile, (1996-1997), addressed the
problems involved in the concept of
human development by focusing on the
specificities of the Palestinian case. It
used concepts linked to this particular
case, such as de-development,
vulnerability, extreme dependency,
fragmentation, transition, and others.
The borders of PNA jurisdiction are not
identical to the borders of Palestinian
society in the WBGS and the concept
of sovereignty usually enjoyed by
modern states does not apply to the
PNA. As was indicated earlier, the
Palestinian case is distinguished by the
plurality of the population groups that
should be included in any report, and
the political implications and
assumptions that could be read into the
inclusion of some of these groups, and
exclusion of others. The current
Palestinian situation, due to the features
described, places harsh and
burdensome constraints on the ability
to plan for development. This is due not
only to the limits of territorial
jurisdiction and the fragmentation of
the PNA, but also to the prevailing
uncertainty over the political, economic
and security future of Palestine because
of external factors.4
The concept of human development
implies that the Palestinian people
There is prevailing
uncertainty over the
political, economic
and security future
of Palestine because
of external factors
The borders of PNA
jurisdiction are not
identical to the
borders of
Palestinian society
in the WBGS and
the concept of
sovereignty usually
enjoyed by modern
states does not apply
to the PNA
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state and society, and also within the
institutions of civil society, and the
implications of these power relations
for economic relations.
The emancipatory concept of
development also means concern for
the quality of life available to
members of society. Quality of life is
reflected in areas such as life
expectancy, health care, a healthy
environment, education, information,
social support systems, mental health
and family health, and the absence of
poverty and need, all of which are
represented in the ability of members
of society to access fixed resources
and services and to make use of them.
º Measuring development
The problem of measuring human
development is linked to the
challenges faced by the concept itself.
On one hand, human development
measures do not distinguish between
growth resulting from unplanned or
from planned processes. Societies
vary in the outcomes and the extent
of influence and effectiveness of the
spontaneous (unplanned for)
processes, and of the planned
processes, according to the history of
each society and the nature of its
economic and political systems.  On
the other hand, the Human
Development Index (HDI) cannot, as
a result of the simplification in its
choice of the three areas, reflect the
qualitative aspects of social life (to
what extent a society enjoys civil,
democratic and human rights).
Development, as measured by
income, health and education
indicators, can take place under
oppressive regimes. Also the HDI
does not measure the wide disparities
present within the same society in
wealth, education and life
opportunities.
Even though gender-sensitive
measures were introduced, they were
not sufficient to solve the problem of
how to measure a concept that tends
to consider disparity within the same
society, or among different societies
to be steps on a single scale. The
difference between the possessor and
non-possessor of power or wealth is
not a difference of degree. Such
disparities cannot be canceled by
special reformist policies, though
some of their results can be mitigated
under strong, interventionist policies
by the governmental and non-
governmental institutions of society.
Human
development means
generating
democratic
structures on the
political, social, and
economic levels
Box 1-6: Components of the Human Development Index (HDI)
The Human Development Index (HDI), as defined by UNDP, is composed
of three basic components: life expectancy (measured by life expectancy
at birth), knowledge (measured by knowledge of reading and writing ratios
among adults, and average years of schooling), and level of living
(measured by purchasing power based on the average real per capita GDP).
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Such disparities often reflect the
distribution of power, privileges,
instruments of control and legal
systems established primarily during
the struggle among social groups over
resources and their distribution, and
over decision-making and
implementation. It is important to
consider development as a strategy
that takes place through processes
evolving within society, in order to
expand the ability of institutions and
individuals to control external
influences obstructing the self-guided
development process.
example, the percentage of
Palestinians in camps and in the
diaspora out of the total Palestinian
population; Israeli settlements in the
WBGS in terms of residents, areas and
apartheid by-pass roads; economic
dependency (Palestinian labor inside
Israel, trade with Israel, control of
border crossings and air- and seaports,
ratio of external funding in the
financing of development projects,etc.);
territorial fragmentation (separation of
Jerusalem, the WBGS from each
other); incapacitation of the labor
force as a result of resistance against
the occupation (prisoners, the
wounded and the handicapped).
Development indicators should be
expanded to be more capable of
highlighting disparities according to
geographic regions, gender, social
groups and location of residence,
whether village, rural area or city.
º Participation as a
   strategy for
   human
   development
Achieving human development
depends on broad-based public
participation in development processes.
Participation means the ability to
contribute to decision-making on
matters of relevance to daily lives and
surroundings, and to make a creative
contribution to the development of
Box 1-7: Indicators of sustainable human development and the
                importance of Palestinian specificity
In addition to other indicators, monitoring the state of development in
Palestine requires assessing the extent of dependence on (or disengagement
from) Israeli occupation, politically and economically. It also requires
measuring the progress toward building institutions and institutionalizing
participatory democracy, especially through the concept of citizenship.
These indicators should be monitored over time in future human
development reports. The present Palestine Human Development Report
assists society in learning about itself and, by shedding light on disparities
between social groups and regions, enables enlightened decision-making
for allocating resources according to the degree of deprivation and regional,
social, and gender needs.
The indicators should also take into
consideration the Arab dimension of
Palestinian development, its Arab
cultural, regional and historical ties.
Sustainable development requires
planning that incorporates the Arab
regional level. In addition, the Report
examines other special indicators, for
The indicators
should also take
into consideration
the Arab dimension
of Palestinian
development
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society. It can also mean the ability to
access markets and ownership of
resources and to benefit from the fruits
of development and public services.
The UNDP Report on Human
Development (1993) noted the
correlation between participation,
democratic transformation and the
emergence of NGOs in various parts
of the world. Of utmost importance is
the fact that people’s needs and
aspirations to participate in
development often are met by
inflexible institutional systems and
disabling environments.
institutions involved in development,
and began to be positively perceived
by governmental and non-
governmental organizations.
Participation is considered the basic
means to empower people and prepare
them for the long and arduous process
of development. Participation was
placed at the core of the process
because it allows targeted groups the
opportunity to be involved in their
own development activities,
guarantees that proposed projects
serve their cultural, social and
economic objectives, and guarantees
The fact is that
people’s needs and
aspirations to
participate in
development often
are met by inflexible
institutional systems
and disabling
environments.
Box 1-8: Deep-rooted development
Palestinians have been engaged in development for decades through their unions,
political parties, non-governmental organizations and institutions affiliated with the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). They accumulated experience in methods
of resistance against deterioration resulting from external factors, and moved from
reacting to being pro-active through the process of development for steadfastness,
resistance development, household economy, voluntary work, the Intifada, and other
local developmental concepts and methods. These concepts and experiences, which
are deeply rooted in the process of the social and political evolution of Palestinian
society, should be put to use in the current development process.
The concept of participation
The concept of participation emerged
after it was found that development
projects and plans failed when people
were excluded from participation in
them, while those projects that
involved people in the development
process met with greater success. The
concept of participatory development
was endorsed by international
their implementation by peaceful
means, removed from social and
political conflict. Participation,
according to this perspective, also
enables people to organize themselves
through the dialogue and interaction
that is created.
This understanding of participation
involves a number of dimensions,
including: a cognitive dimension that
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involves resorting to local experience,
an instrumental dimension that is
based on enabling the targeted groups
to possess the instruments necessary
for self-development, a political
dimension represented in endowing
development projects and plans with
local legitimacy, and a social
dimension based on orienting
development projects and plans
towards meeting the basic needs of
people and combating poverty.
Perhaps it was this approach to
participation that gave rise to interest
in decentralization, considering that it
will strengthen participation and
influence development-related
decisions at the local level.5
and excluded groups, and in being
long-term and deep-rooted.
Participatory development is an
empowering development that
involves the concerned people in all
stages of the development process and
in control of the distribution of its
benefits, based on people organizing
themselves by depending on their own
capacities. The concept of
empowerment has a pivotal position
as an objective of participation in
various forms and levels within the
strategies of human development.
With due appreciation of the
importance of the "empowerment"
discourse from the theoretical and
applied perspectives,  caution should
be employed against using it as a
propaganda slogan, or practicing it
bureaucratically or from above. It
could be rendered counter-
productive if the local cultural
environment and the expertise
acquired by people are disregarded.
Danger also exists if people are led
to believe that real authority is
restricted to the authority of the state
and the economy and that they can
only access such authority if they
participate in the planning,
implementation and execution of
development projects. This slogan
could be misused and transformed by
the authorities and involved
institutions into a purely superficial
process as a result of technocratic and
manipulative procedures.
Box 1-9: Participation in development and participatory
                development
There is some confusion between the concept of “participation in
development” and “participatory development.” The first concept does
not go beyond the idea of mobilizing people to cooperate in pre-set plans
of action that allow no room for control by the concerned people. In this
case the idea of participation is an “instrumental” one that regards people
as one of the “resources” required for economic development. In contrast,
the concept of “participatory development” implies the generation of an
empowering process for the concerned people by giving them responsibility
in designing, implementing and sustaining the projects and initiatives, by
creating autonomy and self-reliance.
Empowerment and
participation
Participatory development is
distinguished by the fact that it aims at
empowering vulnerable, marginalized
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The people as a source of
power
The empowerment discourse may
consciously or unconsciously assume
that ordinary people are weak when
they come up against a repressive
authority. But, as numerous and
diverse examples in the modern
history of the Palestinians
demonstrate, people are able to
confront and to be pro-active in
different ways. Palestinian history has
outstanding examples to demonstrate
this, dating back to the pre-1936
revolution period, the emergence of
the Palestinian resistance movement
in the 1960s, and up to the popular
Intifada in the late 1980s. The
experience of Palestinian community-
based activities are another
outstanding example of the abilities
and capacities of people to affect the
development process or, at least, to
mitigate the harm resulting from
regression in various areas of life.
º The development
   environment in
   Palestine
Since the Palestine Human
Development Profile, 1996-1997, was
issued, no major changes have taken
place in the development environment
in the country other than the fact that
the "transitional" nature of the
Palestinian-Israeli agreements and the
subsequent provisions are assuming
features of permanence. On the
political level, negotiations are still
faltering, and many of the points
concerning the transitional stage have
not been implemented, other than the
withdrawal of the Israeli army from a
number of Palestinian towns and the
decrease in days of closure imposed
on the WBGS. Uncertainty continues
to characterize the political situation
due to conditions prevailing in
negotiations between the PNA and
Israel. Moreover, Israel continues to
expropriate Palestinian land and to
build settlements on them, and
continues with its plans to Judaize
Jerusalem.
There still exists a serious
contradiction between the Israeli and
the Palestinian visions of the final
status agreement. This has given rise
to political anxiety among Palestinians
in view of the major distortion in the
balance of forces. As for the internal
political scene, political parties are
still afflicted by major crises in their
platforms and in their organizational
affairs and leadership, in addition to
other considerations having to do with
the unsuitable circumstances
prevailing. This has rendered their
participation ineffective, both in the
development process and in the
political process.
The "transitional"
nature of the
Palestinian-Israeli
agreements and the
subsequent
provisions are
assuming features
of permanence
As for the internal
political scene,
political parties are
still afflicted by
major crises in their
platforms and in
their organizational
affairs and
leadership
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Box 1-10: National issues are development issues
In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, national issues which constitute the major concern for the Palestinian people are
still pending. Any political settlement that does not lead the Palestinians to acceptable solutions on the questions of Jerusalem,
the refugees, the land, settlements, water and borders will endanger the possibilities of development in the region and
present a threat to the individual and collective security of its population. A number of UN resolutions could provide the
basis for a solution, for example:
Refugees:
Resolution 194, issued in December 1948, stipulates the right of the refugees to return to their homes to live in peace with
their neighbors, and of compensation for those who choose not to return.
Land and settlements:
Resolution 242, issued in November 1967, stipulates the withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from the territories occupied,
and recognizes the territorial integrity and sovereignty, and the political independence, of all states in the region and their
right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders. The Security Council has affirmed on numerous occasions the
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, which prohibits the establishment
of settlements in occupied territories. The General Assembly issued numerous resolutions that affirm the illegitimacy of
Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, and in particular in Arab Jerusalem.6
Jerusalem:
Resolution 252 on Jerusalem, issued in 1968, stipulates that all the legislative and administrative measures and procedures
taken by Israel, and changes in the legal status of Jerusalem, are illegitimate and cannot change the status of the city. This
position was reaffirmed on several subsequent occasions.
International representation:
 The level of representation of Palestine at the UN was raised to full membership in some of the political, regional and
developmental groupings (July 7, 1998).
On the economic level, the movement
of persons and goods within the PNA
areas, and to and from these areas, is
still governed by Israeli conditions and
restrictions. The use of water, land and
infrastructure is still governed by
agreements made for the transitional
stage, which block the use of the
greater part of these resources in
development plans. The shortage in
raw materials in local markets, and the
difficulties impeding import and export
operations also contribute to this
trend. The Palestinian economy has
not undergone any transformations to
decrease its dependency on the Israeli
economy, or reduce its structural
distortions and geographic
fragmentation. It is an economy
primarily made up of small family-run
local establishments, which gives
special importance to the informal
sector and informal labor. The
implications of this can be seen in the
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high percentage of workers with very
low wages, lack of minimal job
security or health benefits, and the
poor ability of the Palestinian
economy to be competitive. The
regulatory environment is still
incomplete as far as promoting
investments is concerned or
guaranteeing a financial system able
to provide large loans with suitable
interest rates.
The years 1997 and 1998 witnessed a
decline in the standard of living as a
result of limited labor markets,
restrictions imposed on the entry of
Palestinians to the Israeli labor
market, the limited ability of the PNA
to impact the direction of the
Palestinian economy (including
restrictions imposed by the Paris
Economic Protocols between Israel
and the PLO), and the Israeli economy
exporting inflation to the Palestinian
economy.
As for financing Palestinian
development, external funding is still
needed and indications are that the
need will continue. No serious efforts
have been made to devise ways for
more sustainable alternatives that
would be able to achieve a higher level
of development.
The regulatory and
institutional environment
Since the inception of the PNA, a
number of official and non-official
parties have made efforts to improve
the regulatory environment in
Palestine. Even though the Palestinian
Legislative Council (PLC) is taking a
greater role than before in the area of
issuing legislation, the completion of
the process and its effective
implementation require that the
executive branch demonstrate greater
acceptance of the role of the
legislative branch, and indicate
Box 1-11: International concern over the deterioration of living conditions
At the meeting of Non-governmental Organizations organized by the International
Committee for the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, Cairo, on April 2,
1998, UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan expressed his concern over the deterioration
of the economic situation of the Palestinians in the WBGS. He stated that economic
and social conditions in the Palestinian territories continue to be very grave, and that
the decline in living conditions and concern over the future are burdening the peace
process. These facts are confirmed by the reports of the United Nations Special
Coordinator (UNSCO), which give evidence of the decline in living standards and in
per capita GDP. The reports emphasize the role of Israeli policies (closures and similar
measures) in the decline of living standards.
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administrative preparedness for
implementation.
As for the separation of powers and
balance and complementarity in their
work, no basic changes have taken
place in this area; the executive branch
continues to control, to a large extent,
the work of the legislative and
judiciary branches. Some positive
steps have been taken, such as
approval of the Law of the Judiciary
in its third reading, and its referral for
ratification by the executive branch,
and the appointment of an Attorney-
General and a Chief Justice. However,
the judiciary branch continues to
suffer from numerous problems that
hinder its work and jeopardize the rule
of law. This is important, particularly
in light of the increasingly negative
manifestations of the prevalent tribal
system that works against equitable
implementation of the law. In
addition, the interference of the
executive branch in the work of the
judiciary, and the takeover by certain
security organs of the role of the
judiciary in some cases, have led to
undermining the principle of the rule
of law. Such an atmosphere increases
feelings of instability and of lack of
security among citizens in general,
and among the private sector and
investors in particular. It should also
be noted that an increasing number of
arrested individuals are detained
without trial.
The Basic Law, although officially
still a draft law, can be used as a
reference in order to identify certain
features of legislation in Palestine. The
draft Basic Law stipulates that
legislation is the responsibility of the
legislative branch, but the executive
branch also enjoys certain legislative
authorities, such as drawing up
secondary legislation and the right to
initiate proposals of legislation. To
date, the Basic Law has not been
ratified by the President of the PNA
following its approval by the PLC in
its third reading. In addition, a number
of other laws were passed in the PLC,
but were not ratified by the executive
authority.
Population
The first Palestinian Population,
Housing and Establishments Census
(1997) indicates that Palestinian
society is a young society with high
fertility rates high dependency ratios
and a high  average number of family
members, in comparison with regional
and international profiles. These
figures greatly influence development
planning, particularly in light of
limited resources and the potential for
added population growth from the
return of Palestinians to their
homeland.
The percentage of participation of the
Palestinian labor force is 41.4%, of
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Total population of the WBGS nearest hundred
Jerusalem
Rest of the West Bank
Gaza Strip
Percentage of refugees from the population in the WBGS
Percentage of camp residents
Estimates of Palestinian population outside the WBGS*
Total Palestinian population*
Population under the age of 15
Total fertility rate
Fertility rate (West Bank)
Fertility rate (Gaza Strip)
Average family size
in the West Bank
in the Gaza Strip
Dependency ratio
Table 1-1: Palestinian population indicators, 1997
Source: PCBS, Census, 1997.
Estimates of the Research Team based on available data.
2,895,700
328,600
1,544,900
1,022,200
41.4%
16%
5,000,000
8,000,000
47%
6.1
5.6
6.9
6.4
6.1
6.9
101.2
which 21.3% are holders of university
or secondary degrees, and 20.1% have
completed basic schooling stage. As
for land and water resources,
Palestinians have access to one-fifth
of the land of the WBGS while four-
fifths fall under the control of Israeli
settlers or the Israeli government.7
Average annual consumption of water
for a Palestinian is 35-50 cubic meters
of water, compared to 150-200 cubic
meters for an Israeli settler.8
æ
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1.  The term "public" is used to denote members of society, both individuals and groups.
2.  Human Development Report 1993, p.21.
3.  See Owen and Shanton, "Marx and Deliberate Development," in Faleh Abdul-Jabbar (editor), Post-Marxism, Dar
     al-Mada li al-Thaqafa wa al-Nashr, 1998.
4.  For an in-depth discussion on the concept of sustainable human development in general, and in relation to the
     Palestinian condition in particular, see "Human Development in Palestine: Preliminary Contributions to the
     Discussion  on the Concept and the Indicators," Birzeit University, Development Studies Programme,1998.
5.  See "Decentralization: A Survey of Literature from a Development Studies Perspective," Development Studies
     Report Office, Occasional Papers (1992) 13.
6.  An independent Palestinian state was also recognized for the first time, in Resolution 181 (1947).
7.  Estimates of the Research Team, based on available data.
8.  Palestinian Water Authority, 1998.
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Chapter 2: Human development profile
Part One: Indicators for the Human Development Index (HDI)
The Human Development Index (HDI)
Gender-related Development Index (GDI)
Economic indicators
Education indicators
Health indicators
Part Two: Human conditions: Features and issues
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Indicator
Per capita GDP ($) 1997
Adult literacy rate (%) 1997
Aggregate enrollment rate for basic, secondary
and university education 1997/1998
Educational attainment index
Life expectancy at birth (years) 1997
Human Development Index (HDI)
Gender-related Development Index (GDI)
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)
Nominal value
1,500*
85.5
72.4
—
71.5
—
—
—
Table 2-1: Human development indicators and HDI1
* Adjusted value = $ 2,286.
Rank number of countries
115 (175)
—
—
94 (175)
74 (175)
100 (175)
96 (144)
85 (103)
Index
0.52
0.855
0.724
0.81
0.77
0.70
0.638
0.290
Introduction
Chapter Two of this Report examines human
development indicators in order to assess the
state of human development in Palestine. This
chapter follows a comprehensive
methodology indicating the strong
relationship between economic, social and
political processes that underlines the state
of development. Economic indicators are
considered along with indicators on
education, health, environment, human rights,
the rights of various social groups, such as
workers, women, youth, the elderly, the
disabled and other issues. In other chapters,
indicators related to the degree of institution-
building, the rule of law, democracy,
participation, the investment environment,
and the role of civil society institutions are
presented in order to emphasize the dynamic
nature of the development process. A profile
of how individuals evaluate their living
conditions is also presented, indicating their
understanding of the development process
and its impact on their political and
development-related practices and choices.
The profile also shows how the public regards
living conditions in comparison to past years.
Part One:
Indicators for the Human
Development Index
º The Human Development
    Index (HDI)
Despite the many reservations mentioned
regarding the use of HDI indicators, they are
still useful from a relative, if not an absolute
perspective, particularly for purposes of self-
comparison over time. Years from now, the
same index can show the degree to which
Palestinian society was able to break away
from the restrictions imposed on its develop-
ment efforts and to translate available
resources into plans to raise the economic
level, educational attainment, and health
status of individuals. According to its HDI
(0.70), Palestine is placed in the Medium
Development level, ranking 100 out of 175
countries. The average HDI value for the
group of countries considered as medium
development is (0.662). The relatively low
real per capita GDP lowers the HDI
for Palestine.
The index value points to a set of
related processes and results:
The possibility of transforming
limited economic resources into
human development, especially in
the fields of health and education.
The important role of civil society
and of public participation in
bringing about development and in
continuing constructive resistance
against the negative consequences
of Israeli occupation.
The importance of remittances
received by Palestinians from
various national or foreign sources.
The importance of focusing on
social policies in the areas of
health, education, and poverty-
alleviation programmes, and on
integrating various social groups in
the development process.
As to the low ranking of Palestinian
society compared to other countries,
there are a set of reasons which could
explain this:
The continuance of Israeli policies
which, for both political and
economic reasons, aim at keeping
the Palestinian economy under
Israeli control.
Lack of ability for self-sustainment
on the part of the Palestinian
economy due to the absence of a
national economic infrastructure.
Expenditure on state institutions
that consume a large part of the
budget without leading to clear
development results, for reasons
that will be examined later.
Preoccupation with infrastructure
projects, which show economic
returns only in the longer run and
only if there is an encouraging
investment environment.
The slight increase in the GNP (and
the GDP), resulting mainly from an
increase in prices, accompanied by
a greater population growth, led to
a decrease in real per capita income.
The important achievements made
in the areas of education and health
may be at risk, unless suitable
mechanisms for their sustainability
are established.
º Gender-related
   Index (GDI)
The gender-related human develop-
ment index (GDI) adjusts the average
achievement for each country, based on
the HDI indicators for income, life
expectancy, and education, according
to gender disparity. According to the
estimated data, the GDI ranks Palestine
(0.638) ranks 96 among 144 countries.
In comparison to other Arab
countries, in absolute terms, Palestine
ranks after Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar,
United Arab Emirates, Libya,
æ
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in the areas of
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are established
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Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia,
Algeria, Oman and Syria. Only
Egypt, Morocco, Yemen, and Sudan
rank lower than Palestine.
When comparing the general standing
of the HDI with the GDI, despite a
persistent and obvious gender gap,
Palestine has a smaller gap than other
Arab countries. For some Arab
countries, particularly the oil-
producing countries, the HDI is higher
than the GDI (with both values higher
in comparison to Palestine), which
indicates that the gender gap is wide.
For example, Oman ranks 78 according
to the HDI, but ranks 85 according to
GDI. Saudi Arabia ranks 69 according
to the HDI, and 78 according to GDI.
The Gender Empowerment Measure,
which measures the empowerment of
men and women in the economic and
political fields,2 is 0.290 for Palestine.
Palestine ranks 85 out of 103
countries, lower than Kuwait, Tunisia,
and Syria, but higher than the United
Arab Emirates, Algeria, Jordan, Sudan
and Mauritania, and near to Egypt and
Morocco. The remaining Arab
countries do not provide data in this
area, either because of the absence of
a regime allowing women to
participate in public life or because
official data is lacking. The PCBS is
the first in the Arab world to establish
a Gender Unit to disaggregate and
analyze national statistical data by
gender.
The availability or scarcity of economic
resources is clearly not the decisive
factor in guaranteeing gender equality.
Both wealthy and less wealthy
countries have achieved a high degree
of gender equality, while in other
wealthy countries a wide gendergap
continues to exist. Balanced and well-
targeted development policies, even
within existing economic limitations,
could achieve greater gender equality
in society. Real equality between men
and women is still a very distant goal
and, without a collective will and
enlightened measures to achieve
equality, there is always the danger of
a decline in the rights of women that
have already been achieved.
º Economic indicators
The Palestinian economy continues to
be in a state of vulnerability and the
ability of Palestinians to control their
economic resources is still very
limited. This vulnerability is the result
of Israeli policies that aim to keep the
Palestinian economy dependent on
the Israeli economy. Dependency can
be seen in a number of indicators,
including in the articles of the Paris
Protocol that keep restrictions on the
Palestinian economy, the trade
balance, dependence on the Israeli
market for employment of Palestinian
labor and the volatility of this market
according to the political interests of
Balanced and well-
targeted
development
policies could
achieve greater
gender equality
Real equality
between men and
women is still a very
distant goal
37
Israel, and in inflation rates.
Economic vulnerability is also
manifested in the continuing
dependence on foreign assistance for
financial operations and for
infrastructure, and for covering the
current budget deficit of the PNA. The
weak economic policies of the PNA
could lead, at least indirectly, to this
vulnerability becoming a permanent
feature of the economic structure of
Palestinian society.
National income
The GDP value for the WBGS was
$3.575 billion in 1995, $3.897 million
in 1996 and $4.200 billion in 1997,
whereas GNP  was $4.235 billion in
1995, $4.509 billion in 1996 and
$4.900 billion in 1997. The per capita
GNP was $1.772 in 1995, $1,779 in
1996 and $1.763 in 1997. The ratio
between the GDP and the GNP
increased from 84.4% in 1995 to
91.7%, reflecting the steady decrease
in remittances from labor in the Israeli
market and from other external
sources.
Trade balance
The balance of payments deficit
continued to rise through 1997, reaching
a 50% increase over 1995 levels. Imports
rose by 26%, while exports experienced
a drop of 18%. Imports were four and a
half times the value of exports in 1997.
Inflation
The sharp depreciation in the value of
the Israeli shekel over the last three years
(over 30%), and the increasing hike in
prices led to a decline in living standards,
particularly for those with salaries linked
to the Israeli currency without
adjustments. Most are low-ranking
employees in the public sector, and
workers employed in the private sector.
Even though inflation rates fell at the
beginning of 1997, they began to rise
again during the early months of 1998.
Labor and unemployment
The labor force participation rate was
41.4% in 1998 but the rate for women’s
participation remained low (11.3%) when
compared to men (70.3%) and to many
Vulnerability could
become a
permanent feature
of the economic
structure of
Palestinian society
Region
Jerusalem
Rest of West Bank
Gaza
WBGS
1995
1,925
1,625
1,205
1,496
1996
1,900
1,691
1,232
1,537
1997
1,833
1,588
1,262
1,500
Table 2-2: Per capita GDP, by geographic region and year3
Source: PCBS.
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countries in the world. Participation rates
in the Gaza Strip were lower, at 36.4%
(65.9% for males and 5.9% for women),
than in the West Bank, at 44.2% (14.3%
for women and 72.8% for men).
The labor absorptive capacity of the
local market increased during recent
years; the proportion of the labor force
in the private sector was about 66%, the
public sector, about 20%, and the Israeli
market, 17%. Despite the rise in the
absorptive capacity, unemployment rates
declined but continued to be high: an
average of 23.8% in 1996, 20.3% in
1997 and 14.4% in 1998.
Unemployment rates were consistently
higher in the Gaza Strip than in the
West Bank, reaching 19.6% in 1996,
17.3% in 1997 and 11.5% in 1998 in
the West Bank, and 32.5%, 26.8% and
20.9% in the Gaza Strip for the same
years. The results indicate higher
unemployment rates among women
(15.2%) compared to men (14.4%).
Youth are the most affected by this
problem: about 28% of the 15-24 year
age group were unemployed in 1997,
although unemployment rates
Youth are the most
affected by
unemployment
Table 2-3: Share of economic sectors in labor force employment (1995-1997) (%)
decreased among youth in 1998 to
22.6%. While employment rates went
up, real wage rates decreased. The
average real wage for a worker in the
Gaza Strip was NIS 38.5 (a little over
$ 9) in 1997 (compared to NIS 41 in
1996). In the West Bank real wages
also decreased from NIS 49 in 1996 to
NIS 46.3 in 1997.
Economic sectors
In the industrial sector,  labor force
employment decreased between 1995
and 1997, while employment rates in the
services sector increased (decreasing
again in 1998). The agricultural sector
accounted for the lowest share of
employment, and the employment rate
in the construction sector fluctuated,
decreasing 0.8% between 1995 and
1997, and rising 4.3% in 1998. The
banking sector continued its growth both
in the number of banks and the size of
holdings: banks increased to 22 (10 Arab
banks, 9 local and 3 foreign) and
holdings rose to $2.907.5 billion,
representing growth of $707.2 million
in 1998.
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
Agriculture
12.7
14.2
13.1
13.8
Construction
19.2
16.8
18.4
22.7
Industry
18.0
17.4
16.4
16.8
Services
49.8
52.2
52.1
46.7
Source: PCBS.
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Tourism sector
The tourism sector faces numerous
constraints, including restrictions
imposed by internal and external
borders, the severe shortage in
tourism services and guides,
especially guides who are
knowledgeable about their cultural
heritage, and the continuing Israeli
falsification of the cultural heritage of
the Palestinian people. In general, the
data indicates that there were 92
hotels in the WBGS by the end of
1998, with 3,682 rooms, most of them
in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Ramallah
and Gaza city. Despite indications of
low room occupancy rates in 1998,
compared to 1996, major efforts are
being put into the Bethlehem 2000
project at present, that aims to
promote tourism to the Holy Sites
during the millennium celebrations.
This historic opportunity could
promote the establishment of
mechanisms for organizing and
sustaining tourism.
International assistance
Foreign funding continues to provide
for the greater part of the development
process led by PNA institutions,
covering more than 90% of
expenditure on investment and
infrastructure projects. Donor
countries disbursed about 80% of the
funds they had pledged to provide the
PNA in the year 1997. From 1994 and
up to 1998, donor countries made
pledges totalling $5.160 billion, of
which about 67.2% ($469 million) has
been disbursed. The greater
percentage of these funds were
disbursed as  "public investments"
($914 million), followed by
"transitional and budgetary
assistance" ($524.7 million), and
"technical assistance" ($459.7
million). According to the data
published for 1994-1998, the largest
amount of funding was directed to
"education" ($293.5 million),
followed by "water and sanitation"
($246.3 million), "health" ($206.9
Box 2-1: The securities exchange
The establishment of the securities exchange is considered an important step in providing opportunities for investment
finance. Efforts to establish a Palestinian securities exchange began in early 1997. The exchange is intended to attract private
sector investors, regulate stock trading and enable buyers to evaluate the standing of companies. Although 20 companies
have listed their activities in the exchange, especially during the second half of 1998, no new companies have joined due to
increasing uncertainty resulting from the stall in the peace process and in the investment environment. The size of trading in
the market continues to be weak and fluctuating, and shows the need to activate and regulate market operations at the legal
level. The total market value of the listed companies was $587.8 million at the end of 1998, compared to $660.1 million at
the end of June of the same year. The size of trading also witnessed a sharp decline during the second half of the same year.
Source: Financial Market 1999; MAS Economic Monitor, no. 5, 1999.
Foreign funding
continues to provide
for the greater part
of the development
process led by PNA
institutions
40 Human development profile
Palestine  Human Development Report 1998-1999
million),  "institution building"
($157.5 million), "humanitarian
assistance" ($121 million), "police"
($94.1 million), and "housing" ($89.5
million).  "Agriculture," received
$41.4 million and "human and social
development," $54.7 million. Funding
for "industrial development" was low
during the period, reaching only $18.8
million. Under the category "women,"
$13.5 million was disbursed.4
Poverty
Using a medium poverty line ($350),
the poverty rate for the WBGS was
23%. If the city of Jerusalem is
excluded, in view of its particular
economic situation, the rate rises to
25% or one-quarter of the population.
The abject poverty line is 15% for the
WBGS5. As for disparities between
regions and different groups, the
following main points should be
underlined:
There were marked differences in
the distribution of poverty between
the WBGS; the poverty rate in the
West Bank was about 16%, while
in the Gaza Strip poverty extended
to 38% of the population.
Although as a whole the Gaza Strip
is poorer than the West Bank, the
absolute number of poor is almost
equal for both regions. Of those
poor, two out of every three poor
families in the Gaza Strip live in
abject poverty, and in the West
Bank one out of every two poor
families live in abject poverty.
Poverty is most extensive in the
southern and central areas of the
Gaza Strip, where more than half
the population lives under the
poverty line. In the city of Gaza and
the northern part of the Strip, about
31% are poor. In the West Bank,
poverty is greatest in the Jenin
Governorate where the rate is 28%,
followed by the Hebron Govern-
orate where 24% are poor.
The poverty rate in villages was
much higher than expected, and in
the Gaza Strip was equivalent to
the poverty rate in the camps (41%
in villages and 42% in camps). In
the West Bank, the poverty rate is
higher in villages than in any other
residential community, reaching
18%, compared with 14% in the
camps and 12% in cities.
The poverty rate is higher among
female-headed households (30%),
compared to male-headed
households (22%).
The percentage of poor families in
Jerusalem (living under the Israeli
poverty line) was about 29% in 1996.
There is a correlation between the
age of the household head and
poverty rates: households headed by
a person over 65 years of age show
higher poverty rates (over 31%).
The poverty rate in
villages was much
higher than
expected
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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While poverty does not exempt the
educated (the ratio of the poor
among university degree holders
reaches 8%, and among diploma
holders, 12%), the poverty rate
decreases with the increase in the
educational attainment of the
household head. Among house-
holds headed by a person with no
educational attainment, the rate of
poverty is 32%.
Poverty is not restricted to those
excluded from the labor market.
The proportion of the poor among
those active in the labor force was
20%, and 75% of the total poor
population are working poor. As is
well known, social assistance
programs do not deal with this
sector although it accounts for the
majority of the poor. The data
indicates that the main reason for
poverty is not social
marginalization resulting from
social transformations alone, but
simply the result of non-
availability of jobs or of jobs that
generate sufficient incomes to
sustain a reasonable living
standards.
While the poor make up 23% of the
population, they consume only 9%
of commodities and services. Poor
individuals spend on healthcare
one-quarter of what non-poor
individuals spend.
8.
Box 2-2: Poverty from the perspective of the poor
The views of poor people were gathered on a number of issues relating to their lives and surrounding conditions. The survey
was based on an in-depth study of hardship cases receiving assistance from the Ministry of Social Affairs, UNRWA and the
Zakat (Islamic alms tax) committees, representing the poorest of the poor, and among those excluded from the labor market):
Those interviewed stressed:
The importance of cash subsidies as the most important form of assistance, particularly in the case of the elderly, the
disabled, those who lack income or who have limited income, and households that have lost their provider.
The low value of the assistance, and its insufficiency in covering their most vital needs.
The deterioration of housing and health conditions of poor families and their need for basic requirements, such as food,
clothing and care for the elderly.
The idea that children are a future source of income, and the hope that family conditions will change through their children.
The poor considered that the basic problem is the overall political and economic situation. They also mentioned a number
of problems, such as: lack of appropriate care for the needy, and particularly for the elderly, the disabled, those suffering
from mental or chronic illnesses; the rise in prices and the reduction in social welfare; the mismanagement of the economy
In their overall attitude to life and the future, those interviewed used phrases expressing a high degree of fatalism (for
example, "Poverty is predestined"), but others used phrases expressing the desire and the feeling of an ability to change
("Everything is possible").
Source: "Poverty in Palestine: Case Studies," Development Studies Programme, 1999.
9.
10.
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º Education indicators
Even though Palestinians in the WBGS
have made important achievements in
the levels of educational attainment,
these achievements should not be over-
estimated, since they can regress under
unbalanced population and financial
factors. When we compare the
Palestinian situation in the WBGS with
the other countries in the world,
Palestine is in the lower half: more than
90 countries have higher levels in this
area, three countries are even with
Palestine, and 82 countries have lower
levels. Despite significant  effort made
by the concerned bodies in the field of
education to meet the requirements of
modern education quantitatively and
qualitatively, there is major concern in
a number of areas. All require linking
education to a plan for sustainable
development that safeguards the rights
of future generations to education and
participation. The Ministry of
Education is currently in the process
of preparing a five-year plan for
education in Palestine, and similar
efforts are underway in the Ministry
of Higher Education.
The education sector, in its different
stages, involves 35% of the population,
as students, teachers and
administrators. In the pre-university
stage, the number of male and female
students enrolled was 889,895,
distributed over kindergartens
(77,173), basic education (746,914),
and secondary education (65,808) in
1998-1999. In the same year, 96,576
students enrolled in the first year of
basic schooling, of which 49.1% were
females, and 50.9% males. Of these
first year students, 60.4% enrolled in
schools in the West Bank and 39.6%
in the Gaza Strip.
Enrollment rates and total
educational attainment rates
The enrollment rate at the basic
education level for the year 1997-1998
was 93.6%, the rate for the secondary
level was 51.6% for the same year.
Enrollment for female students at the
basic education level was 94.06%,
compared to 93.1% for male students.
Enrollment rates at the secondary
education level were 51.4% for
Box 2-3: Education in Jerusalem
Almost one-half of the students in Jerusalem receive education in schools under Israeli supervision. The situation will become
more serious if Israeli Law 564 (for the year 1969) is applied. This stipulates the right of the Israeli Education Ministry and the local
authorities (the Jerusalem Municipality) to supervise education in the city, and all official and non-official institutions in it (including
the NGOs and private institutions). There are 28,188 male and female students enrolled in the 63 schools, including kindergartens,
in Jerusalem that are under the supervision of the Palestinian education system (1998-1999). The Israeli Education Ministry and the
Jerusalem Municipality supervise 51 schools and kindergartens  in which 27,222 students are enrolled (1998-1999).
Source: Palestinian Ministry of Education, 1999.
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females and 51.7% for males. The
enrollment rate for university
education was 21.5% (19.5% for
females, and 23.4% for males). In
general, the total enrollment rate for
basic, secondary and university
education reached 72.4% (72.2% for
females, and 72.5% for males).
The results of the Population, Housing
and Establishments Census (1997)
indicate that 11.8% of the population
over 10 years of age is illiterate. When
we add the "barely literate" to the
illiterate, the ratio of those whose
educational level is insufficient to
adapt to the require-ments of practical
life goes up to 28.5%. Statistics reveal
gaps between men and women, for the
percentage of women in the less
educated groups continues to be high
and constitutes a source of concern.
When the illiteracy rate is calculated
for the population over 15 years of
age, the rate increases to 13.9% (7.7%
for males, and 20.1% for females). It
is generally considered that the
illiteracy rate is higher than that
provided by the present data,
particularly when functional literacy
and pseudo-literacy are examined.
The ratio of the population with
attainment in the tertiary educational
level (post-Tawjihi, the secondary
certificate exam) does not exceed 8.7%
of the population over 10 years of age.
The number of persons holding a PhD
certificate reaches 1,906 out of the total
population of the WBGS (i.e., 6.1 for
every 10,000 of the population).
Women make up 7.2% of the PhD
certificate holders, bringing the gender
gap up to 77.6% in this area.
It is generally
considered that the
illiteracy rate is
higher than that
provided by the
present data,
particularly when
functional literacy
and pseudo-literacy
are examined
Box 2-4: The educational system
                and curriculum
Despite continuous efforts to produce a
Palestinian curriculum, so far no plans
prepared in this area have been
implemented. Among the most
important factors to be evaluated in
producing the curriculum are: how far
they succeed in becoming an integral
part of the development process, so that
the material presented is of relevance to
modern life, reflects technological
developments and enables the
Palestinian individual to cope positively
with current challenges. The curriculum
should encourage a spirit of creativity
and innovation among Palestinian
students, and address contemporary
issues in a manner that promotes
equality between men and women. It
should devote adequate attention to
democracy, human rights and the
environment, mainstream those with
special needs, and establish the spirit of
citizenship while repudiating all forms
of fanaticism, prejudice and racial
discrimination.
Supervision over education
The participation of the private sector
in academic education has increased
to serving 14.6% of the total number
of students (1998-1999), compared to
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11.95% in earlier years. UNRWA
continues to supervise the schooling
of 23.9% of the total number of
students, while the government sector
supervises 61.5% of the total. The
non-governmental and private sector
are contributing to the establishment
of schools as a response to the increase
in the numbers of students, thus
providing wider options for families
in their choice of schooling for their
children. Yet this growing role also
shows the inability of public schools
to absorb the increase in demand for
schools, and could lead to widening
the opportunity-gap between students
in private schools and those in public
schools.
 As for that part of the sector
supervised by UNRWA, the impor-
tance of its continuity and vitality
must be underlined, for any reduction
in the role of UNRWA will lead to
grave consequences in the near future.
Greater attention should be devoted
as well to the quality of education
available to students and to the
teaching environment in these
schools, particularly in the UNRWA
schools in the West Bank where
violence is noticeably widespread.
Drop-out rate
The drop-out rate for female students
in the first secondary year Humanities
stream is 9% and in the second
secondary year is 7.6% (1997-1998).
For male students in the same classes
the rates are 5.7% and 2.9%. These
statistics raise questions as to
inequalities in access to the educational
system, and to system-friendliness in
terms of its availability, quality,
curriculum and teaching methods.
Dropout rates increase as a result of
economic pressures on poor families.
The lack of availability of secondary
level schools (and even basic level
schools) in remote villages, particularly
in the West Bank, also leads to higher
drop-out rates, especially among
Greater attention
should be devoted to
the quality of
education available
to students and to
the teaching
environment in
schools
Dropout rates
increase as a result
of economic
pressures on poor
families... and the
lack of availability
of secondary level
schools (and even
basic level schools)
in remote villages
Box 2-5: Overcrowding in schools
The number of students per classroom in UNRWA schools in the Gaza Strip is about 50,
compared to 33 students per classroom in public schools, and 25.2 in private schools.
The average classroom size is 37.2 students per classroom in the basic level, and the
average ratio of students to every teacher is 29.5. The highest ratio is in UNRWA schools,
particularly in girls’ schools where there are 40.8 students per teacher, while boys’
schools average 38 students per teacher. In public schools, the average for girls’ schools
is 30.2 students per teacher, and for boys’ schools 27 students per teacher. According to
the data, overcrowding is increasing with time.
Source: Ministry of Education, 1999.
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female students. Dropout rates are
higher in public schools than in
UNRWA and private schools. It should
be noted that these rates account only
for the number of students who leave
school during the academic year and
not students who do not return to school
after the summer vacation, which could
double the rates.
Vocational Education and
Training
Vocational education has not been
given the attention it deserves. It is
restricted to the secondary stage, and
the percentage of students enrolled in
it does not exceed 3.26% of the total
number of secondary level students
(1998-1999). The percentage of
females in vocational education does
not exceed 18.7% of the total, and they
are limited to the commercial branch.
Fields of specialization are still
limited, providing mainly commer-
cial, agricultural and industrial
education. The curricula for these
specializations have not been up-dated
to be compatible with technological
developments.
In 1998, the number of male and
female students who enrolled in
vocational training courses was
28,790 (43.8% of them female);
54.3% of the trainees were over 19
years of age. Most of the training was
in the field of computers (46.8%). The
remaining areas of training were
limited to commerce, health,
handicrafts, rehabilitation and
electronics.
Employees of the education
sector
Teachers (and school principals) make
up 79% of all those employed in the
sector of academic education and
kindergartens. Administrative
employees comprise 10.8%, techni-
cians 1.2% and the remaining 0.9%
are assistants and caretakers. The
percentage of teachers without any
university certification is 6.8%, most
of them in kindergartens.
Vocational
education has not
been given the
attention it deserves
Teachers continue to suffer difficult
economic conditions, compared to the
effort and quality of the role
demanded of them. Though data is
lacking on the spread of poverty
among teachers, it is generally thought
to constitute a widespread phenom-
enon in their ranks, since the gross
Box 2-6: Educational counseling
In 1996, the Ministry of Education
appointed a number of educational
counselors to work in its schools.
Although this is important and necessary,
a major effort should be exerted to
develop the work of these counselors,
and to transform their approach from one
of ‘taming’ students to a counseling and
empowering role in the context of
humane concepts.
Though data is
lacking on the
spread of poverty
among teachers, it is
generally thought to
constitute a
widespread phenom-
enon in their ranks
46 Human development profile
Palestine  Human Development Report 1998-1999
salary of a university-graduate school
teacher is only NIS 1,521 a month
(about $355) while the poverty line
at the beginning of 1998 was put at
NIS 1,685 for a family of 6.
about one computer available for
every 188 students.
Technology and services in
schools and kindergartens
The number and quality of libraries,
science labs and computer labs does
not meet the educational requirements
of students. Only12% of schools have
computer labs, with ten or more
computers. The number of computers
available in all schools is 4,044 , of
which 2,507 are in public schools, 98
in UNRWA schools and 1,439 in
private schools. In general, there is
UNRWA
2,035
Private
33
Public
205
Total
188
Many schools lack any computers for
educational use, which confirms that
the inequitable distribution of resources
will lead to disparities in educational
opportunities among students.
Computers that are available are not
only used by students, but also for
administrative purposes. In terms of
basic needs, 16.6% of all schools and
kindergartens have no reliable supply
of water, and 9.8% have no electricity.
The crisis of higher education
Palestinian universities continue to
suffer from a lack of a stable funding
base. To date, no part of their budgets
are allocated to guarantee their
sustainability, or to develop their
community servicing capacities. Nor
has the PNA paid its financial
obligations to the universities. It is
expected that financial crises in
Palestinian universities will be
aggravated unless a communal-
governmental formula can be made to
provide for the financing of education.
Strikes, the deteriorating material
conditions, declining staff morale and
the lack of the necessary facilities and
Many schools lack
any computers for
educational use
Palestinian
universities
continue to suffer
from a lack of a
stable funding base
Box 2-7: Teachers: An important
                role in passing the Civil
                Service Law
Palestinian teachers played an effective
role in pressuring legislative and
executive institutions to pass the Civil
Service Law that will lead to improving
the conditions of teachers and other
public service employees. They
organized protest campaigns, and other
activities to highlight the importance of
exercising freedom of expression
without threats of detention or dismissal
from work. The effective role they
played compelled officials to address a
number of important issues, a process
that benefited society as a whole.
Table 2-4: Number of students to every computer by school sector
                  (1997-1998)
Source: PCBS, 1999.
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equipment will all contribute to the
deterioration of university education,
in quantity and in quality. Palestinian
universities suffer from a lack of
science labs, modern technology and
procurement of new books and
periodicals. Some of them are greatly
overcrowded.
The number of male and female
students enrolled in Palestinian
universities was 60,846 in 1998-1999,6
44.9% female students and 55.1% male
students. In 1997-1998, total
enrollment was 52,427 (43.6% female,
and 56.4% male). Students were
concentrated in the arts and sciences
(47.3%). The percentage of students
enrolled in business administration was
23.0%, and in scientific and technical
schools, 23.8%. Students enrolled for
graduate studies constituted 2.8% of
the total number. The number of male
and female students enrolled in
intermediate community colleges for
1998-1999 was 5,936, (53.4% female,
and 46.6% male). In 1997-1998, the
number of male and female students
enrolled was 4,299 (54.7% female, and
45.3% male). The teaching faculty in
community colleges numbered 2,791
(10.7% female).
º Health indicators7
It is still difficult to measure health
conditions of Palestinians, due to the
lack of adequate data. Although this
subject has been raised elsewhere and
often (including in the Palestine
Human Development Profile, 1996-
1997), with the exception of the data
provided by the General Census, no
important changes have been
introduced into data collection
methods or in the calculation of the
basic health-related indicators. The
indicators published by governmental
and non-governmental institutions
reveal contradictions in statistical
information, and a lack of agreement
on concepts and methods of
measurement, which in turn leads to
major gaps in the data. The statistics
published by the Ministry of Health
(MoH) are in need of standardization
of methodology within WBGS. For
internal reasons, it was difficult to
make a comprehensive and final
assessment on progress and
challenges in the health sector. For this
Report, the Research Team used the
life expectancy figure issued by
PCBS.
Box 2-8: Quality of university education
In a survey conducted to assess the extent of compatibility of higher education with the current job market, 60% of
managers consider the impact of new graduates employed in their institutions to be poor or very poor in improving the
quality of production or services. The employing institutions assessed the performance of new graduates, such as: efficiency
in the field of specialization (60%), computer skills (58%) and research and report-writing abilities (60%).
Source: Centre for Palestinian Research and Studies, 1998
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Challenges
The fertility rate is still at 6.1 births per woman, a rate
higher than most countries in the world.
Fertility among the 15-19 year age group accounts for 9%
of total fertility.
A rise in high infant mortality rates in the Gaza Strip, at
the rate of 2.5 for every 1,000 births.
The ability of government health insurance to meet the
needs of the insured is still questionable.
17.7% of deaths of children are due to accidents, and 13.8%
due to congenital disorders.
Management systems, job descriptions and regulations in
hospitals continue to be ambiguous or are not applied,
which has led to numerous complaints and, in some cases,
death as a result of negligence.
Quality of services and care for patients continues to be
highly questionable and in need of examination and
monitoring, particularly in government hospitals.
The ongoing financial crisis of the governmental health sector
has noticeably reflected itself on health services, in shortages
of medication and health services inside hospitals, etc.
Progress
Decrease in number of births by 6.25% compared to 1996.
Decrease in infant mortality rates in the West Bank by 3.1
for every 1,000 births.
Increase in the percentage of  persons with health
insurance, particularly those employed in the public sector.
Greater clarity in cooperation between governmental and
non-governmental (local and international) health
institutions, particularly in the area of primary healthcare.
The MoH, in cooperation with international donors, built
several hospitals. (The European Hospital (although not
get inaugurated due to many problems) and the New
Jericho Hospital) and increased hospital beds in some
hospitals.
Members of the community collected major donations to
build an annex to Ramallah Hospital, in order to meet
growing needs (the hospital addition has not started
operation to date); donations by members of the local
community for building an annex to the Jenin Government
Hospital (already commenced partial operation).
Table 2-5: Health indicators: Progress and challenges (1998)
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Source of data: Palestinian Ministry of Health, 1998.
Life expectancy at birth
There continue to be discrepancies in
the estimates of life expectancy at
birth. According to estimates based on
the final results of the General Census,
life expectancy at birth in the WBGS
is 69.93 years for men, and 73.15 for
women in 1998, while the MoH
estimates 69 years for men, and 71
years for women for 1996-1997.
Estimates reached by NGOs working
in the health sector and by international
health organiza-tions are lower.  If the
lower figures by the MoH are adopted,
HDI rank for Palestine would be 104
(instead of 100), and life expectancy
rank would be 83 (instead of 74).
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Primary healthcare and
hospitals
Primary healthcare is considered to be
an area most expressive of the
partnership for development between
the governmental and non-
governmental sectors. The MoH
operates about 60% of the 598 primary
healthcare clinics, and the rest (40%)
are operated by NGOs, UNRWA and
the private sector; of the latter, 26% are
under the supervision of Palestinian
NGOs. The government sector employs
about 41% of primary healthcare
workers, while the non-government
sector employs 59%, and of these 35%
are employed by Palestinian NGOs.
The NGO services are distributed in a
balanced manner between the WBGS:
62.5% of NGO healthcare clinics are
located in the West Bank and the rest,
37.5%, in the Gaza Strip. The
government sector, on the other hand,
operates 91% of its clinics in the West
Bank and 9% in the Gaza Strip. While
the non-government sector operates 38
hospitals, with 1,559 hospital beds, the
governmental sector operates 12
hospitals, with 1,698 hospital beds.
The number of workers employed in
the Palestinian health sector is
approximately 11,000; one-third are
employed by the MoH. There are about
83 doctors for every 100,000 persons.
The ratio is 91/100,000 in the Gaza
Strip, and 81/100,000 in the West Bank.
Obviously, the geographic distribution
of health services is unbalanced, and
some governorates lack hospitals (such
as Salfit, the central parts of the Gaza
Strip and Rafah), while hospital bed
adequacy is greater than the need in
some other areas.
Health insurance and
referrals for treatment
The number of persons with health
insurance from the government sector
was about 1,035,761 persons in 1998.
There is no new data available for the
percentage of those insured by the
private sector. Referrals for treatment
outside the government sector
accounted for 10.4% of the budget of
the MoH in 1998, compared to 18.2%
in 1996, and 18.9% in 1995. The cost
of these referrals for treatment outside
during these years amounted to more
than $49,209,918.
The geographic
distribution of
health services is
unbalanced
Box 2-9: Mental health
The field of mental health and counseling
has not been developed in Palestine. In
view of the importance of the
psychological aspects in securing a happy
life and in enabling a person to participate
effectively in the development process,
the various institutions of society should
devote greater attention to this area,
particularly in light of the fact that the
few available centers are not adequately
equipped, and deal with mental health
employing conventional methods.
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Total
0.107
0.305
0.305
0.246
0.167
0.071
0.007
6.04
Source: PCBS, 1997.
Table 2-6: Fertility rates according to region and age
Health conditions of
Palestinian women
The concept of women’s health goes
beyond physical health to include
mental and social wellness. Physical
health risks are often accompanied by
social risks caused by discrimination
against women, the chronic inferior
position suffered by many women,
physical and mental violence directed
against women, restrictions on their
freedom of movement and travel, and
prejudice before the law, particularly
in the Personal Status Law. The health
conditions of women are also affected
by so-called modern diseases, as
increasing numbers of women die of
cancer, particularly breast and uterine
cancer. Official and communal
concern about these two diseases is
still of a formal nature, and much
effort has yet to be made in this
direction.
Fertility rates
The total fertility rate for 1998 was
6.1 births per woman (5.6 births in the
West Bank, and 6.9 in the Gaza Strip).
Fertility in the 15-19 year age group
accounted for 9% of total fertility
among Palestinian women (12% for
the Gaza Strip alone). This indicator
confirms the widespread phenomenon
of early marriage, the focus of much
attention in Palestinian society from
many institutions. However, this
attention has not been transformed
into policies or laws to limit the extent
of the practice. Concerning the use of
contraception, 50.7% of women in the
West Bank, and 33.9% of women in
the Gaza Strip have used contracep-
tives. The data also indicated that a
large percentage of women do not take
part in decisions affecting their sexual
and reproductive health. 44% of the
women do not take part in decisions
related to pregnancy, and about 31%
do not participate in decisions related
to their marriage.8
Physical health risks
are often
accompanied by
social risks caused
by discrimination
Age
15-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
Total
Gaza Strip
0.126
0.337
0.344
0.279
0.202
0.085
0.008
6.91
West Bank
0.096
0.288
0.287
0.230
0.151
0.063
0.006
5.61
Healthcare for pregnant
women
Statistics indicate that 89% of all
pregnant women visited health clinics,
and 21% of these visited more than
one clinic.9 A substantial percentage
of births (7%) still takes place at home
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with the help of a traditional midwife
(6,405 births).
Refugees
Refugees represent about 41% of
the population.
UN resolutions affirm the right of
the Palestinians to return and to
compensation.
Refugee camps are the poorest
locales of residence; the poverty
rate in the Gaza Strip camps is
42%. The living conditions of
Palestinian refugees in the camps
in the diaspora, especially in
Lebanon, are sub-human by any
standards.
The Higher Council for Refugees
and Refugee Camps, which
includes ministers and other
officials, was established in 1998 in
order to secure financial support to
improve living conditions in the
camps, in coordination with
UNRWA.
UNRWA is undergoing a financial
crisis that has reduced its services.
Overcrowding (especially in the
camps of the Gaza Strip), and the
feeling of relative deprivation
(especially in the camps of the West
Bank in proximity to the cities),
leads to social problems that have
negative effects on the daily
security of camp residents (such as
violence, and the potential for
prevalence of weapons and drugs).
Box 2-10: Maternal mortality
Maternal mortality rates continue to present a source of concern for the
reproductive health of Palestinian women. Of concern also is the fact that
the statistics on this phenomenon are disputed. According to the MoH,
maternal mortality rates are higher for the West Bank than for the Gaza
Strip, due to the fact that remote villages that are too far from health clinics.
For the year 1998, maternal mortality rates were 60-80 maternal deaths
per every 100,000 live births.
Part Two:
º Human conditions:
   Features and issues
In this part of the Report, the main
characteristics and issues related to
some important groups in society are
presented. These groups should be
deliberately and methodologically
empowered and integrated in the
development process, in a manner that
will achieve development and benefit
society as a whole. To focus on these
particular groups does not mean that
there are no other vital or marginalized
groups. The issues concerning them
are discussed only in brief here,
without the detailed examination they
deserve. Other specialized studies
have addressed their roles in
development, and it is expected that
future studies will address those issues
not dealt with so far, in a detailed and
focused manner.
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The labor force and
workers
Human resources (15 years of age
or above) constitutes 53% of the
total population; of these, 41.4%
participate in the labour force.
About 70% of males participate in
the labor force; the participation of
women is about 11.3%.
The labor force participation rate
is about 44% in the West Bank, and
36% in the Gaza Strip.
The numbers of those joining the
labor force will increase prog-
ressively, since about 47% of all
Palestinians are under 15 years
of age.
The PNA is a major employer of
the labor force (20%).
Civilian workers make up 56% of
all PNA employees; the security
account for 44%.10
Women make up about 20% of
government sector employees,
concentrated in education, health
and assistant administrative work.
The data indicates that 63,000
members are registered in the trade
unions, however, the great majority
of them do not take part in trade
union activities. Women account
for 8% of the membership.
The adoption of occupational
safety and security methods in the
majority of Palestinian factories
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remains problematic, reflected in
the high number of deaths and
injuries in these factories.
The great majority of employees in
establishments work without
contracts (about 81%).
Over two-thirds of all establish-
ments do not provide their workers
with health insurance.
One-half of all establishments do
not give their workers paid leave.11
Palestinian workers inside Israel
continue to face problems related
to closures, lack of work permits,
lack of compensation and arbitrary
dismissals.
Palestinian women
In 1998, women actively partici-
pated in the debate on laws and
legislation, and the activities of the
women’s movement underlined
their role in demanding equal rights
with men in all fields. The experi-
ence of the Model Parliament was
outstanding in this debate.
Male and female enrollment rates
are equal at the level of basic
education, but the gap increases in
secondary and university level
education.
Women make up only 3% of all
Masters and PhD degree holders.
The percentage of women decreas-
es in specialized professions, with
æ
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the percentage of women engi-
neers, lawyers and doctors at about
12%, and women judges at 4%.
The participation of women in
decision-making positions is
limited. Women make up 7.5% of
the membership of the Palestinian
National Council, and 5.6% of the
Palestinian Legislative Council,
about 3% of the Council of
Ministers, 1% of Local Councils,
and 23% of the boards of charitable
societies.
The membership of the General
Union of Palestinian Women is
50,000, but there are many
questions as to the quality and
effectiveness of membership, and
the absence of elections in recent
years.
The activism of women’s institu-
tions led to granting working women
maternity leave (10 weeks) and an
hour daily leave for breastfeeding,
in addition to the possibility of
having their passport issued without
the prior signature of a guardian.
The participation of women in the
labor force is still weak, and there
are no indications of a significant
increase in the future.
Laws still discriminate against
women, particularly in the area of
personal status and violence
against women; a priority for the
coming period is to pass legislation
that guarantees women equality
with men by law.
Children and Youth
Palestinian society is a young society,
the percentage of children under 15
years of age is 50% in the Gaza Strip,
and 47% in the West Bank.
Child labor is an important issue
that should be addressed, espe-
cially in view of current difficult
economic conditions: the percen-
tage of those working from the 12-
16 age group is 6.6%.
The law does not yet specify a
minimum age for marriage,
although many voices have been
raised demanding that it be linked
to the age of legal responsibility
and compulsory education (18
years of age). Of married women,
40% were married under 18 years
age (1997); for men the percentage
was 2.7% in the same age group.
The number of children per teacher
in kindergartens is 29 to 1, higher
than in neighboring Arab countries.
Forty-four percent of teachers have
a secondary schooling certification
or less.
Many institutions organized
creative activities to promote the
participation of children and youth,
such as campaigns to promote
creative writing and reading.
æ
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Some university students continue
to suffer from the high cost of
university education.
University students practice
democratic elections in selecting
their representatives.
There is a concrete need to activate
the energies of youth in community
development; the future interests of
youth should be mainstreamed in
development planning.
Over 43,000 children live with
only one of their parents, of these
92.5% live with their mothers
(1997).
Orphanages provided care for
1,980 children in 1998, while more
than 2,800 children were provided
care in 1996.
The Elderly
The percentage of the population
over 60 years of age accounts for
5.2% of the total population. It is
expected that the number of elderly
will increase significantly over the
coming decades, which underlines
the importance of initiating
policies of concern to the elderly.
There are 18 old age homes (15 in
the West Bank, and 3 in the Gaza
Strip), one of them governmental.
There are demands for reviewing
the policies followed by these
homes, and their methods of caring
for the elderly.12
In most cases (98%), the elderly
depend on non-official social
support systems, such as self-
reliance, or reliance on sons,
daughters or relatives.
There are charitable institutions
and societies that offer daytime
services to the elderly, such as
providing hot meals, and
organizing recreational activities.
These activities are in need of
institution building and of an
effective, organizing role by
government institutions, in
coordination with the local
community.13
Political Prisoners and
Released Prisoners
To date, 2,500 Palestinians are still
being held in Israeli prisons.
Demands for their release have
widespread, popular support.
Tens of thousands of former
prisoners are in need of re-
integration into society, from an
economic, social and psychologi-
cal perspective.
The Programme for the Rehabil-
itation of Liberated Prisoners, and
later, the Ministry for the Affairs of
Prisoners and Released Prisoners,
have organized assistance given to
released prisoners, particularly in
the area of health insurance,
æ
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training, loans and education.
However, an assessment should be
conducted to find out how well
released prisoners have been
integrated in society, with released
prisoners participating in the
assessment process.
The Disabled
About 2% of the population are
disabled.
The General Union for the
Disabled was established in 1992,
with 6,000 members.
The Palestinian disabled are unable
to access 98% of public facilities,
either wholly or partially.
Health services are not oriented to
the disabled and their needs, which
has negative implications for all
aspects of their lives.
Programes for rehabilitation and
training are limited in outreach and
in quality.
The Palestinian Legislative Coun-
cil passed a modern law for the
disabled in Palestine, and the law
was ratified. It is important to
create the mechanisms necessary
for its implementation.
There is a need to expand the
Programe for Social Rehabilita-
tion, particularly in the area of
prevention.
Dozens of institutions provide
programes of treatment, care and
rehabilitation, the majority of them
centered in the vicinity of
Ramallah, Bethlehem and Gaza
city.
Human Rights
Israel continues to expropriate
land, build settlements, Judaize
Jerusalem, demolish houses, kill
Palestinians and hold detainees in
administrative detention.
Israel also continues to impose
restrictions on the movement of
Palestinians, separates the West
Bank from the Gaza Strip, and
places barriers on the movement of
trade.
Jerusalem continues to be isolated
by force from the WBGS, while
Israel prohibits freedom of
movement for the residents of the
WBGS and access to Jerusalem
and to its places of worship.
The Israeli Supreme Court
legitimized the use of physical
force, including forms of torture,
during the interrogation of
Palestinian detainees.
The withdrawal of the Jerusalem
ID from Jerusalem Palestinians has
become a serious problem, and
requires a major campaign to halt
the policy.
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The number of political detainees
in PNA prisons is estimated at 300,
while hundreds of detainees (for
political or criminal reasons) are
being held without trial. Moreover,
there are reports indicating the use
of torture in prisons.
Capital punishment was carried out
against three Palestinians, in
violation of human rights.
A number of radio and television
broadcasting stations have been
closed down, and journalists
detained.
Cultural Life
There has been an increase in the
number of cultural centres and
public libraries, in addition to an
increase in the number of cultural
and artistic activities.
Public libraries are severely under-
resourced in books, equipment and
computers. There are estimates
indicating the need for 400
additional public libraries.
There are no private radio or film
broadcasting stations in the Gaza
Strip.
The Palestinian television and
cinema production sector lacks
infrastructure, and to date there is
no significant cultural production
in these areas.
The private sector contributes to
the funding of the summer cultural
festivals.
Cultural and artistic festivals are
few in number and restricted to
certain areas.
The Ministry of Culture organizes
a number of activities in the area
of art and literature, particularly in
appreciation of the contributions of
writers and intellectuals.
The Union of Palestinian Writers
has held internal elections to select
its representative body.
The Union of Palestinian
Journalists continues to be
hindered by disputes as to its
membership, elections and the
approach to the role of journalism.
The culture of development
requires up-to-date awareness of
issues of citizenship, the
importance of initiative taking and
creativity, respect for personal
freedom and pluralism.
Food and environmental
security
Interest is increasing concerning
issues related to food and
environmental security for
Palestinians. For example, numer-
ous ministries (such as Supply,
Environment and Health) and
NGOs have made efforts to address
the problem of spoiled food.
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In 1997, the total quantity of
spoiled food confiscated was
63,969 tons, valued at NIS
5,104,517, and in the first quarter
of 1998, the amount confiscated
was 249,677 tons.14
According to statistics published
by the MoH, there were 506 cases
of food poisoning from spoiled
food between January 1997 and
the end of September 1997.
There are preliminary efforts in the
area of the environment, although
not institutionalized or put into
law, which aim to mitigate the
negative effects of Israeli
occupation, the ambiguous or
unimplemented policies of the
PNA, and infringements by the
private sector.
There are seven Palestinian
industrial zones in the West Bank,
adjacent or in close proximity to
residential areas, with inadequate
infrastructure. Israel operates
seven industrial zones in the West
Bank, but there is little information
available about them. There are
also 71 Israeli military areas in the
West Bank and 29 in the Gaza
Strip.
Stone-cutting industries are
considered to be the main reason
for the degradation of some
populated residential areas by
pollution. Smoking is legal in
public places, and the percentage
of smokers is noticeably high,
especially among the young.
The disposal of all kids of waste-
solid, medical and toxic-is a highly
problematic process.
Even though numerous awareness-
raising programs stress the impor-
tance of environmental conserva-
tion, environmental conditions
have not been substantially
improved, particularly regarding
pollution caused by quarries and
infrastructure construction.
Officials have been practically
apathetic in addressing problems of
dust, and toxic and medical waste.
Owners of workshops and factories
have been inclined to violate the
law more frequently, in the absence
of decisive and consistent law
enforcement.
Even though the PNA established
a Ministry of Environment,
environmental awareness is only
beginning. Existing legislation
does not provide for a system to
assess the environmental implica-
tions of proposed projects.
Cooperation between all institu-
tions of society and all citizens to
create a sound environment has
become a necessity, particularly
because environmental pollution is
a main source of contagious
diseases.
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Changes in education and life expectancy indices were introduced after taking into consideration the comments by
PCBS on the data published in the Summary Report. However, the general ranking of Palestine remains almost the
same. The methodology used will be explained in a special appendix at the end of the Report. The formulae and
comparisons used are the same as those used by the International Human Development Report, 1999.
It measures parliamentary representation, managerial and organizational positions, professional and technical
positions and income from wages.
According to the information provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), GDP for the years 1995/1996/
1997 was $3,222 million/$3,219 million/$3,253 million, and GNP for the same years was $3,469 million/$3,399
million/$3,545 million successively. Per capita GDP was, for the same years, $1,424/ $1,346/ $1,261.
There are additional items that can be added to the already existing ones, due to their similarity. There are other
items whose value varies according to the method of classification, and their integration in some cases  with other
items. The items under  "undefined or multi-sectoral" are unclear as to their nature and items of disbursement. See:
MOPIC Quarterly Monitoring Report of Donors Assistance, Dec. 31, 1998.
The results provided do not take into consideration variations in commodity prices and exchange rates. The poverty
line has been calculated on the basis of expenditure and consumption data and not on income levels, for which
data was lacking. The line reflects the amount needed by a six-member family (two adults and four children) to
cover basic needs. See: The National Commission for Poverty Alleviation, Palestine: Poverty Report 1998; and
MOPIC, 1998.
The Ministry of Higher Education does not have statistics pertaining to the number of Palestinian students completing
their studies abroad. Available information shows that the number of students who are awarded scholarships,
grants, or chairs outside the country does not exceed 800 students per annum.
Data provided by the Palestinian MoH, 1998.
Association for Planning and Protection of the Family, "Participation of Women in Decision-making as to Sexual
and Reproductive Health,"  Survey, 1997.
HDIP, 1997.
World Bank Mission to the Palestinian Territories, unpublished data, 1997.
Ministry of Labor, 1997.
Society for Atta’  Services, 1998; see also, Fahoum Shalabi, "Old Age Homes in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. "
Ibid.
Ministry of Supply, 1998.
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Even though Israeli occupation
continues to affect the Palestinian
environment and is one of the main
reasons for its destruction, the
responsibility for confronting this
problem is shared by society itself
and by its institutions.
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Chapter 3: PNA institutions and the management of development
Institutionalization of PNA
Separation of powers: Balance and complementarity
Human resources and organizational structure
Visions, objectives and structures
Centralization and decentralization
It is not easy to formulate objective
measurements for institution-
building, especially under
circumstances of transition.
Institution-building is not an action
that has fixed starting and ending
points, but it is a process that is
continually evolving. It is important
that concerned decision-makers will
progress enough in building
institutions so as to instill confidence
in citizens and investors and draw
them towards participation in the
development process. Institution-
building will thus resolve a lack of
confidence and will establish
continuity with all parties to the
development process through
participation. Public institutions
should concentrate on carrying out
their roles and functions, in devising
strategies policies, and regulations.
Such strategies should empower
citizens, so that they may attain their
rights and perform their duties. This
process should take place within a
systematic professional partnership
with NGOs and the private sector.
PNA institutions62
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Introduction1
The Palestinian National Authority
(PNA) is the first national authority to
be established on Palestinian land since
the rise of Palestinian national
consciousness at the beginning of the
twentieth century. Since its establish-
ment in 1994, the PNA has been con-
fronted with many issues related to its
authorities, performance, the condi-
tions governing its work, and the
relationship between the political and
the developmental in its plans of action.
The present chapter will focus on the
question of institution-building and the
transformation of institutions towards
state institutions during the transitional
period. It will examine the most
important challenges and achievements,
and the potential for streamlining the
transformation process. This chapter
will also address issues related to PNA
institutions and patterns of relations
with society, specifically in areas
involving development. It examines the
major importance of the national issue
and the difficulty, if not the impossi-
bility, of separating the national issue
from development efforts.
º Institutionalization of
   PNA
The PNA was established in 1994 as a
result of the Declaration of Principles
(Oslo Agreement), signed in 1993
between the Israeli government and the
Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO). The PNA continues to face major
problems resulting from the delayed
implementation of the Agreement and
the regoliated agreements that followed,
and from limited control over the land,
natural resources, and even human
resources. Nevertheless, the PNA has
taken important steps in a number of
areas related to building public
institutions. Among the most
outstanding of these achievements:
Establishment of an infrastructure
for PNA executive institutions,
including ministries, departments
and agencies, at both the national
and local levels. These institutions
were provided with staff, buildings,
equipment, and means of commu-
nication and transportation.
The Palestinian Legislative Council
(PLC) was established following
Box 3-1: On PNA institution-building President of the State of Palestine, Yasser Arafat,
The President of the State of Palestine emphasized the importance to the PNA of: "completing the task of building institutions
and administrative bodies that base their work on a network of laws and regulations, to serve our goal of establishing the
foundations of a modern state characterized by the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; a state that safeguards
freedoms and human rights, and respects political pluralism and multiple parties. We also emphasize our commitment to
consolidate the principles of accountability and transparency in all the institutions of the PNA and to pursue a policy of
comprehensive administrative reform."
From a speech before the Palestinian Legislative Council, May 8, 1998.
æ
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Palestinian elections at the beginning
of 1996. After an exploratory and
experimental period, the PLC has
started to assume its role in
legislation and oversight.
There is an interest in building
institutions in the judicial system
and in guaranteeing its indepen-
dence.  However, this interest has
not been clearly defined or
translated into practice so far. The
overlap between the various
security bodies has decreased to
some extent.
Organizational structures for
public institutions and depart-
ments, including job descriptions,
have been established. There are
also initial attempts to identify
areas of duplication and inconsis-
tency in the work of public
institutions, in order to improve
coordination internally and among
the different institutions.
Major efforts have been made to
reform the tax system and methods
of tax collection, and to establish
uniform standards to govern the
financial regulations and proce-
dures in PNA institutions and
bodies. As a result, PNA income
from tax revenues has equaled or
surpassed countries at similar
development levels.
Some ministries and public institu-
tions have drawn up work plans
that include projected activities for
coming years.
Several ministries provide
important services to the public,
such as services in education and
health; issuing of passports and
other official documents; providing
cash and in-kind assistance to
needy families; and implementing
infrastructure projects.
International sources of funding
were secured, and a network of
international relations established.
These resources were used in ways
similar to that followed by other
countries that receive international
assistance.
The relationship between the PNA
and the private sector continues to
be a subject of debate. A large
number of laws and procedures
have been issued to regulate this
relationship, but implementation is
still in an early stage.
Debate continues about the rela-
tionship between the PNA and civil
society, specifically NGOs, political
parties and unions. Laws to regulate
this relationship have been issued
and their implementation is expected
to take place in the near future.
The impact of the
transitional stage
A number of features have character-
ized the process of PNA institution-
building during the transitional stage.
Despite the transitional nature of the
current stage, the emerging institu-
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tional structures are similar to those
required by state institutions. To build
institutions that will serve the goals of
Palestinian society both for development
purposes, and simultaneously for a state
structure, requires additional efforts.
These efforts should not be constrained
by the limitations of the transitional
stage, but should be an integral part of a
long-term vision.
There is an urgent need to build state
institutions and, in order to secure the
rights of future generations,
construction should proceed on
foundations that are clearly defined
and focused on sustainable
development. Palestinians can also
benefit from the experiences of
neighboring, fraternal countries.
However, it is important to avoid
adopting ready-made models,
especially those that distance the
public from participation in
governance and from the development
process, or those that regard their
citizens as mere development tools
contributing to increased production
without proportionate benefits.
Prolonging the transitional stage
maintains limits imposed by the
political agreements, denies the PNA
full jurisdiction over its territories,
natural resources and border
crossings, and keeps restrictions on its
economy and external relations. This
situation will keep the PNA in need
of assistance from donor countries and
organizations, who have their own
terms and priorities. Prolonging
transition will ultimately lead to
wasting efforts needed for the process
of institution building and human
development and will take its toll on
the process of comprehensive
development, democratic transforma-
tion, and establishing the rights of
citizenship and the rule of law. What
is being established now will deter-
mine whether transitional institutions
can transform into institutions for
development, capable of devising self-
sustainment mechanisms.
The nature of the transitional stage has
also influenced the formative process for
the establishment of the PNA. The first
bodies to be established were the
security and police organizations,
followed by the ministries and other
civil departments and institutions, and
the PLC following general elections in
January 1996. Thus the executive
authority was established before the
legislative authority. The judiciary
authority remained dependent on the
executive authority, without any
mechanism in place to guarantee its
independence, or a basic law endorsing
the independence of the judiciary and
regulating the relationship between the
three branches. This situation gave the
executive authority an advantageous
position by virtue of having  precedence,
and allowed it to set up institutions in
the manner it found most suitable.
Institution-building
efforts should not be
constrained by the
limitations of the
transitional stage,
but should be an
integral part of a
long-term vision
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Separation of the WBGS
The forced separation between the
WBGS gave rise to cumbersome
government institutions due to the
necessary duplication of all PNA
bodies, executive, legislative and
judiciary. This administrative
duplication entailed additional costs
which further burdened the PNA. The
judiciary in the West Bank was forced
to remain separated from its counter-
part in the Gaza Strip although the
enactment of new laws and the
attempts to unify them continues. The
administrative history of each region
makes it imperative that special
mechanisms be established to guaran-
tee unification and enforcement of the
laws in both regions2; there is an
urgent need to unify the laws between
the two regions without delay.
The factors mentioned above led to
progressive and significant growth in
numbers of employees in the civil,
military, legislative and judicial
institutions and bodies between 1994
and 1997. From 1994 to the end of
1996, employment figures in PNA
institutions and bodies had tripled, and
PNA employees made up over one-
fifth of the employment in the WBGS.
Although lower than in neighboring
countries, the number of public sector
employees remains high in
comparison with the requirements of
the Palestinian situation. Palestine
lacks the need to build regular and
specialized armed forces, or a large
economic sector controlled and
managed by a central authority, as is
the case in other countries.
The seriousness of forced separation
between the West Bank, the Gaza Strip
and Arab Jerusalem goes beyond
duplication in PNA bodies, and the
resulting waste in resources, efforts,
time and hardships in planning. The
absence of "a safe passage," and
Israel’s refusal to provide for
territorial integrity as specified in the
text of the Declaration of Principles,
signed in September 1993, have
forced a situation where two societies
are emerging with separate social
organization, economic conditions,
cultural life and political expectations.
It has also led to the creation of a
separate status for Palestinians of Arab
Jerusalem which Israeli policies have
isolated from the rest of the West Bank
and where Israel applies its own laws.
Separation is aggravated by
maintaining different education
curricula and judicial systems, and by
the lack of economic integration
between the two regions. This is a
challenging situation for the
Palestinian negotiator and planner, for
it requires devising ways to ameliorate
the effects of forced separation
between the WBGS. It calls for
urgency in unifying laws and curricula
between the two regions, for
unification of administrative
The forced
separation between
the WBGS gave rise
to cumbersome
government
institutions
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structures and development vision of
the government sector, and for the
PLC to play a more prominent role as
a unifying body for all three regions.
Relationship between PNA
and PLO institutions
The relationship between the PNA and
PLO institutions is ambiguous. The
Declaration of Principles was signed
by Israel and the PLO, and the
structures of the PLO are supposed to
provide the frame of reference for the
PNA and its institutions. In reality the
role of the PNA, especially its
executive and legislative bodies, has
become the decisive role, particularly
concerning wider social and
development-related issues. The
institutions of the PLO no longer play
an effective supervisory accountability
role . All decisions related to the
development process, as well as all
political decisions, are taken by the
"Palestinian Leadership,"  composed
of the President of the PNA, who is
also the Chairman of the PLO
Executive Committee, the PNA
Council of Ministers and the leadership
of different institutions of the PLO.
This confusion in roles leads to the
predominance of the political over the
developmental, and to an ineffective
merger between the political process
and the development process, which is
very different from the important
theoretical linkage between them.
Moreover, the role of the PLO should
not be disregarded, for it continues to
be the sole legitimate representative of
the Palestinians, wherever they may be.
All decisions related
to the development
process, as well as
all political
decisions, are taken
by the "Palestinian
Leadership"
Box 3-2: The main problems facing the executive authority
The role of the Palestinian Council of Ministers vacillates between an executive and a political body. This makes it
difficult to evaluate its performance in development, particularly without comparing it to a development vision governing
its work (a Ministerial Statement was issued only on the programme of action and policies of the Council of Ministers).
The Council of Ministers does not supervise the work of public authorities nor does it monitor their activities directly;
most of these authorities are accountable to the President of the PNA. The Council of Ministers does not discuss and
approve the by-laws and procedures regulating the work of the ministries and public institutions, which are intended to
end duplication and overlap, and to define powers and responsibilities clearly.
The Council of Ministers has not established clear and approved organizational structures for ministries and public
authorities. Although the "Civil Service Law" has been passed, its implementation has caused confusion which has not
yet been resolved.
The number of employees in the government sector is very high, and increases constantly.
Power centers have emerged within institutions and ministries, compounded by duplication, conflict, and overlap of
powers, interference of the security organs in the work of ministries and specialized institutions, interference of the
latter in the work of other ministries or organizations,  and the difference in laws between the WBGS.
1.
2.
3.
4.
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The lack, or non-application, of procedures, by-laws and work regulations in ministries and public institutions has
given rise to waste of public funds and abuse of public office. Some examples are: exceeding the public budget allocations,
extravagant furnishing of offices, use of government cars for private purposes and the involvement of public officials as
investors or board members in private companies.
There is an absence of laws to regulate the work, and define the mandate and powers of the security bodies. This has led
to excess numbers of people on the payroll of these bodies and overlap and duplication in their work, especially in
higher levels. There is no mechanism for clear and effective supervision, nor any body entrusted with supervision over
the operations of these bodies, a situation which has allowed their interference in the work of the judiciary, the ministries
and public institutions, and in the work of other security bodies.
5.
6.
Absence of a development
vision
The process of PNA institution-
building began without a clear vision
of the mechanisms for this process, or
a developed philosophy of its
foundations and its relations with the
different institutions and formations
in society. The resulting process was
characterized by experimentation and
spontaneity. While acceptable during
Box 3-3: PNA institutions and the Palestinian public
A public opinion poll on a number of issues related to institution-building reveals the urgent need to take into account the
interests and aspirations of the Palestinian people, and the potential for investment of human capital in the development
process. Following are some of the most important results:
-79% considered that participation in decision-making is limited to a small group of people.
-69% considered that senior posts in the PNA are not equally accessible to all those who are qualified.
-60% did not agree with the statement "The PNA works for the interests of all, on an equal basis," while 20% agreed, and
16% considered the statement to apply to a certain extent.
-64% considered that transactions cannot be speedily processed in government institutions, if the concerned applicant is not
"well-connected." The percentage was higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank.
-34% agreed that government institutions offer qualitative service to the public, 31% disagreed, and 27% replied "somewhat."
A larger percentage from the West Bank agreed with the last expression, than from the Gaza Strip.
-20% agreed to the following statement: "All sectors of society benefit from the economic development projects implemented
by the PNA," while 55% did not agree.
DSP, Palestinian Public Opinion Poll, June 1999.
the early stages of institution-building,
its perpetuation will lead to blocking
and weakening the development
process. The fact that the PNA lacks
a unified empowering development
vision has led to confusion and
conflict within its institutions, and will
give rise to continuing problems that
will hold it back from assuming its
empowering leadership role in
development. In this vacuum, each
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ministry and public institution
continues to formulate its own
development policies, without
reference to a comprehensive frame,
embraced by national consensus. As
a result, public employees are
demoralized and feel excluded from
the policy-making process, which in
turn has led to visible on-the-job
apathy, where keeping office hours is
an end in itself. The method of
appointments in different PNA organs
and institutions reflected this
approach by, taking into consideration
different political, factional, tribal and
regional clusters.
The PNA must develop a clear vision
of the nature of the society and the
state it is seeking to build, a vision
harmonious with national aspirations
and reflecting the highest level of
national consensus. Such a vision
should be based on participation and
a respect for pluralism (using the
Declaration of Independence as a
basis, for example), and should be
congruent with the concepts of
sustainable human development. In
other words, it is necessary to combine
national tasks with the tasks of
building a modern democratic state
and a development environment.
While the task is not that of the PNA
alone—for it is the responsibility of
the various political and civil forces
in society as well—the PNA should
develop a vision of its role in society
and undertake all its leadership
responsibilities. The process of
institution-building was negatively
affected by the decision of the
Palestinian opposition forces to
abstain from participating in the
governmental institution-building
process, and from forging alternative
bases and visions for it.
º Separation of powers:
   Balance and
   complementarity
The factors mentioned above have led
to the predominance of the executive
power over the other powers of
government, threatening the future of
civil life in Palestine.  Such a situation
has negative impact on the effective-
ness and sustainability of the
development process, especially in the
absence of constitutional checks and
guarantees to control the relationship
between the three powers in a well-
defined manner.
The PNA continues to operate without
constitution or articulated vision of the
nature of the state it aspires to become
and the nature of the society it wants
to contribute to developing. It is urgent
that the separation of powers be
implemented, and a constitution be
adopted for the future state of
Palestine. PNA institutions should be
separated from those of the PLO, and
the relationship between them clearly
There is absence of
constitutional
checks and
guarantees to
control the
relationship
between the three
powers in a well-
defined manner
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established. The importance of having
a basic law or constitution in place,
based on the principles endorsed in the
Declaration of Independence, increases
with the ending of the transitional
stage, and the expected declaration of
an independent Palestinian state on
Palestinian land. The enforcement of
a body of laws is also required,
particularly those delineating and
regulating the relationship between the
public sector and civil society,
including the Charitable Associations
and Organizations Law, the Political
Parties Law, the Law on the
Independence of the Judiciary, the
Civil Service Law, the Local Elections
Law and several other laws.
Box 3-4: Confidence in PNA institutions
The percentage of those sampled who said they had trust in any of the PNA institutions (executive, legislative or judiciary)
did not exceed one-third: 24% said they trust PNA institutions in general and 31% said they trust them "somewhat." On the
other hand, 38% said they do not trust PNA institutions. As for the PLC, 30% said they trust the PLC, while 35% said they
do not. Trust in the judiciary was slightly higher at 33%, and equal to those who do not trust the judiciary. In the Gaza Strip,
the percentage of those who trust the judiciary declined to 27%, while in the West Bank it was 37%. The percentage of those
who do not trust the judiciary in the Gaza Strip went up to 43%, and those who do not trust the PLC to 47%. Trust in the
security bodies was 33% and, in the case of the police, increased to 40%. The percentage of those in the Gaza Strip who do
not trust the security bodies was 42%. Noteworthy is that trust in all of these institutions was lower in the Gaza Strip than
in the West Bank. The percentage of those who gave no opinion was higher in the West Bank where the PNA has a less
extensive presence than in the Gaza Strip.
DSP, Palestinian Public Opinion Poll, June 1999.
Box 3-5: The PLC: Achievements and challenges
The PLC has succeeded in generating its own dynamic, and has taken important strides towards the creation of its own
institutions, including: setting up permanent and specialized committees; approving its internal standing orders; developing
a network of relations with civil society organizations, including human rights organizations, and with official and non-
official Arab and international organizations; and forming its administrative teams.  The PLC also established its legislative
role and its role in monitoring the executive authority. However, the PLC has not succeeded so far in taking up its full role
in consolidating democratic life in Palestine and in effectively monitoring the executive authority. These shortcomings are
due to several factors, among them:
Absence of a Basic Law or a constitution regulating the relationship between the PLC, the executive branch, and the
PLO institutions.
Lack of cooperation on the part of the executive authority with the PLC. The executive authority has obstructed the
work of the PLC in issuing legislation and in monitoring, ignored many of its decisions, and delayed submission of the
budget to the PLC.
The political composition of the PLC is not diverse; the great majority of its members are affiliated to the same
political organization. A high percentage of PLC members are also members in the executive branch (as ministers,
advisors to the President of the PNA, or as senior PNA officials).
1.
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The judiciary
The status of the judiciary in Palestine
is closely linked to a set of factors that
limit its performance in enforcing the
principles of the rule of law, and
protecting the rights of citizens. The
prevailing culture is among the more
prominent factors responsible for the
present situation, for it does not take
the rule of law seriously, both at the
popular and official levels. In addition,
the history of the Palestinian judiciary
has reflected the separation of the West
Bank from the Gaza Strip, and the
application of a different code of law
in each region, a legacy that has led to
confusion in the enforcement of the
law under the PNA. It is not clear why
a reasonable degree of unification of
procedures and legislation between the
two regions has not been achieved so
far. Meanwhile, the judiciary suffers
from an overlap in powers: the
Ministry of Justice, the Public-
Prosecutor and other institut-ions have
all intervened and tried to influence the
work of the judiciary. The judiciary
also lacks the expertise and the
facilities necessary to carry out the role
required of it. There are, for instance,
only 37 judges and 16 public
prosecutors. In the year 1998, each
judge had to examine an average of
7,084 cases (at an average rate of 28
cases a day). There is one bailiff per
200,000 persons, a rate low by
international standards. To date, the
Law on the Independence of the
Judiciary has not been ratified.
Security bodies
There are nine different security
bodies in the PNA: the percentage of
the number of persons working in the
police and security bodies in the PNA-
controlled territories compared to the
total population is among the highest
percentages in the world, and the
Israeli measures hinder the movement of PLC members, the operation of its committees and, in some instances, even
interfere with its meetings.
The PLC continues to lack experienced staff in parliamentary affairs and, although there have been improvements in
this area, the PLC still lacks standing administrative orders that would guarantee the necessary coordination and
complementarity in the work of its committees and departments.
Most of the decisive sessions of the PLC begin with a legal quorum, but only a small number of the members remain for
plenary meetings and even for voting on draft resolutions.
The PLC adopts redundant resolutions and sometimes adopts resolutions of an executive nature, not within its mandate.
The relationship of PLC members with their constituency is an administrative relationship, lacking vitality and interaction.
From the sample mentioned, 24% of Palestinians considered the PLC to be playing the role required of it in development.
However, 45% of the sample did not agree that it was,  while another 20% agreed "somewhat."
4.
5.
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The percentage of
persons working in
the police and
security bodies in
the PNA-controlled
territories
compared to the
total population is
among the highest
percentages in the
world
process of establishing security
institutions still continues.
In light of these facts, there is concern
over interference by these organs in
political life, and over their partiality.
Human rights and citizens’ rights
organizations have monitored
numerous incidents involving
transgressions by security bodies of
individual rights, such as arbitrary
detention, detention without trial,
torture, refusal to submit to decisions
of  the judiciary, and interference in
issues that do not fall under their
sphere of competence. These bodies
need to incorporate a high degree of
professionalism and discipline before
the law in their work, and to provide
continuing education for their
members on the concept of
citizenship. Their role and very
existence is to protect the rights of
citizens and their access to those
rights, irregardless of class, gender,
religion, age or other factors. The
institution-building of the security
bodies requires that scientific research
be undertaken to assist them in their
work, in investigating the causes and
motives behind certain forms of
behavior disruptive of public order
and social security (crime, drugs,
juvenile delinquency, violence against
women and children, destruction of
public property, etc.), to enable these
bodies to fulfill their duties towards
all citizens.
Institution-building in this field
requires that a number of steps be
taken: a reduction in the number of
security bodies as much as possible;
formalization of the relationship
between the security bodies and the
executive and judiciary branches;
education of the security bodies on
respect for citizens’ rights, and respect
for the law and its fair enforcement.
It also requires that these bodies be
subject to supervision, similar to the
non-military public bodies , and abide
by the law.
PNA institutions
Box 3-6: Monopolies Companies
                and other bodies
The PNA has established, or taken part
in the establishment, of a number of
companies and bodies active in trade,
industry and services. This phenome-non
has been questioned and criticized from
a variety of sources (see Chapter Four).
Criticisms focused on the fact that this
situation has created PNA monopolies,
which affect the ability of other
companies and institutions with private
capital to compete, and, in addition,
hinder the monitoring of the legal and
administrative regulations of these
companies and institutions. Companies
that are owned by the PNA are also in
conflicting with the policies of the donor
countries, the World Bank and the IMF,
all of which support developing the role
of the private sector, and restrict the role
of the state to providing the infrastructure
and the legal framework that will
promote investments by private capital
and free trade.4
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º Human resources and
   organizational
   structures
The pattern in operations of PNA
bodies has produced an organizational
structure that is, in most cases, that of
an inverted pyramid, due to the
multiplicity of senior posts (under-
secretary, assistant under-secretary,
director-general) and mid-level posts
(director), compared to the lower
executive functions. It has also led to
difficulty in devising job descriptions
as required in the transitional stage,
all of which has led to dysfunctional
over-employment in the bodies and
institutions of the PNA.
Diversity of human resources
The PNA has drawn on three distinct
labor pools in forming its institutions
and organs. The first is the body of
employees in the PLO institutions, and
the cadres of some of its political
factions, be they returnees or residents
of the WBGS who were distributed
between the security bodies, the new
ministries and other PNA authorities
and institutions. The second pool is
public employees working for the
Jordanian and Egyptian administra-
tions, and for the Israeli Civil
Administration. Most were employed
in institutions of education, health,
social affairs and the judiciary. The
third pool is those working for NGOs
in the WBGS or in the private sector.
Each of these groups brought with
them a diversity of concepts and
experiences, and differing visions of
what it means and what is required to
build PNA institutions in a transitional
stage, with transformation into a
sovereign state as the ultimate goal.
Box 3-7: Employees of PNA
               Institutions
No accurate figures are available as to
the numbers of employees in PNA bodies
and institutions, however, signs point to
an increase in the number of government
employees from 22,000 in mid-1994, to
75,000 by the end of 1996; the number
may have exceeded 100,000 during 1998.
It is difficult to calculate the number of
government workers due to multiple
payrolls. A number of government
employees and experts are paid by
international assistance programs. The
Ministry of Local Government does not
have a complete registry of all those
employed in the organs of local
government (municipal and local
councils) in the Ministry, because these
councils rely on self-finance and external
assistance, in varying degrees.
Box 3-8: Human resources: Diversity of background and orientations
In a survey conducted by the DSP, about 68% of those occupying the posts of
director-general or director in PNA ministries began work in their ministries
following the establishment of the PNA, while the proportion of those who
worked in these ministries before the PNA was 26% of the total. In addition,
44% of all these directors spent most of their working life outside Palestine,
while 46% did so in Palestine. As for the political orientations of these
directors, the majority described themselves as supporters of the Fatah
movement, while the rest considered themselves independents or leftists or
did not name a specific political orientation.
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Duplication and overlap in
the work of ministries and
authorities
PNA public institutions remained
without a vision to guide their role or
their plans. It is not surprising, then, that
conflicting visions and perceptions
emerged in these institutions as to their
role and to the methods of practicing
and advancing this role. This situation
was also reflected in the confused
relationship of each public institution
with other public institutions, NGOs
and international parties, and on the
evaluation of these relations. Individual
perspectives, governed by subjective
considerations and measures, rather
than a common goal, led to dissipation
of efforts and waste of resources.
In addition, the establishment of a large
number of ministries has also led to
confusion, duplication and competition,
obstructing the forging of a policy with
a rational approach to institutional
development. Under such conditions,
delineation and description of tasks and
authorities in a number of ministries and
authorities was not undertaken. It would
have been feasible to merge a number
of civil authorities and administrations
into a single ministry working in a
specific field, and thus eliminate many
of these problems of excessive
bureaucracy: competition, confusion,
excess workers, outright unemploy-
ment, under-employment and waste of
human and financial resources.
Moreover, certain tasks do not warrant
a special ministry, but can be entrusted
to a center or authority with clearly-
defined functions and powers.
Importance of organizational
structures and administrative
and financial systems
The institutional performance of certain
ministries and specialized agencies has
improved since their establishment in
1994 or 1995. Such improvement can
be seen in the fields of education, health,
social welfare and infrastructure, and in
the availability of data and studies on
various aspects of Palestinian life.
However, this improvement falls short
of what is expected or acceptable.
Moreover, there is a prevalence of a
service-oriented approach in the work
of these institutions, and a lack of a
participatory development vision.
The establishment
of a large number
of ministries has
also led to
confusion,
duplication and
competition,
obstructing the
forging of a policy
with a rational
approach
Box 3-9: Performance of the
                PNA from the public
                perspective
A significant percentage of the public
evaluates the performance of the
executive and legislative authorities
positively, even though a high percentage
of the public also believes that there is
corruption in PNA bodies and fears it
will remain so in the future. These results
indicate an understanding of the
circumstances surrounding the PNA, the
pressures imposed on it and the
importance of giving the PNA the chance
PNA institutions74
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Yes Somewhat No No response
Table 3-1: Results of survey on inter- and intra-ministerial relations (%)
º Visions, objectives
    and structures
A significant number of employees in
government institutions believe that
their institution does not have a clear
policy, that the administration is not
streamlined and does not follow a well-
defined plan of action. A large
percentage of these employees feel
they do not have job security, do not
participate in decision-making and
consider working conditions to be
inadequate. According to a survey
conducted by the DSP, the majority of
directors and director-generals
described the relationship inside their
ministries as undemocratic. They also
expressed genuine concern about the
working relationship, cohesiveness and
complementarity of skills within each
ministry, with other ministries and with
the branches of the same ministry in
the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip.
Relations in PNA ministries are democratic
Relations in our ministry are professional
Relations in our ministry are democratic
Administrative skills in our ministry are harmonious in their
development vision
Administrative skills in our ministry complement each other
Relations with other ministries are complementary
Relations between ministry offices in the WBGS are
consistent and complementary
12.9
32.3
14.5
13.1
9.7
31.1
20.0
32.3
33.9
29.0
29.5
22.6
27.8
23.3
43.5
27.4
53.3
54.1
64.5
34.6
46.7
11.3
6.4
3.2
3.3
3.2
6.5
10.0
to carry out its duties. The 1999 survey
indicated that 49% of those surveyed
evaluated the performance of the PLC
positively (while 17% evaluated it
negatively, 25% "somewhat," and the
rest gave no opinion); 49% evaluated
the performance of the government
positively (while 15% evaluated it
negatively, 23% "somewhat," and the
rest gave no opinion); 48% evaluated
the performance of the judiciary and the
courts positively (while 20% evaluated
it negatively, 19% "somewhat," and the
rest gave no opinion); about 56%
evaluated the performance of the
institution of the presidency positively
(while 11% evaluated it negatively,
14% "somewhat," and the rest gave no
opinion); and 56% evaluated the
performance of the security bodies and
the police positively (while 18%
evaluated it negatively, 19%
"somewhat," and the rest gave no
opinion).5
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How does employment take place in your ministry?
In a centralized and non-competitive manner.
As a result of free competition.
A combination of both styles.
Are the management and finance systems adequately clear for all the employees in the ministry?
Yes, for all of them.
Yes, for the senior employees only.
Somewhat.
No.
The survey revealed that the majority
of directors and director-generals
believe the vision and objectives of
their ministries are incomplete,
ambiguous or inadequate. They were
nearly unanimous in describing
organizational structures as either
non-existent, or incomplete, primitive,
ambiguous, or highly centralized and
serving personal interests. Organiza-
tional structures were also criticized
for being unequally applied among
employees, for lack of controls in their
application, and for their diverse
interpretations without any profession-
al standards, depending on the person
in charge of implementation.
In one of the main ministries, the
organizational structure has been
changed ten times, and has not been
finalized yet. Most importantly, in
many cases there is no harmony
between organizational structures in
the West Bank and those in the Gaza
Strip. When asked about the clarity of
these structures to all the employees
in the ministry, 30% of the directors
responded that they were clear to all
employees and 13% said they were
somewhat clear. As for the rest (57%),
they declared that the structures were
not clear at all (although they may be
clear as far as decision-makers in the
ministry are concerned).
Administrative and financial
systems
There was near-unanimity about
whether there are administrative and
financial systems in place in the min-
istries. The administrative system was
criticized for being bureaucratic, tradi-
tional, lacking in comprehensiveness,
unwritten and unapplied in some
cases. Job descriptions for the
different departments and sections
were either lacking or poorly written.
In addition, employment procedures
were not clear and, in many instances,
not based on open competition and
eligibility.
The majority of
directors and
director-generals
believe the vision
and objectives of
their ministries are
incomplete
The administrative
system was criticized
for being
bureaucratic,
traditional, lacking in
comprehensiveness,
unwritten and
unapplied in some
cases
52%
19%
29%
20%
13%
23%
44%
Table 3-2: Results of opinion poll on administrative and financial systems in PNA ministries
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 The directors criticized the financial
system, despite considering it clear
and detailed, for being bureaucratic,
centralized, not applied equitably, in
need of developing and in need of a
degree of independence from the
Ministry of Finance which applies
procedures that the directors consider
to be obstructive of the work carried
out by their ministries. The directors
asked for independent and
sustainable budgets for each
ministry. They also criticized both
the administrative and finance
systems for not being adequately
clear for all employees in the
ministries.
The Civil Service Law
The debate surrounding the Civil
Service Law revealed the high degree
of confusion resulting from the
arbitrariness that governed the
building of institutions and bodies of
the PNA. The rationale did not devote
adequate attention to real priorities
and needs, and did not define powers
and responsibilities in specific terms.
Appointments did not take place
according to needs, qualifications or
experience, and not even as a
response to what could be described
as the need to reward militants. They
took place on grounds nearer to tribal
and regional considerations  and,  in
other cases, on grounds of favoritism,
personal connections and political
loyalties. This gave rise to the
administrative inverted pyramid in
most of the public institutions, which
resulted in overlap in authorities
within the ministry and between
different ministries, and encouraged
tension, conflicts and individual
interests that obstruct planning,
initiative-taking and clarity of vision.
Thus it is virtually impossible to
separate between implementing the
Civil Service Law, and conducting
comprehensive administrative
reform, which would result in the
implementation of the Law. Such
reform should start by ratifying the
Basic Law, and endorsing the
principle of the separation of powers.
The government (the Council of
Ministers) should hold separate
meetings to address government
affairs, and to forge policies and
strategies at various levels. The Civil
Service Law should not be regarded
merely as an instrument to improve
the salaries of government
employees, but as an instrument to
organize the civil service on a modern
and effective basis. Unless such
conditions are made available, it is
most likely that the policy of
appeasements and exceptions will
become the rule. Lastly, enabling
resources should be made available
to the PNA for the enforcement of
any law, including the Civil Service
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º Centralization and
    decentralization
The laws approved by the PNA (and
specifically the Law of Local
Councils, approved on 12/10/97), and
the current policy followed by the
Ministry of Local Governments,
indicate that the paradigm governing
the relationship of the central authority
with local authorities and councils is
a centralized one. This centralized
paradigm may be one of the factors
behind the successive postponements
of the elections for local councils,
even though the law regulating these
elections was approved in late 1996.
Despite repeated declarations by
officials in the Ministry about
preparedness for holding these
elections, they have not been held to
date. Meanwhile, municipal and
village council elections were
replaced by the appointment of
committees, on tribal or factional
bases. This process transforms
committee members into employees,
instead of being representatives of
their local communities. The above
paradigm is supported by the fact that
all decisions and directives are issued
by the Ministry of Local Governments
centrally and transmitted to the local
committees. Such decisions include
zoning for purposes of regulating
construction, and transformation of
village councils into municipalities
without clear justifications for doing
Box 3-10: Supervising the
                  executive authority
The Commission of the Public
Controller, set up at the end of 1995,
and directly accountable to the
President of the PNA, has taken an
important step in producing a report
on the performance of several
ministries and other civil authorities
of the executive authority. However,
the report focused only on financial
matters, while overlooking the role of
security bodies in the work of the civil
institutions.  It also did not address
other issues such as customs
collection, disbursement of public
property (particularly state lands), and
excess employment within the civil
service. Yet this report was not adopted
by the executive authority as a basis
for initiating reforms in the civil
service. The PLC in turn issued
another report, after conducting a
study of the report by the Commission
of the Public Comptroller and
adopting specific recommendations
and procedures, but it was also rejected
by the executive authority. In this
matter, importance is given to the role
of Palestinian human rights
institutions in monitoring PNA
violations and the role played by a
number of other organizations active
in the field of human rights.
Law, the cost of which is estimated
at $300 million annually out of a
public budget that does not exceed
$1 billion.
The paradigm
governing the
relationship of the
central authority
with local
authorities and
councils is a
centralized one
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so. It is a paradigm that does little to
encourage local councils to devise
means, plans and initiatives to develop
local resources (both material and
human), and to reduce their
dependence on central resources.
a spirit of initiative and responsibility
into local communities, broaden their
participation in public life, develop
their human and material resources,
and boost their ability to challenge
restrictions, obstacles and external
transgressions. All this would lead in
Box 3-11: Women and local government councils
The gap between the work of local councils and women in the community continues to
be very wide. Even though these councils affect the lives of women much more than
does any other governmental institution, the plans and projects prepared by these councils
do not mainstream  issues and concerns pertaining to women, nor do they have any
gender focus in their work. The percentage of women appointed as members in these
councils does not exceed 1%, despite continuous appeals by the women’s movement
for greater integration of women in local government, and a Ministry of Local
Governments decision to appoint women in every council.
Objective circumstances surrounding
the Palestinians in the WBGS have
influenced choices about the kind of
relationship between central and local
administrations. This situation can be
described as follows: an infrastructure
inherited by local councils after
decades of occupation; scarce local
resources; forced separation of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip; wide areas
of West Bank lands remaining under
classifications as "Area B" and "Area
C"; the condition of the PNA as a self-
rule authority; low population figures;
and limited geographic space.
Although these factors are of major
importance, the adoption of
decentralization as a system of
governance would infuse vitality and
turn to achieving a higher level of
sustainable human development.
The ideal solution may lie in gradual
transition into a system in which local
authorities would enjoy the powers of
local government. This can first be
applied in larger cities, which have the
necessary human and material
resources, then applied in other
municipal councils and village councils,
as suitable conditions develop.
However, such an approach would
require the implementation of the Local
Elections Law, and consolidation of the
responsibility of these councils before
their local communities. In addition, it
requires amending the Law of Local
Councils to allow local communities
greater participation in the forging and
The gap between the
work of local
councils and women
in the community
continues to be very
wide
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implementation of local development
plans, and in the public life of their
communities.
taken into consideration in institution-
building:
A political and legal environment
should be created that promotes the
completion of institution-building
in PNA bodies, authorities and
departments.
Clarity of vision and objectives
should be developed, as well as
adequacy and compatibility of work
methods and internal administration
and structure in these institutions
with the vision and objectives.
Clarity of vision, objectives and
work methods is necessary at the
level of each public institution, as
well as at the aggregate level
including all institutions, and in the
relationships between them.
Institutional capability should be
developed to accumulate experi-
ence and transfer new information
from the individual to the institu-
tion, and vice versa.
Mechanisms should be generated
for continuing assessment of
institutional work, by the staff and
the beneficiaries of each institution.Conclusion
There is a tendency to reduce the
process of institutional development
into a process of training, rehabilita-
tion and capacity-building for
institution staff, in isolation from the
comprehensive components of institu-
tional work.6 This tendency should be
avoided, and the following points
A political and legal
environment should
be created that
promotes the
completion of
institution-building
in PNA bodies
Box 3-13: Optimism and pessimism
About one-third of all directors and
director-generals surveyed described
their feelings about the future as
optimistic; 11% were pessimistic and
31% described their feelings as "in
between." Those remaining, 24%, were
not able to specify the nature of their
feelings about the future.
æ
æ
æ
æ
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Box 3-12: Fear of deterioration in public services
There is serious concern about a possible deterioration in public services,
particularly those measured by the human development indicators in the
areas of health, education and social welfare. Such concern stems from the
insufficiency and instability of funding, the weak administrative experience
of some officials, inefficient supervision and monitoring, and the overlap
in responsibilities. These concerns are seen in the way Palestinians appraised
their living conditions during recent years.
Economic Conditions: 44% of Palestinians felt that their standard of
living had not changed since the establishment of the PNA, while 41%
felt their conditions had grown worse. On the other hand, 14% felt their
living conditions had improved.
Educational Conditions: 35% of those surveyed believed they could
not afford adequate education for themselves or for their children, while
29% believed they could afford it; 36% described their ability in this
respect as "fair," 64% assessed educational services positively; 27%
assessed the services as average; while  9% described them as poor or
below average.
Health Conditions: The situation is more serious in terms of health
services. One-third of those surveyed considered that they could not
afford adequate healthcare in the event of illness, be it their own or that
of a family member, 36% described their ability as "fair," while 31%
declared they could afford it. At the same time, 39% gave a positive
assessment of health services, 26% gave a negative assessment, while
36% considered them "fair,".
DSP, Palestinian Public Opinion Poll, June 1999.

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The process of public institution-
building is in need of streamlining and
review to reflect political and
developmental priorities at the
national level, and the distribution of
available and potential resources.
Decentralization and re-organization
of public administrations should be
accompanied by the provision of
human resources suitable in
qualifications, experience and training
for the mission of each institution.
Functions should be based, firstly, on
empowering citizens to enable them
to obtain their rights and to contribute
to the process of development. Their
main allegiance should be to the
citizens in general, or to that group of
citizens targeted by the mission of the
institution. Secondly, it should be
based on providing consultations,
studies and proposals to policy-
makers to contribute to the
empowerment of citizens, and to
attaining their rights. PNA institutions
should not be transformed into quasi-
NGOs, either in the way they obtain
funding or the kinds of services they
provide, or in their methods of work.
Such an overlap leads to wasted
efforts and to losing their original
objectives which are to provide an
enabling environment, to draft
policies and strategies, and to offer
basic services that every citizen is
entitled to. In order to carry out these
functions, mechanisms should be
established to interact and communi-
cate with citizens, according to the
group or groups targeted by the rele-
vant ministry or institution. The
quality of the relationship between the
institu-tion and its citizens is the best
way to judge its performance and the
extent of its actual participation in the
development process, and make it
possible to further improve its
performance.
The time has come for streamlining
the structures of public institutions to
be compatible with their role in
empowering citizens, broadening their
choices, and their current and future
capacities. This requires a greater
focus on those fields in which the
PNA has an enabling role (especially
in the educational, health, social and
legislative fields), and the allocation
of funds and efforts in their direction.
Streamlining becomes feasible once
this role and the relationship with the
community are defined according to
the resources available. The process
also requires that a development
strategy be drafted for the critical next
period, that will impose on the donor
community respect for the Palestinian
will and Palestinian development
priorities. There can be no effective
public institution structure if it lacks
clarity in its vision of development
and in its scale of priorities.
PNA institutions
should not be
transformed into
quasi-NGOs, either
in the way they
obtain funding or
the kinds of services
they provide, or in
their methods of
work
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Data on government employee opinions in this Chapter are based on a survey conducted by the DSP in a number of
Palestinian ministries, and on an opinion poll and a series of in-depth interviews with a number of senior officials
in government institutions, in addition to a number of research papers. See the appendices for details.
Fifteen laws were approved by the President of the PNA (up to the end of 1998), after PLC approval and submission
for ratification. These are not adequate for unifying all the different aspects of daily life in the WBGS.
Quoted from: "The Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens’ Rights, Third Annual Report," 1999.
There are several examples of declared positions by the PNA, expressing commitment to privatization, encouragement
of the private sector, and creation of the suitable environment for investment, through  issuing legislation and
through negotiations with Israel (see "Interview with the Director-General of PECDAR," Al-Ayyam newspaper,
January 16, 1999).
See Opinion Poll No. 28, conducted by the Centre for Palestine Research and Studies, January 1999.
For a clearer idea about PNA government employee structures, see: Ghania Malhis, "International Conference on
Employment in Palestine - Ramallah," Ministry of Labour, 1999. This study indicates an increase in educational
levels for civil service employees, in comparison to private sector employees, and an increase in rates of employment
for women in the government sector, compared to the private sector, due to their increase in the fields of health,
education and social affairs. The study also indicates a rise in average age of employees in the public sector compared
to the private sector (due to the formation of the public sector, and the inherited staff from the Israeli Civil
Administration, and PLO cadres). The study also reveals over-employment in senior administrative and supervisory
positions, leading to some ministries having a greater number of directors than staff in lower positions.
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Chapter 4: Economic policies and human development
Employment and wages
Investment and development
The Palestinian public sector
The Palestinian private sector
Public sector-private sector relationship
Macro-economic policies
Introduction
Economic growth is regarded as an
important factor in expanding the
material means to meet the needs of
the public, and to broaden their
choices. Thus economic growth is a
necessary, although not a sufficient,
condition for human development.
Moreover, the relationship between
the two is not automatic; rapid
economic growth may be accompa-
nied by slow human development and
vice versa. They may enhance each
other, or stifle one another. That is why
decision-makers should devote special
efforts to avoid a growth that does not
expand job opportunities or that is
merciless, rootless and futureless.1
For the first time in its history, the
Palestinian economy in the WBGS is
under the supervision of a national
authority that bears the responsibility
for managing economic policies and
the various social services. A civil
service was established under
Palestinian administration and with
Palestinian implementation, and
incurred criticism when it expanded
in size past all expectations. The
performance of the public sector, and
its relationship with the private sector,
has also raised many questions about
its role in the process of human
development.
At the same time, the absence of clear
macroeconomic policies increased the
For the first time in
its history, the
Palestinian
economy in the
WBGS is under the
supervision of a
national authority
burdens borne by the Palestinian
economy, and created a situation
where there were no independent
mechanisms for economic growth,
and under continuing siege and
dependency imposed by Israel on the
Palestinian economy. In addition, the
PNA does not have clearly-defined
development orientations, or a
demonstrated commitment to the
declared government policy of giving
the private sector a main role in
development.
Therefore, the distribution of powers
and tasks, and the implementation of
regulations, were vulnerable to
manipulation. This situation gave rise
to monopolies and favoritism between
those with political clout and
investors, while excluding vital social
groups from the development process
including women, the poor and other
marginalized groups. The lack of
market regulations led to frequent
violations by the private sector to the
detriment of the environment, health,
human rights and workers’ rights.
Social support systems were too
overwhelmed to provide adequate and
reliable protection for all those harmed
as a result of the lack of fair
macroeconomic policies.
This chapter presents an analysis of
the main economic policy issues in the
WBGS, specifically, employment,
wages, poverty, investment, the
Economic policies84
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regulatory environment for invest-
ment, economic growth, and the
relationship between public sector and
private sector.
an increase of about 13.8% over 1997.
In addition there was a rise in full
employment to 77.8% in 1998,
compared to 69.4% in 1997. This
coincided with a decrease in levels of
unemployment and partial employ-
ment, which is usually considered an
indicator of improved conditions in
labor markets. Yet the data indicates
a decrease in real wages, and increase
in working hours and average
workdays, which indicates the
possibility of a drop in living stan-
dards for wage-earning employees.
The increase in job opportunities was
concentrated in the public sector,
under an employment policy that has
grown to become an economic
º Employment and wages
A distinction has to be drawn between
sound growth accompanied by an
increase in job opportunities,
improvement in productivity, more
equitable distribution of income, and
improvement in working conditions,
and unsound growth that does not
benefit the lives of individuals and the
community. Employment in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip increased by
8.44% in 1997, compared to an
increase of 0.06% in 1996. There were
58,450 new job opportunities in 1998,
Box 4-1: Economic development from the perspective of the Palestinian public
93% of Palestinians considered difficult economic conditions among the main factors
hindering their effective participation in the development of their society; 37%
considered company practices in the private sector to be part of these impediments.
48% believed that the Palestinian economy was not based on free competition (the
percentage was higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank), while only 23%
considered it to be a free market economy, characterized by fair competition.
21% believed economic development projects implemented by the PNA were of
benefit to all sectors of society, while 55% believed that some sectors did not benefit
from these projects; 61% said that benefits from development projects implemented
by the PNA were not distributed evenly over all geographic regions.
76% believed that international assistance does not bring equal benefits to all
Palestinians, while 9% believed it does.
DSP, Palestinian Public Opinion Poll, June 1999.
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Sound growth is
accompanied by an
increase in job
opportunities,
improvement in
productivity, more
equitable
distribution of
income, and
improvement in
working conditions
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burden. Workers in jobs inside Israel
accounted for a substantial portion of
the increase in the numbers of
employed Palestinians.
Social profile of Palestinian
workers
Wage-earning workers made up the
largest group of workers in 1998,
representing 65.3%, followed by self-
employed, 21%, and unpaid family
workers, 7.9%. Employers made up
5.8%. The proportion of the self-
employed is an indicator of the size
of the informal sector in the economy,
which increases its activity during
periods of economic recession and
rises in unemployment, and shrinks in
periods of economic growth and
prosperity.
26.6% came from the PNA. The
main economic sectors providing
new job opportunities were the
commerce sector, restaurants and
hotels (33.7%), the construction
sector (31.8%), and the
manufacturing and mining sector
(11%). As for the distribution of
workers according to economic
activity, the data indicates that the
services sectors (commerce,
restaurants, hotels, transportation,
storage, communications and other
services) were the main employers
in the Palestinian economy, with their
share of employment reaching 51%
in the Palestinian territories (46.7%
in the West Bank and 57.9% in the
Gaza Strip) in 1998. Among the
reasons for the increased share of the
services sector in employment in the
73.4% of the new
job opportunities
added in 1997 came
from the Palestinian
private sector and
the Israeli economy
Source: PCBS, Surveys of the Labour Force.
Worker status
Employer
Family member, without wages
Self-employed
Wage-earning employee
Number of workers
1995
6.8
10.1
21.1
61.6
402,350
1996
5.7
10.7
22.8
60.8
402,613
1997
5.4
10.1
23.1
61.4
436,588
1998
5.8
7.9
21.0
65.3
---
Table 4-1: Relative distribution of workers from the WBGS according to worker status (%)
Gaza Strip, compared to the West
Bank, is the lesser importance of
productive sectors (agriculture,
mining, quarries and manufacturing
industries) in the Gaza Strip, and the
increased importance of public
sector.
Workers according to
economic activity
The data indicates that 73.4% of the
new job opportunities added in 1997
came from the Palestinian private
sector and the Israeli economy, while
Economic policies86
Palestine  Human Development Report 1998-1999
Total
39,300
58,800
75,040
86,800
92,000
Production
(in millions of $)
5,286.26
6,077.95
6,731.24
Year
1994
1995
1996
Public sector contribution
(%)
12.7
16.5
22.4
Table 4-2: Share of the public and private sectors in production in the WBGS (including Arab Jerusalem)*
Private sector contribution
(%)
87.3
83.5
77.6
Source: PCBS. National accounts.
The private sector includes the NGOs. Production includes intermediary consumption, and value added.*
The share of public sector employ-
ment is increasing incrementally,
reaching about one-fifth of the labor
force. The relative importance of the
public sector role in employment varies
between the WBGS: 27.7% in the Gaza
Strip in 1997, compared to 14.3% in
the West Bank. The distribution of PNA
workers between the civil and military
sectors in 1997 was 55.8% working in
civil institutions and 44.2% in military
services. The average annual increase
in the number of PNA employees was
30% per annum between 1994-1997
(43.6% in the military sector, and
22.5% in the civil sector).
The expansion of public sector
employment led to an increase in
expenditure on current costs at the
expense of investment, which in turn
increased the PNA budget deficit,
covered by grants, donations and local
and foreign loans.
The share in employment of the
Palestinian private sector fell from
70% in 1995, to 66% in 1997, as
did the agricultural sector,
decreasing over time from 14.5% in
1996 to 12.1% in 1998.
Employment in the industrial sector
and the services sector tended to
stabilize, while the construction
Table 4-3: Number of PNA employees and their distribution between the civil and
                   military sectors
Source: World Bank Mission to the Palestinian Territories, 1998.
Initial estimates.*
The relative
importance of the
public sector role in
employment reached
27.7% in the Gaza
Strip in 1997,
compared to 14.3%
in the West Bank
End of year
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998*
Civil
25,500
34,800
41,020
48,400
---
Military
14,000
24,000
34,020
38,400
---
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sector fluctuated over time due to
dependency on the Israeli labor
market, and political volatility in the
region.
Unemployment
Unemployment was 14.4% in the
Palestinian territories in 1998 (12.3%
in the West Bank, and 21.5% in the
Men and women in the
labor market
The share of men out of the total
number of workers (full employment
and underemployment) increased
from 83% in 1996 to 85% in 1997, at
the expense of women’s participation
which decreased from 17% to 15%
over the same period. The absolute
number of working women decreased
by 9% (5,240 job opportunities) in
1997, compared to 1996.
Box 4-2: Drop in relative participation of women in the labor market
There are indications that the decrease in job opportunities for women is due to
structural reasons related to the labor market itself, both in the kind of jobs available
and in their quality. In spite of the increase in job opportunities in general in 1998, the
participation of women in the labor force decreased by 11.3%. This could be attributed
to the following reasons:
48% of all new job opportunities in 1997 and 56% in 1998 were inside Israel
(where males occupy 97.6% of available jobs).
Job opportunities in the PNA tend to favor males over females. The proportion of
males out of the total number of workers was 82.5% in 1997, compared to 17.5%
for females. There were 8,797 new job opportunities provided in the public sector
up to the third quarter of 1997: 7,266 employed males (82.6% of available jobs),
compared to 1,531 jobs employing females.
In the private sector, most new job opportunities in 1997 were concentrated in the
construction sector (31.8%), and in commerce, restaurants and hotels (33.7%),
where men occupied the great majority (99.2% in construction, and 93.7% in
commerce, restaurants and hotels sector).
æ
æ
æ
Gaza Strip). Unemployment levels
have been steadily decreasing since
1996. But in spite of the relative
decrease in unemployment rates, the
absolute number of job seekers
(unemployed)2 has risen from 89,900
in 1995 to 126,000 in 1996, only to
decrease again to 115,900 workers in
1997. High unemployment rates in the
Gaza Strip (compared to the West
Bank) are attributed to the weaker
capacity of the economy in the Gaza
Strip to provide job opportunities, and
Economic policies88
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In addition, there are large numbers
of discouraged workers.5 When we
add discouraged workers to the
unemployed, the unemployment rate
increases from 23.9% to 32.65% in
1996, and from 20.98% to 30.14% in
1997. These rates reflect the extent of
difficulty involved in finding job
opportunities in the Palestinian labor
market, and the psychological
conditions and frustration suffered by
thousands of job seekers. It was also
revealed that discouraged labor in the
WBGS aggravates the complexity of
the problems among the marginalized
groups in society, where it is more
widespread among women than
among men, and among the less-
educated and the young.
its greater dependence on labor inside
Israel, compared to the West Bank.
Moreover, Israeli closure procedures
are applied on the Gaza Strip more
strictly than they are in the West
Bank.
The problem is aggravated when we
consider the phenomena of under-
employment, and discouraged workers,
both of which are widespread in the
WBGS.
Underemployment reached 8.4% in
the West Bank and 2.3% in the
Gaza Strip (6.5% in the Palestinian
Territories in 1998). On the other
hand, disguised unemployment is
widespread in the public sector,
where it is estimated that only one-
half of the current number of
employees is needed.4 But as a
result of the Israeli policy of
separating the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip, the PNA duplicated
institutions in the two regions. It
also attempted to address the
Total number
of workers
338,110
347,960
350,390
355,250
346,840
383,090
368,880
Private sector share
(%)
84.2
79.8
79.7
78.6
77.8
79.6
76.3
Quarter/Year
4/1995
2/1996
3/1996
4/1996
1/1997
2/1997
1-2/1998 (average)
Public sector share
(%)
15.8
20.2
20.3
21.4
22.2
20.4
23.7
Table 4-4: Distribution of workers in the WBGS between the public and private sectors3
problem of unemployment that was
aggravated by the repeated closures
imposed on the WBGS, by
absorbing the largest numbers of
unemployed in PNA institutions.
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Wages
The data indicates a decline in living
standards and working conditions of
Palestinian laborers, as real monthly
wages declined and average work
days increased in the WBGS. Real
monthly wages declined by 5.9% in
1997 over the previous year (9.6%
decline in the West Bank, 11% decline
in the Gaza Strip and a 0.11% increase
in wages of Palestinian laborers inside
Israel). Average monthly work days
increased by 2% overall, with most of
the increase in the Gaza Strip (5.9%),
and inside Israel (5.6%); in the West
Bank, the increase in average monthly
work days was only 0.3%. This means
that workers make additional efforts
and spend more time at work in an
attempt to compensate for the decline
in real monthly wages. The increase
in differences between workers in the
Israeli labor market, and those in the
WBGS labor markets should also be
noted. In 1998 the per capita average
real wage increased for a fully
employed worker by 8.5% to NIS
59.5, and monthly income went up by
10.1% to NIS 1,347 ($353.54), while
the Palestinian worker put in an
average of 1.3 additional work days
compared to 1997.
In the public sector, the average daily
wage was NIS 53.3 in the West Bank
and NIS 45.9 in the Gaza Strip in the
third quarter of 1997.6 Public sector
wages compared to average level of
wages for the same period are 2.2%
lower for the West Bank, and 4.8%
higher for the Gaza Strip.  The
importance of the public sector as a
source of workers’ compensations
(wages and other advantages) increased
to 53% in the Gaza Strip in 1996 and
46% in the West Bank. This increase
came at the expense of the private
sector contribution which steadily
declined.
Laborers make
additional efforts
and spend more
time at work in an
attempt to
compensate for the
decline in real
monthly wages
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Box 4-3: Economic growth
                without sustainable job
                opportunities
Economic growth in the WBGS did  not
lead to progress in human development,
because it did not achieve greater levels
of independence and sustainability. It
was marked by a decline in productivity
and real wages, and a decrease in the
absolute participation rates of men and
women in the labor force. This, in turn,
led to a decline in the living standards
of workers, who had to devote greater
effort and more time at work, and
received lower wages. Even though job
opportunities increased (by about 8%
in 1997), this increase was not sufficient
to impact on unemployment levels that
remained high in the Palestinian
economy. These indicators reveal that
economic growth in Palestine, besides
being modest, is neither consistent nor
sustainable as a result of Israeli closure
policies, the institutionalized depen-
dence on foreign assistance, and the
lack of a mechanism for self-
sufficiency.
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Poverty and the inequitable
distribution of services and
income
Poverty is widespread in the WBGS
with a high percentage, about 23%,
of all Palestinian households under the
poverty line, and about 14% in deep
poverty. Of poor families, 60% cannot
meet their basic needs of food, and
housing. Poverty is more prevalent in
southern, central and northern Gaza
Strip, and in the governorates of Jenin
and Hebron. Refugee camps and
villages also suffer higher poverty
rates compared to the cities.
In spite of the short history of the
experience and the persistent external
factors, a large number of procedures
still need to be established in order to
promote investment. On one hand,
work is continuing on legal reforms,
but the slow pace of these operations
and the complex procedures have not
created investor confidence. In
addition, many practices by PNA
bodies and officials in the Palestinian
public sphere, combined with
bureaucracy in economic transactions,
have repelled Palestinian expatriate
capital and foreign capital. Moreover,
Palestinian public sector employment
º Investment and
   development
The establishment of the PNA offered
a historic opportunity to promote the
Palestinian economy by introducing
real reforms in the regulatory and
investment environment. The
establishment of the PNA also led to
the growth of the public sector, and
to its substantial contribution to
investment and employment, and to
the setting up of institutions that
facilitate the process of investment.
policy and administrative performance
have been the target of considerable
criticism; there are numerous exam-
ples demonstrating abuse of power and
administrative and financial corruption
in a number of PNA organs.
Investment capital declined in 1998.
The records of the relevant ministries
indicate that during this year there was
a decrease in the number of
applications submitted for licenses,
and in the size of capital registered in
these applications.
60% of poor
families cannot
meet their basic
needs of food, and
housing
Box 4-4: The poor get poorer, and the rich richer
Economic policies did not persuade Palestinians that the gap between rich and poor was
narrowing; in fact, 73% said the gap between the two groups was increasing. The percentage
of Palestinians who felt this was higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank.
DSP, Palestinian Public Opinion Poll, June 1999.
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A large number of
procedures still need
to be established in
order to promote
investment
Table 4-5: Decline in size of investments
The PNA issued a
number of
important economic
laws
Opinion polls
indicate that
Palestinians widely
believe that
favoritism and
personal
connections are
used commonly in
official processing
Regulatory environment for
investment
The PNA issued a number of
important economic laws, such as the
Law for Promotion of Investment, the
Law of the Palestinian Monetary
Authority, the Law for the Registra-
tion of Residential Apartments and
the Law for the Regulation of
Currency Exchange. Various studies
that have analyzed these laws have
concluded that they are similar to laws
prevalent in the region. There are
some reservations as to their lack of
harmony with international trends,
however, such as linking the
Palestinian Monetary Authority with
the Ministry of Finance, and granting
the government power of intervention
in decisions related to monetary
policy. As for the Law for the
Regulation of Currency Exchange, it
prohibits money changers from
providing loans, thus depriving a
large sector of citizens from access
to credit that cannot be provided by
commercial banks, due to the high
degree of risk involved. Among the
important laws that could positively
effect the regulatory environment and
that should be given priority are: the
Basic Law, the Law of Public
Freedoms, the Labor Law, the Income
Tax Law, the Anti-Monopoly Law, the
Law of Companies and the
Bankruptcy Law.
Procedures and regulations
Opinion polls indicate that Palestin-
ians widely believe that favoritism
and personal connections are used
commonly in official processing.
They believe the procedures followed
are ambiguous at best, and totally
lacking in other cases. Procedures are
often not published or are published
in a confusing manner. Thus the
procedures and their follow-up
increase in number, and are burden-
some for trade, investment and con-
struction operations. In addition, the
1996
-
-
66a
76.1
104
182.5
1998
347
19.8
84
17.0
19
123.9
1997
718
85.2
103
50.2
68
160.7
Item
Number of registered companies
Capital of registered companies (in millions of dollars)
Number of factories licensed
Capital of factories licensed (in millions of dollars)
Number of applications for investment incentives
Capital of applications for investment incentives (in millions of
dollars)
Source: Archives of relevant ministries.
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fact that many economic and
investment activities are conditioned
on the approval of the security
bodies, encourages abuse of power,
discourages entrepreneurs and
pollutes the investment environment.
In fact, the powers granted to the
security bodies in general facilitated
their interference in economic
activities; in return for securing
necessary licenses, allowing
operations, or facilitating procedures
with tax authorities and at the border
security personnel would demand a
percentage of the profits without
contributing to the capital. This led,
in certain cases, to the migration of
Palestinian capital, especially
expatriate capital. It also led to the
obstruction of many local investment
projects.
On the other hand, the PNA obliged
companies importing to the
Palestinian market to deal through a
Palestinian agent (or a Palestinian
distributor), thus limiting the
monopolization of the Palestinian
market by Israeli importers. This
decision encouraged foreign
companies to regard the Palestinian
economy as separate from the Israeli
economy and to have separate
agencies. A prevalent view is that such
procedures have consolidated existing
monopolies, and caused losses to
small merchants.
The PNA also required that an Arabic-
language composition and usage
sticker be appended on imported
products, which contributes to
enhancing public safety. An institute
for standards and specifications was
established, and it began work on
Palestinian specifications, some of
which have already been adopted. As
for public safety, the Palestinian
Ministry of Labor established a
division for Public Safety and
Occupational Health to protect
workers at the workplace, although
this institution still lacks mechanisms
that define and enforce public safety
and set sanctions in the event of
violations.
The Ministry of Supply conducts
intensive inspection campaigns to
monitor the sale of basic goods and
their fitness for human consumption.
However, in addition to a shortage of
staff, ministry employees complain of
an inability to control all channels of
entry for  products with expired dates,
due to the long border between the
West Bank and Israel, and the use of
Israeli settlements as an intermediary
point for the entry of such products.
The Palestinian inspectors also lack
adequate powers to follow and inspect
trucks. There is a need for reviewing
and streamlining investment-related
procedures, reducing bureaucratic
red-tape, ending any role for the
security bodies in these procedures,
There is a need for
reviewing and
streamlining
investment-related
procedures and for
reducing
bureaucratic red-
tape
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and making some of these issues
subject to the judicial authority in an
institutionalized manner.
is to establish companies similar to the
electricity companies. Transportation
has always been owned by the private
sector in the form of monopolistic
concessions for different routes.
The infrastructure
The PNA policy on infrastructure
services is to empower the private
sector so that it will become the
provider. In fact, the telecommuni-
cations sector was transformed into the
Palestinian Telecommunications
Company. The Gaza Electricity
Company, along with similar
electricity companies in West Bank
areas, was established to provide
electricity services as part of the
private sector, whereby the companies
are initially owned by local councils
entrusted with servicing the area. As
for water, the issue is still undergoing
discus-sion, but the general orientation
Box 4-6: Monopolies do not
                advance human
                development
Monopolies have raised genuine
concern among Palestinians about high
prices for poor services. However, the
experience of many countries has
demonstrated that telecommunic-
ations, fuel, tobacco and cement
sectors, for example, can be regulated
in a way that allows free competition
and gives the incentive for efficiency,
upgrades the level of services and
lowers costs.
Institutions
Public institutions have progressed
considerably since their establishment,
and are being dealt with normally by
investors. The registration of
companies is now the sole
responsibility of the Ministry of
Economy and Trade. Work has also
commenced (though at a slow pace)
on the commercial registry. The
Ministry of Economy and Trade has
established relatively good relations
with the different institutions of the
private sector. The Department of
Investment in the Ministry has reached
Economic policies
Box 4-5: Commercial agreements, treaties and funds
The PNA concluded a number of commercial agreements with governments
and international agencies, although  Israeli procedures have so far obstructed
the possibility of benefiting fully from these agreements.  Free trade
agreements were concluded with the EU and with the US, and another
agreement with IFTA is ready for signature. In addition, commercial trade
agreements were concluded with Jordan and with Egypt. The International
Investment Guarantee Agency has established an investment guarantee fund
to support the Palestinian economy for investments brought in from outside
the WBGS. The World Bank and International Finance Corporation (IFC)
helped the PNA establish the Real Estate Mortgage Corporation, to promote
housing loans. The Corporation will provide long-term loans to commercial
banks and financial institutions for their use in providing loans for housing.
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an advanced stage of organization in
the application of the Investment
Promotion Law. According to this
Law, the Ministry should decide
within 30 days after the submission of
each application, otherwise the
applicant is automatically granted the
exemptions provided for in the Law.
The Ministry of Industry has also
developed a prominent relationship
with different industry owners, and has
helped set up industrialist associations
in different branches of industry. It is
also taking part in the drafting of a plan
to develop internal and border
industrial zones.
of total deposits by the end of 1997.
This loan percentage is considered
small in comparison with neighboring
countries and with the role expected of
the banking sector in economic
development in Palestine, especially
since 53% of these loans were form of
loans to cover overdrawn accounts, that
is, to finance short-term commercial
operations. Much still remains to be
done to develop financial services,
particularly related to investment; there
is a need for specialized banks for
housing, industrial development and
investment. Commercial banks are also
in need of developing their services, by
reducing the time required for carrying
Box 4-7: Chambers of commerce and industry, industrial and businessmen’s associations
The chambers of commerce and industry played a prominent role in the development process in Palestine during the
occupation by issuing certificates of origin to Palestinian products. They continue their contribution by providing support
services in the area of export, import, information, training, and coordination with chambers of commerce and industry in
the Arab world and on the international level. The establishment of industrial and businessmen’s associations helps provide
services to members in various fields. It is important to give attention to this kind of contribution to the process of development,
without allowing such unions to be transformed into monopolistic centers, that burden society and endanger public interests.
Palestinian financial institutions
Palestinian financial institutions have
developed and expanded both
vertically and horizontally. The banks
operating in the WBGS and their
branches spread out rapidly, with
deposits gradually increasing to $2.090
billion by the end of 1997. Loans
offered by these banks also increased
to $612 million, making up about 30%
out transactions, and by adopting a
marketing policy that caters to
depositors and other clients.
On the other hand, the securities
exchange was established and began
operations in February 1997. Although
not yet a barometer for the Palestinian
economy, it does constitute an
important step in providing sources of
credit for Palestinian investments.
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accounted for 45% of all wages and
compensations disbursed in the
WBGS. It should be noted that the
proportion of workers in the
government sector in the Gaza
Strip (27.7%) was higher than in
the West Bank (14.3%).
The Palestinian budget increased
from $587.1 million in 1995, to
$1,858.1 million in 1998 (a rise of
216%). In addition, the value of
investment (capital) expenditure
allocated in the budget also
increased significantly, going up
from $143.4 million in 1995 to
$937.2 million in 1998. However,
the almost complete dependence of
the PNA in financing capital
expenditure through assistance
from donor countries has led to
incomplete achievement of those
plans. Whereas actual capital
expenditure during 1995 was
$189.3 million, it rose to $345
million in 1997, and stood at
$198.8 million during the first half
of 1998.
The contribution of the public
sector in the GDP went up from
12.4% in 1994, to 24.9% in 1996.
However, the establishment of a
market without laws regulating its
work leaves it vulnerable to bankruptcy
or sudden collapse.
º The Palestinian
    public sector
The Palestinian public sector
underwent major expansion after the
establishment of the PNA due to the
growth of all its components: the
government sector, government
companies and the activities of local
councils. The government sector
expanded several times over when the
PNA was established. This expansion
can be seen in the following:
The number of employees in PNA
bodies and ministries increased
from about 22,000 in 1994, to over
87,420 in mid-1998.7 As a result,
the government payroll increased
from $304.3 million in 1995 to
$220.4 million for only the first
half of 1998, accounting for 61%
of the total current expenses of the
PNA during that period.
Government wages in 1996
Table 4-6: Contribution of the public and private sectors in the GDP in the WBGS (including Arab Jerusalem)8
GDP (in millions of dollars)
2,975.00
3,574.86
3,896.75
Year
1994
1995
1996
Private sector contribution %
87.6
80.6
75.1
Public sector contribution %
12.4
19.2
24.9
Source: PCBS.
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Sectoral distribution of
public expenditure
Palestinian current and capital public
expenditure was distributed over a
large number of areas, including
more than 30 ministries, in addition
to numerous other departments and
institutions. However, current
expenses were largely focused on a
limited number of areas, namely:
Security, the Ministries of Education,
Health and Social Affairs, and the
Office of the President. While the
share of these areas decreased from
about 78% of the budget for 1996,
to about 73% of the public budget
for 1998, they continue to take up a
substantial proportion. The share of
security (about 30%) is large
compared to other countries and the
share of basic public services
(education and health) has declined
relative to other sectors. As for
capital expenditure, there are no
specific figures for allocations
published. The Budget Report covers
the allocation of a portion of the
capital needs of ministries and other
institutions, but most of the planned
capital expenditure appears within
the budget of the Ministry of
Finance.
Box 4-8: Public investment and donor countries
Public investment and disbursements by donor countries have contributed to curtailing
the decline in education, health and poverty indicators. From 1994, and up to mid-
1998, over $1,000 million from donor countries was disbursed, as can be seen in the
following table:
Still, investment in these areas was much lower than needs. It is expected that this will
have a negative impact on indicators in the future, especially in light of high population
growth rates and population needs, fewer Palestinian laborers in the Israeli market and
the concluding of the donor country support period.
Source: MOPIC, 1998.
Sector
Education
Health
Housing
Social and human development
Institution building
Other infrastructure areas
Development of democracy
Environment
Donor Assistance (in millions)
$293.5
$188.5
$87.1
$44.7
$249.3
$77.5
$70.0
$6.8
The share of
security (about 30%)
is large compared to
other countries
Public investment
and disbursements
by donor countries
have contributed to
curtailing the
decline in
education, health
and poverty
indicators
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The Palestinian public
sector: Recommendations
The Palestinian public sector can carry
out the following tasks with a view to
achieving sustainable human
development:
Continue to provide public
facilities, which include water,
electricity and sanitation, within a
management philosophy based on
efficiency and competition, and
adherence to acceptable levels of
quality and continuity.
Continue to provide basic education,
and draw up plans to develop it,
reducing the number of students per
classroom, and the number of
students per teacher, and raising the
living standards of teachers. In
addition, curricula should be
developed to keep up with scientific
developments.
Continue to provide primary
healthcare, and guaranteeing that all
citizens have access to these
services. These services should be
made qualitatively competitive with
services offered by the private sector
in order to avoid a dual health
system: a developed system
provided by the private sector at high
costs, and only accessible to the rich;
and another governmental system, at
low cost, but of low quality,
characterized by overcrowding,
serving only those who are unable
to afford the private sector care.
Provide the physical infrastructure,
including roads, sources of energy
and water, water networks, electri-
city and sanitation, and maintain
and develop existing facilities in
the service of population, and the
process of development.
Regulate the communications
market to guarantee that the
monopoly concession will not be
abused by the Palestinian Tele-
communications Company, and
accelerate the passing of legislation
regulating public monopolies, and
prohibiting private monopolies.
Provide various social security
systems that protect families from
fluctuations in their income and
consumption, and to protect them
from poverty by providing them
with basic minimum needs. Such
systems should place specific
responsibilities on individuals, the
private sector and the public sector
in funding the different forms of
insurance.
Stress the importance of social
investment namely the extent of
increase accrued in social capital.
This would include investments in
the various economic sectors, in
various public services (education,
health, culture and social welfare),
in addition to developments in
social and political institutions, in
social relations and in the overall
regulatory fram-work. There is a
To accelerate the
passing of
legislation
regulating public
monopolies, and
prohibiting private
monopolies
To stress on social
investment
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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close relationship between invest-
ment and human development
indicators that fall under social
capital, such as parliamentary and
democratic institutions, freedom of
the media, respect for human
rights, information technology, the
judiciary and others.
º The Palestinian
    private sector
The Palestinian economy underwent
radical transformations after 1993.
These developments created major
opportunities and challenges for the
future of the Palestinian economy. In
spite of the optimism that accompanied
the peace process, the overall
performance of the Palestinian
economy was poor: the real GNP
decreased by 18%, and per capita GNP
decreased by 35% between 1992 and
1996. This decrease was a consequence
of Israeli policies of closure and
separation. The overall downturn of
economic performance was
accompanied by a decrease in the
relative role of the private sector in
economic life in the WBGS.  The data
indicates that the contribution of the
private sector in the GDP fell from
87.6% in 1994 to 75.1% in 1996, while
the share of the public sector increased.
The contribution of the private sector
to production also gradually decreased,
from 87.3% in 1994 to 77.6% in 1996.
Even with this decrease, the private
sector continues to play the main role
in production.
The contribution of the private sector
in investment  decreased from 19% of
the GDP in 1993 to 10% in 1997. Real
private investment also decreased by
38% between the years 1993 and 1996.
The activities of the private sector
extended to investments in
infrastructure-related fields, such as the
Palestinian Telecommunications
Company financed and run by the
private sector with the participation of
the PNA, and the Central Transporta-
tion Station in al-Bireh built by the
Palestine Real Estate Investment
Corporation. There are continuing
attempts to set up private companies for
production and marketing of electricity.
The size of private sector investments
is estimated at $1.5 billion, of which
75% is joint investments between local
and expatriate Palestinian capital, and
25% local investments.9
º Public sector-private
    sector relationship
Declarations by Palestinian officials
imply that the Palestinian economy will
rely on the private sector to play the
leading role in the development process,
and the public sector will prepare the
enabling environment for development.
In this manner the public sector will
complement and regulate the role of the
private sector. No doubt such a
The overall
downturn of
economic
performance was
accompanied by a
decrease in the
relative role of the
private sector in
economic life
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relationship can only be forged through
ongoing discussion, and through trial
and error; it cannot be determined
according to an idealistic paradigm. On
the one hand, hegemony of the private
sector over the state cannot be
acceptable; nor can it be acceptable to
abuse political influence by setting up
monopolies that expose society to grave
risks. As for the present "strategy," it
continues to be ambiguous. The role of
the public sector has not been
elaborated in all its aspects, and so far
the relationship between the two sectors
cannot be described as an effective one.
At this stage, there is a particular need
for an active and leading role by the
PNA in development, not only in the
economic sphere, but also as it relates
to the general political environment,
human rights and the regulatory
environment. This is in addition to its
role in providing basic needs and public
services, such as public facilities (water,
electricity, sanitation, basic education,
healthcare, infrastructure, social
security systems and others) that have
a direct impact on the quality of life of
every citizen.
º Macro-economic policies
There are many questions about the
extent to which the PNA holds the keys
to economic policy, and how far it can
exploit this to bring about sustainable
human development. The ability of the
PNA to formulate an independent
economic policy appears to be limited
by the political and economic
agreements signed by the PLO and the
Israeli government. This is very clearly
manifested in the areas of foreign and
domestic trade, Israeli control of the
border crossings and the movement of
individuals and goods, and Israeli
control over the number and kind of
Palestinian labor allowed entry into the
labor market. In addition, there are a
number of internal constraints impeding
the formulation and application of
economic policies to promote human
development, among them:
the emergence of bureaucratic
cliques that are influential at
decision-making levels and have
economic ties with Israel;
marginalization of the institutional
role in development;
constraints on the role of the
Palestinian private sector which
prevent it from playing a main role
in economic development and thus
reduce its ability to impact overall
economic policies;
the weak structure of social capital;
and the weakness of the PNA
democratic system on the
economic level, and partic-
ularly in the field of develop-
ment.
The lack of a clear vision and policies
with specific objectives leads to
Hegemony of the
private sector over
the state cannot be
acceptable; nor can
it be acceptable to
abuse political
influence by setting
up monopolies that
expose society to
grave risks
æ
Economic policies
æ
æ
æ
æ
100
Palestine  Human Development Report 1998-1999
economic policies developing in most
cases as reactions to or as attempts of
1.  UNDP, 1996. Merciless growth takes place when most of the economic benefits of growth accrue to the rich,  while
     excluding the poor; silent growth is growth that is not accompanied by the spread of democracy, and social and
    economic participation; rootless growth is growth that drains away the cultural identity of the people, by
     marginalizing and dissipating it.
2.  DSP uses the term "job seekers" instead of "unemployed," because of the active connotations of the former.
3.  Data for 1995-1997: MAS: Economic Monitor, no. 2, 1997.  Data for 1998: UNSCO Report, Autumn, 1998.
4.  Interview with Dr. Mohammad Shtaiyeh (PECDAR), Al-Ayyam newspaper, Sept. 5, 1997.
5.  Discouraged workers are those who searched for work for a long time in vain, and eventually gave up searching.
     As a result, statistics do not include them within the category of "unemployed."
6.  PCBS, unpublished data.
7.  This number does not cover all employees, since there are employees working in various PNA bodies, but without
     their names being listed in the registry (see Malhis, 1998).
8.  The private sector includes the NGOs.
9.  Jamil Hararah (Director-General for Investment in the Ministry of Economy and Trade), Al-Ayyam newspaper,
     April 20, 1998.
falling into step with the perceptions
of donor countries.
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Chapter 5: Civil society organizations and human development
Civil society as a development concept
Diversity among civil society organizations
Diversity in sphere of activity and forms of relationship with the public
Non-governmental organizations and the PNA
Civil society organizations
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Introduction
Historically, development activity in
Palestine has depended on the
initiatives of civil society organiza-
tions. Until the establishment of the
PNA, these initiatives were almost
always in conflict with existing
governments in their goals, policies,
and methods of work. The aim of
these initiatives was to effect a kind
of development that would contribute
to resisting Israeli occupation and to
attaining an adequate standard of
living for the Palestinians. Successive
governments played a limited role
(and in many cases, a subversive role)
in providing social services to the
population and in investing in human
capital. NGOs had an important role
in filling the gap created by the
policies of successive governments.
Many charity and relief societies were
established, based on family and
political bases, and offered services
to the poor sectors of Palestinian
society. These societies were most
active during and after the outbreak
of wars, providing forms of assistance
to those devastated and dispossessed
by the events. Such non-governmental
organizations played an important role
under Israeli occupation.
Occupation policy deliberately
neglected the Palestinian economy,
and fostered dependency on the Israeli
economy, while ignoring infrastruc-
ture and basic community services for
the Palestinians. The absence of a
national authority, or any official
Palestinian governing body in the
WBGS, led to the growth of civil
(non-governmental) organizations and
institutions to cover needs, and to
provide the community with various
basic services. In general, Palestinian
NGOs filled two major roles: they
contributed to resistance against
Israeli occupation, and supported
Palestinian society by protecting it
from the consequences of occupation.
Within these initiatives, many
organized bodies were established in
the form of charitable organizations,
NGOs and academic institutions as
well as organizations of a more
popular composition, such as trade
unions, political parties and local
committees. All of these bodies played
a major role in the development
process through their efforts to halt the
Israeli policy of de-development.
Despite this, Palestinians were able to
maintain a "reasonable" level of
human development by international
standards, particularly in the fields of
education, health and social programs.
The Palestinian experience with
organized community work is
considered to be one of the richest
experiences at the international level,
both in its ability to safeguard the
Palestinian social fabric, and through
the services it offered to compensate
Palestinian NGOs
played two major
roles: they
contributed to
resistance against
Israeli occupation,
and supported
Palestinian society
by protecting it
from the
consequences of
occupation
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in some cases for the lack of govern-
ment services. This experience was
distinguished by a high degree of
grass-roots participation; NGOs
depended on the spirit of community
initiatives and constructive partici-
pation by various sectors of the public
in order to implement their activities
and, in some cases, to protect them.
º Civil society as a
   development concept
The human development concept
regards civil society as a sphere for
the mobilization and organization of
individuals for wide-scale and
effective participation in the
development process. In this concept,
civil society is considered a partner in
economic, social and political
development, and contributes to
alleviating the negative impact of
economic growth and economic
policies that leave large sectors of
society virtually unprotected. Civil
society also contributes to the
development process by carrying out
tasks that government institutions do
not usually perform, particularly in
serving disadvantaged groups and
areas, thus expanding economic and
political opportunities and choices for
members of society. The existence of
civil society also has political meaning
indicating the nature of the prevailing
political regime, and the size of
democratic space allowed by the
government. This in turn gives rise to
competition between organizations of
civil society, on the one hand, and
government institutions. This
competition is more intense in the
presence of external development
funding, and when NGOs are
affiliated with political parties in the
opposition. The great diversity in
NGO activities and forms of
organization makes it difficult to place
them all in a single group, either from
a theoretical, legal or procedural
viewpoint.
Civil society and the state
Civil society is considered the
advocate and the embodiment of
democracy, political freedom and civil
rights. But however valid this view
might be, supported as it is by
comparative studies, there is a
tendency to oversimplify the
relationship between the state and
civil society, reducing the state to
government (the executive authority
only), and ignoring the extensive
diversity of NGOs. This diversity can
be seen in the activities of each NGO,
the social groups it targets, its sources
of funding, vision, internal structure
and the conditions surrounding its
establishment.
This viewpoint also tends to place
NGOs outside society, regarding them
The Palestinian
experience with
organized
community work is
considered to be one
of the richest
experiences at the
international level
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as bodies that provide services or
carry out tasks related to
development, and that mobilize or
advocate from outside society. It
tends not to regard them as a vital part
of the social formation with their own
specificity, and interacting within a
regional and international environ-
ment that has its influence and
extension inside these organizations.
This perspective also tends to over-
simplify the relationship of NGOs
with the state or the central authorities.
In reality this relationship may take
different forms, varying in degrees
and complexity. The tendency to
oversimplify also affects NGOs’
relationship with each other, which
can be characterized by coordination,
competition or conflict, according to
their field of activity, vision, source
of funding and social roots.
º Diversity among civil
    society organizations1
The organizations of Palestinian civil
society are diverse in their activities
and vision. The most prominent kinds
of organizations are:
Charitable societies
These organizations aim at alleviating
poverty and deprivation and assisting
those in dire need, without trying to
introduce qualitative change in the
conditions of these groups. These
societies represent the largest group
of NGOs, nearly one-third. This is
partly a reflection of their history,
since a considerable number of these
organizations could only form as
charitable and religious societies, and
avoided any activities of a clear
political or developmental nature.
Box 5-1: Civil society: A broader framework
The forms of relationship between the PNA and NGOs can vary according to the
variation in types and functions of these organizations. There is a need to regulate this
relationship on an impersonal basis, through legislation drafted with the participation
of the concerned parties. These laws should safeguard the independence of civic and
non-governmental organizations in relation to the executive authority of the state, define
their frames of reference, strengthen their public accountability, and monitor their
budgets through the relevant organs of the central authority. To compress the
organizations of civil society into a single type, with a unified vision and identical
modus operandi, negates the main component characteristic of civil society, which is
the space where diverse and divergent (and in some cases, contradictory and conflicting)
social, intellectual and political expressions and visions are represented, competing
and coexisting together. These diverse formations are the expression of the diverse
and complex socio-economic and political composition of any society, and including
the Palestinian society in the WBGS.
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Organizations with
empowerment or
development-oriented policies
These organizations make up about
20% of NGOs, the vast majority of
which are urban-based (85.5%). Their
aims are to effect change in the
capabilities of their constituency and
improve their life opportunities. They
are very diverse in the size of their
outreach, and in their effectiveness.
These NGOs are among the most
recently established. Most began by
being linked to the PLO and to its
factions, but eventually followed an
independent path. The organizations
benefited from the supportive
international environment for
development-oriented NGOs, the
transformations in the status of the
PLO, and the nature of the political
period.
These organizations and institutions
played an important role in providing
services that were lacking due to the
policies of Israeli occupation
authorities and the absence of a
national authority or state. They are
now demanding that the laws and
regulations governing their relation-
ship with the PNA be clearly specified.
The PNA needs to provide a compre-
hensive development policy within
which its relationship with civil society
will be clear. Most of the NGOs have
maintained their independence, while
establishing working partnerships with
PNA institutions. Their relationship
with the PNA is different than their
previous relations with the PLO and
its factions before the establishment of
the PNA.
Box 5-2: Transparency and accountability
On many occasions, civil society organizations, and particularly those
involved in development activities, have been requested to consolidate
networking and coordination among them, and to demonstrate the principles
of transparency, accountability and democratic methods in their dealings
with the public and with their staff.
The NGOs are
demanding that the
laws and regulations
governing their
relationship with the
PNA be clearly
specified
Political parties and forces
Even though the political parties
make up a small portion (1.5%) out
of the total number of civil
organizations, their influence is
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Box 5-3: Palestinian universities
                are civil society institutions
Universities are among the most
important channels of the development
process. In Palestine, universities were
established by civil initiatives, with
support from the community and the
PLO. At present government regulations
are being applied to these universities.
The universities' real accountability,
however, lies in the extent to which they
participate in the development of
Palestinian society and provide
qualitative education to serve its
objectives. Palestinian universities
continue to suffer from chronic financial
crisis, a condition that limits their
qualitative contribution to development.
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widespread. Opinion polls indicate
that about 60% of all adults support
an existing political faction or party.
Most of these organizations are active
in the WBGS (and some of them in
Palestinian communities abroad).
Some parties or movements are active
in the Gaza Strip alone, appearing
after the PNA was established, but
their activities and influence are very
limited.2 There are differences among
these parties’ ideological frames of
references, their relations with the
PNA, and their political and social
platforms. They also hold different
perspectives concerning a political
settlement, the tasks remaining for the
national liberation movement, and the
nature of the desired Palestinian
political system. On the social level,
there are secular perspectives and
religious perspectives.
Political parties and organizations
can play an extremely important role
in consolidating a democratic
political system, and in vitalizing
civil society because of their
diversity, legitimacy and freedom of
action. However, they have been
blamed for a decline in grassroots
activities and effectiveness in
presenting political and develop-
mental platforms and alternatives.
They also have made a very limited
contribution in influencing the Law
of Political Parties, a draft law that
has not been passed to date.
Unions and trade unions
Popular organizations, and labor and
professional unions are active in
organizing and mobilizing the people
and particular groups to defend their
interests. These unions were an
extension of the PLO and its main
factions. The Islamic movement began
to participate in such forms of
organization in the last two decades.
These unions account for a significant
share of civil organizations (about
11%, without taking into consideration
their branches). However, their
membership and grassroots support
have declined substantially in recent
years after the Intifada and the
establishment of the PNA.
The unions are criticized, along with
other organizations of civil society, for
being an elitist and disregarding the
rules of the democratic process. Most
unions have not held elections for
many years, and are no longer close
to the grassroots they once
represented. Some have reoriented
themselves from being popular unions
to working as pressure groups that
receive funding from international
organizations. Many of the leaders of
unions are currently employed in PNA
institutions. Some of these
organizations have been affiliated, in
one way or another, with institutions
of the executive authority. An
exception to this rule are university
student groups, that are set up
Political parties and
organizations can
play an extremely
important role in
consolidating a
democratic political
system
Most unions have
not held elections
for many years, and
are no longer close
to the grassroots
they once
represented
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according to political affiliation, and
run for elections once a year inside
each university. Another exception
could be some of the chambers of
commerce and industry.
Popular unions, and political parties,
can play an important role in
consolidating democracy, on the
political, social and economic levels.
They can use their role as intermediaries
representing the public and defending
the interests of various social sectors
and groups, not only in the face of
violations or policies of the central
authorities and the public sector, but
also in the context of working
conditions in the private sector and
market volatility.
Human rights and advocacy
organizations
This group includes civil institutions
and organizations with a diversity of
interests and activities, such as:
organizations for the defense of human
rights, civil freedoms, democracy,
children, women, prisoners, and the
handicapped; and organizations for
environmental conservation, combating
drug addiction, preventing traffic
accidents, and others. Many of these
organizations emerged in the 1990s, in
response to local needs and interna-
tional interest in these areas. They
account for about 5% of the total
number of civil organizations in the
WBGS. Their relationship with the
PNA varies, from a relationship of
complementary work and coordination
(such as the organizations for prisoners,
handicapped and against drug abuse),
to that of "pressure group," to a
relationship of criticism and conflict (as
is the case with some of the
organizations that defend human rights
and public freedoms). Some of these
organiza-tions have been criticized for
their work being influenced by funding
imperatives, especially their quality and
sustainability, and because their reports
do not adequately address the
Palestinian public.
Institutions of culture, research
and artistic expression
These organizations make up a
sizeable portion (about 18%) of
Palestinian civil society institutions.
They have diverse fields and spheres
of activity, including: many local
cultural fora (seminars and lectures),
and public education centers (public
health, childcare, democracy and civic
rights, etc.), public issue centers,
specialized research centers (media,
water, environment), and centers of
multi-disciplinary developmental
work, both university-affiliated and
independent centers. There are also
institutes that are specialized in policy
research directed to decision-makers,
and others that focus on training and
rehabilitation, which are private
sector- oriented.
Some of these
organizations have
been criticized for
their work being
influenced by
funding imperatives,
especially their
quality and
sustainability, and
because their
reports do not
address the
Palestinian public
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Sports clubs
Clubs that organize sports activities
for youth account for about 19% of
the total number of civil organizations
in the WBGS. Over one-half are based
in villages, one-third in cities, and
one-sixth in camps. The development
role of sports institutions (both NGO
and governmental) is not clear in this
area, and Palestinian sports has so far
not been promoted to become
competitive on the Arab or interna-
tional levels.
º Diversity in sphere of
   activity and forms of
   relationship with the
   public
Most of the NGOs are active locally
within the community in which they
are based (city, village, camp), while
some are active on the national level.
NGOs are concentrated in cities; two-
thirds (65.5%) have their main
headquarters in urban areas, even
those that have extended their
activities to villages and camps. About
27% of all NGOs operate in a single
village, and about 7.5% in a single
camp.3 NGOs also vary as to the size
of the public they work with.4
Social and charitable Palestinian
NGOs provide different kinds of
assistance: in-kind assistance,
financial assistance, loans, health
services, educational services,
rehabilitation or training. Some
organizations provide more than one
kind of assistance or service.
Box 5-4: NGO work and
                  poverty
There is a correlation between the
activities of NGOs and poverty rates.
It is estimated that about 76% of all
NGOs are in the West Bank, and 24%
in the Gaza Strip. Of the West Bank
NGOs, 43% are based in the north,
35% in the center, and 22% in the
south, while 69% of the Gaza Strip
NGOs are based in the city of Gaza.
When these figures are compared to
the population distribution, and
poverty rates according to geographic
distribution, it is clear that the areas
with greater poverty are not given
proportionate attention by many of
the NGOs. This underscores the
importance of the role played by these
organizations in alleviating poverty,
and the usefulness of comprehensive
planning towards that end. It also
points to the importance of extending
NGO activities to the poorer areas,
which some NGOs have already begun.
Box 5-5: Diversity of target groups
Youth are the sector most targeted by Palestinian NGOs. About 39% of all
NGOs offer "youth services," either as a main or secondary field (divided
among sports 19%, training 6%, education 6%, and culture 8%)5. The
organizations targeting women and workers make up about 19% of the
NGOs, those focusing on economic development about 12%, those targeting
the groups with special needs about 8% (prisoners, veterans, handicapped
and elderly), and human rights organizations and research institutes about
3% each, out of the total number of NGOs.
There is a
correlation between
the activities of
NGOs and poverty
rates
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NGOs and participation
The majority of Palestinian NGOs
have a long history of involvement
with the people, however, a definite
decline has taken place in their
constituency. This can be seen in the
visible drop in membership, and in the
limited communication between the
public and the leadership of these
organizations, especially in setting
priorities, contributing to decision-
making and actual participation in
projects.
The decline in voluntary work in the
last decade deserves examination by
the NGOs to understand its causes,
relationship to living conditions,
prevalence of individualist values, low
value of participation, political
developments (dependence on the
PNA), and the work methods and
programs of the NGOs themselves.
The vocational transformation of a
number of NGOs could also be a
reason behind the decline in voluntary
work. In a considerable number of
NGOs, voluntary work has shrunk to
membership of their administrative
boards and general assemblies.
A lack of clarity in the roles of NGO
administrative boards and general
assemblies, and in their relationship
with management of the institution,
raise doubts as to democracy in these
organizations and the extent of
transparency in their work. This
problem is not restricted to the work
of Palestinian NGOs, but has emerged
as a problem in the work of Arab
NGOs as well.6 The decline in
voluntary work has also affected
membership of the popular organiza-
tions and unions (in particular, among
women and workers) and,  in varying
degrees, the membership of most of
the political parties and organizations
that formed the PLO.
The decline in
voluntary work in
the last decade
deserves
examination
NGOs vary in the numbers of salaried
employees. The available data
indicate that most NGOs employ a
small number of employees.  A
modest percentage, 19% of all NGOs
(including charitable societies and
clubs), offered their services solely
dependent on voluntary efforts.7
About 70% of the representatives of
these institutions declared that they
depend on volunteers for the
implementation of their projects. On
the other hand, 43% of NGOs employ
1-10 employees, and about 25%
Most NGOs employ
a small number of
employees
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Box 5-6: Activating the role of
               general assemblies
The data indicate that 80% of all NGOs
have a general assembly, while 18%
have a board of trustees. In 69% of the
NGOs, an elected administrative board
manages the work. Though such data
should be viewed with caution, they do
indicate an interest, at least nominally,
in having effective general assemblies
in the institution.
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employ 11-50 employees. The NGOs
that are members of the Palestinian
NGO Network tend to employ a
greater number of employees
compared to the organizations that are
members of the General Union of
Charitable Societies. There are a
number of reasons, the most important
being that more funding is available
for the Network partners, and the kind
of services provided by its member
organizations require a higher level of
specialization and professiona-lism in
their work.
º NGOs and the PNA
The establishment of a Palestinian
national authority for the first time on
Palestinian land has raised the need
to re-assess the experience of
Palestinian NGO work and its role in
the context of the new political,
economic, and legal conditions
resulting from the Palestinian-Israeli
peace agreements. In general, the
relationship between PNA institutions
and NGOs is characterized by cooper-
ation and coordination at times, and
by competition and conflict at others.
Box 5-7: Palestinian NGOs and the public
When asked whether Palestinian NGOs and charitable societies devote attention to needy groups in society, 42% of the
Palestinian public gave a positive response, while 21% gave a negative response. The percentage of satisfaction with the
work of these organizations was higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip.
On whether NGOs have played their expected role in the development process, results were as follows:
When respondents were asked whether they were members in any of these organizations, the response was as follows:
Regarding their confidence in these organizations, the respondents expressed higher confidence in social institutions than
in institutions active in the political sphere:
Yes
39%
24%
34%
Somewhat
34%
19%
23%
No
19%
45%
22%
NGOs
Political parties
Professional and trade unions
No
84%
84%
81%
Yes
16%
16%
19%
NGOs
Political parties
Professional and trade unions
Palestinian universities
Zakat committees
Women’s unions and organizations
Political opposition
Professional and trade unions
Somewhat confident
24%
21%
26%
19%
23%
Have confidence
68%
57%
30%
24%
34%
Lack confidence
6%
16%
28%
45%
22%
The relationship
between PNA
institutions and
NGOs is
characterized by
cooperation and
coordination at
times, and by
competition and
conflict at others
æ
æ
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The relationship between the PNA and
Palestinian NGOs has been influenced
by a number of variables, dating back
to the long history of PLO institutions
being tied to these organizations
before the establishment of the PNA.
This relationship essentially favored
the political role over the develop-
mental role in the work of these
organizations in the 1970s and 1980s.
This gave rise to organizations that had
mainly political and party-affiliated
objectives guiding their activities,
although they did also offer various
services to different sectors of society.
Alongside these organizations, other
organizations with a focus on
development emerged beginning in the
late eighties. This new approach was the
result of experience with the Intifada
and its new needs that included, in
addition to the political basis for
confrontation, unified economic and
social institutional support to activate
popular participation in the struggle
against Israeli occupation.
Box 5-8: Different perspectives on the PNA-NGO relationship
There are divergent viewpoints among officials in PNA institutions about the relationship
with NGOs. Some officials believe in the need to establish clear and strict mechanisms
to regulate the work of NGOs. This perspective is part of their approach to the relationship
with civil society in general, either because these officials have concerns over the
emergence of a political and developmental alternative to their own role, or because
they believe that firmness is necessary to check the financial and administrative dealings
of NGO leaders. With such an approach, it is difficult to see a role for the effective
partnership which many independent NGOs have been calling for.
The other approach among PNA officials is for regulating the work of these organizations
under a "modern" law that allows these organizations to operate, and secures a reasonable
degree of participation, transparency and accountability. The advocates of the second
approach regard the work of these organizations from a pragmatic perspective. Too
much control over the work of these institutions could lead to a reduction in their necessary
services, the lack of which will cause greater suffering among the people, and lead to
higher demands on the PNA to provide these necessary services. Others uphold the
importance of the "partnership" between the NGO community and the PNA for
completing the process of national liberation and strengthening the construction process.
Some PNA officials believe in the necessity of having NGOs that will monitor PNA
institutions and hold them accountable. A number of these NGOs were originally
established for political purposes and, in the absence of an official political opposition
to the PNA, the existence of such organizations becomes a real necessity. In this context,
it should be noted that many PNA officials and employees were, and continue to be, part
of the institutions of civil society, and maintain their roles, and direct and effective
relations with them.
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As for the Palestinian civil institutions
that operated under occupation
(particularly the charitable societies),
friction with Israeli authorities and
government institutions gave them
rich experience in dealing with
"government bodies" and their
requirements. Even though these
institutions refused to comply with the
requirements of occupation, they had
to learn the rules of dealing with such
authorities for the minimum necessary
to keep themselves in operation.
Moreover, many of the societies
operative in the West Bank and
Jerusalem had experience in working
in accordance with Jordanian law, and
working with the various ministries
in Jordan.
As for relations with the PNA, some
assume that the newness of the
relationship between NGOs and the
PNA (established in 1994) is the
reason behind the "misunderstanding"
between the two sides, and their lack
of acceptance of each other. This
assumption could be partly true, but
to exaggerate its importance would
reflect a simplistic analysis of a
complex issue. According to this
assumption, time will provide the
solution to bridge the gap between "the
parties".  Hover it is not reasonable to
address this issue by depending mainly
on the healing role of time. All these
assumptions should be re-examined,
taking into consideration that the PNA
was established based on the
legitimacy of the PLO, which has a
long-standing relationship with
Palestinian civil organizations.
For many years NGOs considered
themselves to be the basis of
development work in Palestine,
especially in the absence of an official
national authority on Palestinian land.
Although they did receive support
from the PLO and from Arab and
foreign countries, they were the party
present on the ground, implementing
different programs and providing
services, and directly involved in the
daily issues and concerns of people in
Palestine. Moreover, the political
atmosphere under which many of the
NGOs were established encouraged
the concept of effective participation
in decision-making, and even more so
in implementing those decisions. On
the other hand, the mentality of the
politician, not the development
Box 5-9: Reasons for tension between the PNA and the NGOs
Many of those surveyed (81%) consider the main reason for the tension to
be competition over funding. This is followed in order by:  the difference
in experience between the leaderships from exile and those from inside
the WBGS (52%); the Law of Organizations and Charitable Associations
(52%); the political role played by the NGOs (46%); the difference over
the concept of civil society and participation (42%); and the difference in
their approach to development (32%). These results indicate that the tension
is not only due to differences in vision over core issues (development), but
also over methods of funding and administration (differences in experience
and concepts).
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worker, continued to dominate the
concepts and methods of work of
many leaders of Palestinian NGO
work.
funding is at the center of this
competition, despite the fact that
NGOs receive most of their funds
from their international counterparts,
Box 5-10: NGOs and the future
About 42% of those surveyed felt that NGOs enjoy a reasonable degree of freedom
under the PNA; 21% of them regarded the future with a high degree of confidence and
optimism; 60% regarded the future with a moderate degree of confidence and optimism;
and 17% with a low degree of confidence and optimism.
A number of NGOs
have become an
inseparable part of
PNA institutions in
terms of funding,
administration, and
type of programs
Civil society organizations
Box 5-11: NGOs and the law
The Union of Charitable Societies and the Palestinian NGO Network have worked
for the passage of a modern law to regulate their relationship with the PNA, and
safeguard their independence. These organizations succeeded in setting up organized
and effective lobbying committees that brought about PLC acceptance of many of
their proposals, and the introduction of these proposals into the draft text of the Law
of Organizations and Charitable Associations. The PLC voted on the draft law and
approved it. However, controversy continues as to the legitimacy of the law, and on
the interference of the executive authority in the process. Nevertheless, the work that
preceded the passing of the law, and the wide-scale and effective NGO participation,
have set an example to be followed by other institutions, and by NGOs in neighboring
countries. A special ministry was set up for NGOs in June 1999. To date, it has not
drafted a clear and specific vision of its work and relationship with civil society
organizations  and with other ministries, and there are questions as to whether its role
is development-focused or political in nature.
While a number of NGOs have
become an inseparable part of  PNA
institutions in terms of funding,
administration, and type of programs,
many others have remained largely
independent of the PNA in these areas.
This has generated a kind of
"competition" between the PNA and
these organizations. International
rather than directly from "donor
governments." The relationship
between local and international NGOs
goes beyond funding relations to an
affinity in positions, in particular in
the area of internationally recognized
human rights, gender, the environ-
ment, civil rights and reproductive
health.
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There are many appeals and attempts
to forge a "participatory" relationship
between NGOs and the PNA in
drafting plans and policies and in
implementation. However, it would be
unrealistic to assume that the
"competition" or the "contradiction"
between them will come to an end in
the near future. This is not surprising,
particularly in developing countries
and societies. In many cases,
governments in these countries have
hesitated over whether to accept any
role for the NGOs, and "estranged"
relationships between the two sides
have prevailed for decades.
Governments tend to regard their own
role to be "in direct control" of the
work of these organizations. The
theoretical debate as to how to regulate
NGO activities is still ongoing in many
countries years after they have gained
independence. It cannot be assumed
that laws grow more "NGO-friendly"
with the passage of time, and that
authorities become accustomed to the
existence of such organizations.
Conclusions
The most obvious conclusion is
that sustainable human develop-
ment of Palestinian society requires
activating civil society to its maxi-
mum capacity, particularly in light
of scarce natural resources. The
young age of PNA government
institutions gives the Palestinians
the advantage of establishing their
institutions through partnership,
benefiting from experiences of
other countries.
Civil society organizations should
not be seen as rigid or static units.
They are potent social formations
operating in a dynamic context.
The history of Palestinian NGOs
during the last decades, under
successive authorities and different
political and economic conditions,
is a clear demonstration. Not
surprisingly, a large number of
NGOs were established in the
WBGS in the 1980s and 1990s in
response to the changing
It would be
unrealistic to
assume that the
"competition" or
the "contradiction"
between NGOs and
the PNA will come
to an end in the
near future
Box 5-12: Divergent viewpoints on the development vision
One of the reasons behind the "competition" or "friction" between PNA institutions and NGOs is their different viewpoint on
development work and on methods of organizing civil society. For example, NGOs active in the health sector tend to focus
on primary healthcare programs, whereas the Ministry of Health focuses on secondary healthcare in addition to its work in
primary healthcare. Many human rights, democracy and women’s organizations regard themselves as monitors of the work
of government agencies. Some PNA organs are opposed to this role, regarding it as interference in their internal affairs, or
even, in some cases, as a threat to internal security. With such divergent perspectives and differences of opinion, the Palestinians
have no agreed-upon development vision that would help set objectives, maintain clarity and regulate the relationship among
the parties to "the social contract." The lack of a consensus on developmental goals has contributed to confusion and
inconsistency in dealings between the different parties.
æ
æ
Sustainable human
development of
Palestinian society
requires activating
civil society to its
maximum capacity
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conditions in these areas, and to
national, regional, and interna-
tional transformations.8 Civil
society cannot be regarded as a set
of identical organizations or
uniform units automatically
lumped together; nor can the
relationships between them and
their grass roots be over-simplified
or stereotyped. Civil society should
also not be seen as a formation of
organizations, institutions and
bodies that exist parallel to society,
or operate on its peripheries. Civil
society organizations exist and
operate under dynamic social,
economic and political conditions,
and they change according to the
transformations of their society.
Thus they are influenced by
society, and they influence society
at the same time.
The diversity of existing NGOs is
reflected in the diverse relations
forged between these NGOs and
other civil organizations. It is
difficult to establish coordination
and cooperation among the wide
range of NGOs that differ in their
vision, objectives, or target social
groups; it is easier to facilitate
coordination among NGOs
working in the same field or in the
same specialization, or among
political organizations with
differing ideologies and orienta-
tions.
Civil society cannot
be regarded as a set
of identical
organizations or
uniform units
automatically
lumped together
Coordination and cooperation
between civic organizations and
PNA institutions is a necessity,
especially to complete reconstruc-
tion and development, and to
achieve a unified view of develop-
ment. This is particularly true of
organizations working in the fields
of health, education, agriculture,
social welfare, and vocational
training. It does not apply in the
same way to other NGOs, such as
Box 5-13: NGO unions and networks
About 85% of the organizations
surveyed are affiliated with a local union
or network. One of the oldest and most
popular unions is the Union of
Charitable Societies, while the newest
and most influential for development
and policy-making is the Palestinian
NGO Network. The majority of those
interviewed (71%) said that
relationships within these networks
were democratic. 70% said that the
member organizations benefit from
membership. The organizations take
part in decision-making, draw up plans,
implement joint activities, and take part
in seminars and various training
activities. Some of those interviewed
indicated that several unions did not
hold meetings at regular intervals, kept
power centralized and had unnecessary
bureaucracy. Among representatives of
institutions, 52% said that cooperation
and coordination among them was
weak, while 65% felt positive about
cooperation and coordination among
institutions active in the same field.
æ
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human rights organizations,
political parties in the opposition,
and groups, unions and trade
unions representing special
interests which may conflict with
those of the PNA or with the
private sector, although all these
groups may share the same general
national concerns.
Moreover, an independent
judiciary gives wider protection to
civil organizations than a judiciary
controlled by the executive
authority.
Compared to other countries,
Palestinian civil society is a society
based on institutions in spite of the
setbacks it has experienced in the
Box 5-14: Cooperation for development
The relationship between NGOs and the executive authority institutions gain special
importance in determining the nature of the relationship between civil society and
political authorities. Of the NGOs in the sample, 71% declared that there was a work
relationship between them and PNA institutions, and 35% of them consider that they
have contributed to influencing decision-making in PNA institutions, for example, on
issues such as the rights of women and children. The work of NGOs with specific
ministries—the Ministries of Agriculture, Health, Public Works, Planning, Industry,
Municipal Affairs, Education, Labor, Interior, Transportation, Higher Education,
Housing, Supply, Tourism, Justice, Culture, Social Affairs, Youth and Religious Affairs—
involved both cooperation, and also efforts to influence their policies. From the number
of ministries dealt with by NGOs, it is clear that the civil society institutions have given
attention to all sectors of institutional work.
The nature of relations between an
NGO or a political organization on
one hand, and the authority or the
state on the other, differs according
to the specialization of the latter.
For example, the relations of some
NGOs (represented in the NGO
Network) with the PLC are
different from their relations with
PNA ministries. Similarly, the
relations of political parties with
the PLC differ from their relations
with executive authority officials
or with its security bodies.
last few years. The sheer number
of civil organizations gives
evidence to a culture of institutions.
The increasing number of NGOs
also indicates that more groups are
becoming interested in effecting
change, using community-based
activities to influence their future
in an organized manner, through
sustainable civil action, based on
institutions rather than individuals.
The size of NGOs also indicates
attention to institution-building;
without institution-building,
æ
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development efforts will be
dissipated and growth will not be
forthcoming.
NGOs have demonstrated their
readiness to propose and draft a
general framework of principles
and concepts regulating their
relations with the PNA. This
framework would be comprised of:
a legal framework according to
which civil organizations are
guaranteed legitimacy, continuity
and independence, and which
provides mechanisms for
transparency and accountability;
and a professional framework
which promotes moving from
relief work to sustainable
development work, under the
principle of participation. Finally,
civil organizations see the
establishment of the PNA as
providing an opportunity to
consolidate their role in resisting
occupation, and in promoting
development and civil society.
æ
Civil society organizations120
Palestine  Human Development Report 1998-1999
These remarks are based on a number of sources, including research conducted by DSP among NGOs, a sample
survey of the Palestinian public, and a series of workshops and meetings.
The draft Law of Political Parties has not been approved by the PLC to date.
It is difficult to determine an exact percentage for the distribution of these organizations for the following reasons:
the lack of a comprehensive and accurate survey of these organizations, the lack of an accurate agreed-on definition
for a civil society organization (for example, including political parties), and the ambiguity as to whether the estimate
includes the branches of the main organization or not. The above percentages were based on unpublished estimates
prepared by the Social Studies Unit at MAS. The second study does not cover the branches of civil organizations,
including political parties, in case they exist, in villages and camps. According to a small sample of NGOs surveyed
by the DSP, the NGOs were distributed as follows: 76% in the West Bank and 24% in the Gaza Strip. In the West
Bank, they were distributed as follows: 43% in the north; 35% in the center; and 22% in the south. In the Gaza Strip,
69% of all NGOs were based in the city of Gaza. As for distribution according to residential areas, the same study
provided the following percentages: 72% in cities, 21% in villages and 6% in camps.
Over one-half of all social, developmental or charitable organizations provide services and assistance to a very
small number of families (less than 100 families), and about 10% provide assistance to a relatively large number of
families (more than 1,250 families). As for individual assistance, the number of NGOs that provide assistance to a
very small number of individuals (less than 750 individuals) was over 73%, while NGOs that provided assistance
to a large number (more than 5,250 individuals) did not exceed 14%  (Jamil Hilal and Majdi al-Malki, September
1997, op. cit.).
Youth (the age group of 15 to 39) constitute 38.1% of the population in the West Bank (not including that part of
the Jerusalem annexed by Israel in 1967) and the Gaza Strip (PCBS, Population, Housing and Establishments
Census, 1997, Final Results - Summary, November 30, 1998, Table 2). Thus youth do not enjoy a special advantage
when their size relative to the total population is taken into consideration.
In a study comparing a sample of Arab NGOs with Palestinian NGOs, 32.5% of the Palestinian NGO sample said
they face problems due to shortage of volunteers, compared to 38% of the aggregate Arab sample; 11% of Palestinian
NGOs said this problem arises sometimes (while 12% of the aggregate sample said the same); 41% said they faced
no problems as to volunteers (while 45% of the aggregate sample said the same). 72% of the Palestinian sample
considered that the shortage of volunteers was due to their preference for salaried work (compared to 51% of the
aggregate Arab sample), and 13% said it was due to the decline in the value of voluntary work (compared to 41%
of the aggregate sample). As for shortage of female volunteers, 30% said it was due to the decline in the value of
voluntary work (equal to the percentage in the aggregate sample), 29% said it was because of traditions and
conventions (compared to 44% of the aggregate sample), and 22% said it was due to their preference for salaried
work  (compared to 37% of the aggregate sample). See: Shahida al-Baz, 1997, op. cit., Table 17, p. 219.
Out of a sample of charitable, social and developmental organizations (numbering 272 organizations, and excluding
the Zakat committees that depend to a large extent on voluntary work), the percentage of organizations that depend
completely on voluntary work was 15%, organizations with less than five employees made up about 33%, and the
percentage of organizations with over 20 salaried employees was 17% (Jamil Hilal and Majdi al-Malki, September
1997, op.cit.)
Out of a sample of charitable, social and developmental organizations (numbering 272 organizations, and excluding
the Zakat committees that depend to a large extent on voluntary work), the percentage of organizations that depend
completely on voluntary work was 15%, organizations with less than five employees made up about 33%, and the
percentage of organizations with over 20 salaried employees was 17% (Jamil Hilal and Majdi al-Malki, September
1997, op.cit.)
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Introduction
The analyses presented on develop-
ment management in Palestine had one
point in common: the lack of a
development vision to guide and unify
all efforts toward a desired objective.
This situation is a result of the young
age of the Palestinian experience in
integrating the main components of
society: the political authority, civil
society and the private sector. Political
and social variables, and the rapid pace
of events have also contributed to a loss
of orientation. This reinforces the need
to revive organized and democratic
debate in society in order to reach a
harmony among different development
trends and interests. Optimal utilization
should be made in this process of
human and material resources, and
respect should be paid to intellectual,
political and social pluralism.
The formulation of a development
vision requires more explicit and
detailed discussions that have the
support of decision-makers and wide-
scale public participation. The last
chapter in this Report attempts to
clarify a set of issues to be taken into
consideration in order to arrive at such
a vision. However, it does not claim
to provide a comprehensive vision.
Theoretically, a development vision is
the broad framework that takes into
consideration all political, social and
economic variables, and provides the
guidelines for a development strategy
adopted by institutions of society.
These guidelines direct different areas
of development work towards the
long-term objectives, taking into
account the interfacing that exists
among them. A vision of development
is shaped through a process of ongoing
debate in society; a democratic debate
in which all sectors of society take part
with a view to achieving the best for
all members of society. This process
is complemented by input from
centers of thought and learning that
interact with society. Basically, a
development vision is devised in the
service of a realistic goal. It is a clear
policy supported by a level of
consensus in society and bound by the
limits of material and political reality,
with the aim of enhancing human
capacities and incrementally raising
standards of living, both materially
and qualitatively.
º Palestinian Specificity1
In the context of development in
Palestine, it is important to take into
consideration the relationship between
the political (national) and the
developmental. In this context, the
question relates to the ability of
Palestinian society to make develop-
ment choices, a basic and necessary
condition for any kind of develop-
ment, at a time when the Palestinian
people continues to be denied the right
to self-determination on its land. Self-
To arrive at a
development vision
requires more
explicit and detailed
discussions that
enjoy the support of
decision-makers and
wide-scale public
participation
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determination in this case includes
two main components:
Political self-determination for the
Palestinian people;
The means for effective participa-
tion of the Palestinian people in the
process of development.
The Palestine Human Development
Profile, 1996-1997 offered a defini-
tion of the concept of development,
basing the concept on
"recognition of the importance of
development in all aspects of life, and
the right of the individual to enjoy
integrated sustained development on the
basis of equality and fairness....[And]
the importance of devising strategies
which start and end with the individual
in society."
This definition is in harmony with
other definitions of the concept of
development for Palestine, among the
most important being:
"Development is no less than a project
of civilization for society as a whole
in most of its walks of life, if not in all
of them. As such, it requires a process
of radical and in-depth social re-
education of citizens on a wide front."2
These definitions provide an indi-
genous version of the concept of human
development adopted by the UNDP,
which advocates widening the choices
before people and strengthening their
capacities to participate in development
and reap its benefits. They all serve
Palestinian goals and provide the basis
for development in Palestine, once the
necessary conditions for development
stipulated by international law are made
available. The above definitions place
the human component at the center of
the development process, respect the
humanity of the individual, and regard
them as a full partner in development.
They are in harmony with international
law, and provide the best investment
in pluralism and democracy in the
development process.
º Basic issues
Numerous factors are involved in the
discussion of a development vision for
Palestine, some of which will be
briefly presented here. As mentioned
earlier, the need remains for a detailed
examination of these issues in the
future. Among the most important of
these issues are the factors impacting
the establishment of a development-
friendly environment in Palestine:
continued Israeli occupation, the role
of the PNA, and the influence of donor
countries and foreign funding.
Factors relating to the
development environment
The report highlights three main
factors shaping the development
environment in Palestine. The policies
resulting from these factors determine
Real development
places the human
being at the center
of the development
process
Towards a Palestinian vision
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leadership role in the development
process: a role of responsible
leadership based on wide
participation and on social justice.
Donor countries: In spite of
potential self-support resources,
donor countries are still heavily
relied on as the main source of
development funding. This funding
aims at supporting PNA institution-
building, and capacity-building for
the Palestinian economy as it
moves towards a free market
economy with a greater role for the
private sector. The funding issue
continues to raise important
concerns: first, the role of
international aid in reinforcing the
state of dependency; second, the
extent of compatibility between the
donor agenda and Palestinian
interests; third, the real benefits to
Palestinian development, since part
of the funds allocated for
No other single
factor is of greater
importance than the
impact of
continuing Israeli
occupation on the
state of human
development in
Palestine
1.
2.
the possibilities and content of
sustainable human development in
Palestine.
Israeli occupation: No other single
factor is of greater importance than
the impact of continuing Israeli
occupation on the state of human
development in Palestine. There-
fore, Palestinian development
activity in all its aspects must be
emancipatory, balancing the
processes of construction and
liberation.
The role of PNA institutions: Perhaps
the most important task facing the
PNA (particularly in the political
sphere) is re-shaping the
relationship with the Israeli side to
secure greater freedom for
Palestinian society, allowing it to
gain greater control over its
development process. The PNA is
still searching for suitable mecha-
nisms through which to assume its
Box 6-1: Planning for development
Development planning continues to be a subject of debate among Palestinians. Part of the problem has to do with the limitations
on the Palestinian ability to plan: which part of Palestine is to be covered by Palestinian planning, and from where will the
resources to secure implementation of these plans come. In spite of this, several attempts at planning have been made. Ever
since the formulation of the PLO's "Economic Development Program," several successive Palestinian Development plans have
been drawn up by MOPIC for the years 1997, 1998-2000 and 2000-2003. These conceptual or planning frameworks, all of
which were presented to the donor countries, include investment programs based on the principles of free market economy,
promotion of investment and a leading role for the public sector in the development process. However, it should be noted that
these plans; 1) are not based on a comprehensive long-term development vision; and 2) offer a shopping list that is not clearly
integrated in a manner that would secure the sustainability of the development process. In addition, even though extensive
efforts were made, the preparation of these plans did not provide for participation from the public or from within the government
sector. Certainly, development planning does not only depend on the Palestinian factor; the role of donor countries and their
modes of operation affect planning as well.
3.
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Palestinians revert back to the
donor countries themselves; and
fourth, the current trend towards
borrowing, which could burden
future generations with debt.
Popular participation in
development
Beneficial development is develop-
ment that stems from the people’s
conviction and their readiness to take
part under a socio-economic-political
system that provides the opportunities
to do so. When such conviction and
readiness to take part in the develop-
ment process exist, it is the responsi-
bility of a wise leadership to translate
these given conditions into objectives
and executive programs of work that
Box 6-2: Funding the process of development and self-reliance
Funding depends on both external and self-support resources. In spite of
the importance of foreign funding for development, especially during the
current stage, there is potential for optimizing self-support funding. On one
hand, the Palestinian Ministry of Finance collects nearly $1.15 billion
annually in taxes (representing 40% of what should be paid by the Palestinian
taxpayer and of what should be transferred by Israel to the PNA from various
taxes and customs duties). This constitutes a potential reserve since this
amount can be doubled, once suitable mechanisms for tax collection are
established, and when Palestinians are motivated by beneficial economic
and fiscal policies to pay taxes. Revenue from monopolies can provide an
important asset when added to the Ministry of Finance budget. Developing
the banking sector environment in Palestine, its relations with fiscal
authorities and the conditions under which it operates, will lead to greater
investment of domestic savings. Lastly, and of great importance, is the
management of public funds; no doubt there are several areas where savings
could be made with better management and disbursal policies and practices. 1.
2.
It is not possible to
talk about
sustainable
development
without widening
the scope of
democratic
practices
maintain the right balance between
capacities and challenges, while
continuously adapting these programs
to be responsive to defined objectives.
A capable development leadership is
one that keeps in close communication
with the grass roots and is responsive
to their needs, and is capable of
mobilizing the public and of expressing
their rights as they themselves would
express them. Such a leadership will
devise detailed and applied
development programs that are both
convincing to the public, and
responsive to their needs. In brief, an
aware political leadership is part of an
aware development leadership.
Development needs an environment
capable of producing the desired
leadership on the following bases:
It is not possible to talk about
sustainable development without
widening the scope of democratic
practices. It is also not possible to
talk of human development if it
emanates from the top of the
pyramid of authority and without
effective and sustainable grass-
roots participation. This process
requires a rational exchange and
interaction between the leaders and
the public that will yield beneficial
development.
The Palestinian people are entitled
to attain the level of development
achieved by developed countries;
however, for effective develop-
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ment it is important to be realistic
and balance possibilities and
capacities in order to optimize
developmental results.
The responsibility for activating
public participation mechanisms does
not lie with the government alone;
NGOs and private sector institutions
can become an integral part of the
development process, with a high
level of responsibility towards
society. The responsibility of NGOs
is related to their role in providing
various social and economic services,
in activating public participation in
development, and in representing the
interests of different groups, and
particularly marginalized groups, to
make them beneficiaries of
development.
The private sector can affect economic
policies related to promoting the role
of workers and economically deprived
areas. This responsibility goes beyond
the concept of material gain (though
the latter is important to sustain it), to
include social responsibility and
support for culture, and the fine arts
and for health and education
development. Partnership among all
sectors of society provides the main
guarantee and the only secure
mechanism that the Palestinians will
have to depend on the future. This is
specially the case in light of forecasts
of economic decline that could result
in various social problems. Such
problems will have to be addressed
collectively, based on national unity
and real participation by the public.
Such a participatory system will enable
Palestinians to broaden their collective
choices toward any proposals or future
projects and, in the current process of
negotiations, on the political or
economic levels.
Vital groups and sustainable
human development
In applying the concept of participa-
tion, a courageous and qualitative leap
must be taken in order to achieve
comprehensive and sustainable
human development. Such a leap is
basically dependent on establishing
suitable and effective mechanisms to
integrate vital groups, whose
resources have not been sufficiently
tapped, into the development process.
These groups not only have a right to
participate in development, but their
participation is necessary and should
override any existing disagreements
among differing schools of thought.
Palestinian society and its develop-
ment leadership can set a successful
example of their ability to integrate all
social groups in the development
process, so that all people become the
producers of development as well as
its beneficiaries. The following groups
are selected as examples:
The responsibility
for activating public
participation
mechanisms does
not lie with the
government alone
Establishing suitable
and effective
mechanisms to
integrate vital
groups, whose
resources have not
been sufficiently
tapped, into the
development process
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Palestinian refugees: The question
of Palestinian refugees is of
primary importance to any
development planning in Palestine.
In addition to its political and
human dimensions, any successful
development plan should consider
the national rights of refugees
along with their human rights. As
refugees constitute the majority,
whether on Palestinian land or
outside of Palestine, the process of
integrating them and their
aspirations in the development
process requires research and
extensive efforts by political and
social forces and decision-makers.
rights they are entitled to in
Palestinian society. Despite clear
stipulations in the Declaration of
Independence and in the draft Basic
Law about equality between men
and women, major and persistent
efforts are required in many areas,
such as education, health, labor,
wages and personal and civil rights.
Basic changes have to be introduced
in legislation, and especially in the
Personal Status Law, to benefit of
women and the family in general.
Just as the benefits of the
participation of women will reflect
on society as a whole, the
responsibility for bringing about
such positive change also falls on
all sectors of society.
1.
Box 6-3: Palestinian refugees
According to Palestinian estimates, there are about 5 million Palestinian
refugees and Palestinians living at present in the diaspora; of these 75%
live in Arab countries and in Palestine, and are registered with UNRWA,
and the rest in different countries around the world. According to UNRWA
estimates (for the year 1998), there are 3,521,130 Palestinian registered
refugees, living in 59 refugee camps (10 camps in Jordan, 12 in Lebanon,
10 in Syria, 19 in the West Bank and 8 camps in the Gaza Strip). Palestinian
refugees are distributed as follows: 41.5% of them reside in Jordan, 10.4%
in Lebanon, 10.3% in Syria and 37.8% in the WBGS (22% in the Gaza
Strip and 15.8% in the West Bank).
Palestinian women: Women make
up one-half of Palestinian society.
While Palestinian women have
been forthcoming in effective
participation in national and
development activities, the size of
this participation has not been
proportionately reflected in the
Jerusalem and Areas (C ): Jerusalem
is the target of a campaign of
Judaization that affects the political
and developmental future of its
population. The size of social
problems (housing, legal and
educational rights) in Jerusalem is a
source of concern and will have
implications for the region as a
The question of
Palestinian refugees
is of primary
importance to any
development
planning in
Palestine
Fundamental
changes have to be
introduced in
legislation, and
especially in the
Personal Status Law,
to benefit women and
the family in general
Box 6-4: The Basic Law and non-
                discrimination
"Palestinians are equal before the law and
the judiciary without any discrimination
among them because of race, sex, color,
religion, political creed or disability."
Article 9, Draft Basic Law, in its third reading
before the PLC.
2.
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interests are part of the population
question as a whole, and of how far
available and potential resources can
be used in providing a suitable
standard of living for them in the
future. If population increase is not
accompanied by productive
economic growth that is beneficiary
to all, health and education resources
will not be able to provide
quantitative and qualitative services
to citizens. This will subject social
programs to major pressures, and
poverty rates will increase as a result
of rising unemployment.
The absorption capacity of the
Palestinian economy for the coming
years is not yet proven. Basic changes
are not expected in the structure of
the economy and in job opportunities
available locally or abroad. Thus any
development vision for the future
should include the interrelationship
between the rights of future
generations, population increase,
available resources for services and
the absorption capacity of the
Palestinian economy under external
pressures that are not expected to
disappear in the near future.
Jerusalem is the
target of a campaign
of Judaization that
affects the political
and developmental
future of its
population
Any development
vision for the future
should consider the
interrelationship
between the rights of
future generations,
population increase,
available resources
and the absorption
capacity of the
Palestinian economy
whole. Continuous efforts should be
devoted to the city and its population.
The claim that Jerusalem falls outside
the scope of Palestinian development
work cannot be maintained anymore.
The claim based on Israeli illegal
aunexation of city, serves to deprive
Jerusalem of external donor funding
for Palestinian development efforts.
The same situation applies to a large
extent on the areas referred to as
"Areas (C)," which do not fall under
the control of the PNA. In many of
these areas poverty is widespread,
and there is a need for organized
efforts to improve the infrastructure
and for social programs to develop
these areas and integrate them with
the rest of the regions over which the
PNA exercises its sovereignty.
Youth and children: Addressing the
question of development requires
integrating the interests of future
generations within the current
process of construction. The interests
of youth should be an important
standard in evaluating the extent to
which various plans and projects can
be conducive to development. These
Box 6-5: The future of education
Serious attention should be devoted to the question of education in Palestine, especially in light of indicators such as the large
annual increase in the number of students, estimated at 6-7% per annum. Annually there is a need for over 2,000 classrooms
and 2,000 teachers. This is added to the unsolved problem of overcrowding in schools, and the futility of the system of multiple
shifts. The absence of a modern Palestinian curriculum continues to thwart the educational process. In addition, Palestinian
higher education continues to suffer the problem of financial crisis threatening academic life in Palestinian universities.
4.
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Institution-building and
democracy
There is near unanimity on the public
level, in PNA institutions, NGOs and
the private sector on the importance
of building institutions in a
streamlined manner to provide the
foundations and the suitable
environment for sustainable human
development based on cooperation
and partnership, regulated and
safeguarded by law. The PNA has
demonstrated its interest in the various
reports issued by local and
international bodies; it has appointed
specialized committees to address the
problems indicated, and to present
recommendations as to the suitable
procedures to effect change. In spite
of this strong interest, real institutional
work is still in the beginning stage.
Though there are some modest
achievements in this area, further
achievements would certainly activate
available resources and raise the level
of all political and developmental
work.
Box 6-6: Report on strengthening PNA institutions (ROCAR)
The PNA established a senior-level committee for administrative development. Their "Report on Strengthening PNA
Institutions," known as the ROCAR Report, offered the following suggestions for developing the administrative performance
of PNA institutions:
A formal constitution or basic law, that establishes the main principles governing the complete process inside PNA
institutions;
A more streamlined Office of the Presidency, in order to strengthen the ability of the President to offer more effective
political and diplomatic leadership, and to transfer routine tasks to branch offices;
A more effective PLC, with stronger participation in decision-making on public policies, the budget, monitoring and
external oversight over the Comptroller’s Commission;
A more independent judicial system, and strengthening of the rule of law, under the supervision of a higher judiciary council;
Financial operations that are more transparent, accountable and standardized that will lead to achieving better equilibrium
between the cost and effectiveness of public administration and employment, and will strengthen the confidence of the public;
A more streamlined public administration, adopting clear standards for employment, with major cuts in the numbers of
employees and a simpler organizational structure;
A police force subject to civilian control, subject to political, financial and legal supervision by the PLC and the relevant
ministries.
In spite of the importance of these recommendations and the greater importance of setting up the senior-level committee
itself, the Palestinian public anxiously awaits positive changes that will improve the daily lives of citizens, affirm the principles
of participation and justice in the distribution of available resources, and halt certain negative phenomena mentioned in the
various reports issued by PNA institutions and civil institutions. The process of development is an ongoing and normal
process that should stem basically from the demands put forth by the Palestinian public to the PNA, that are clearly specified
up in all parts of this Report.
Sustainable human
development based
on cooperation and
partnership,
regulated and
safeguarded by the
rule of law
æ
æ
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Institution-building is closely linked
to legislation, and the separation and
balance of authorities. It is of utmost
importance that legislation be
responsive to the interests of different
groups in society. The work that
started towards improving the role of
the judiciary branch must be
maintained in an effective and radical
manner, so that the judiciary authority
will develop into an effective organ
highly respected by members of
society.
Civil society organizations
The vital role played by Palestinian
civil society contributes to affecting
balanced and sustainable human
development. Interaction between
civil society institutions is a result of
the prevailing concepts of democracy
and participation, and their role in the
development process. When civil
society is allowed an adequate role,
development will necessarily include
all sectors of society, because these
institutions and groups are
representative of the interests of their
public. In addition, political parties
have an important role in promoting
the kind of democracy needed for
development. The laws that are being
drafted and implemented on political
parties, NGOs, workers’ rights, and
integration of the disabled, are clear
indications of the kind of society that
is currently being formed in Palestine.
The private sector
The private sector remains the prime
activator for economic development in
Palestine. In order to do this, it needs a
favorable investment environment that
would render its participation possible
and effective. This environment is
determined by legislation, commercial
practices and the relationship of the
public sector and its senior officials
with private monopolies, among other
factors. Public interest requires that the
Palestinian market be open for all
Palestinian and Arab investors who are
willing to invest, without bureaucratic
or artificial restrictions that would
make their participation virtually
impossible. Investors need a
reasonable degree of safety provided
by institutional and regulated procedures.
At the same time, the private sector
cannot expect to have the exact same
market economy that is applied in other
countries; it requires creative thinking
on the part of investors to deal with
the constraints imposed on the
Palestinian economy. Moreover, the
responsibility of the private sector
towards building and consolidating
institutions of the PNA and of civil
society are greater than in other
countries.
Political parties
have an important
role in promoting
the kind of
democracy needed
for development
The private sector
remains the prime
activator for
economic
development in
Palestine
The responsibility of
the private sector
towards building
and consolidating
institutions of the
PNA and of civil
society are greater
than in other
countries
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º Human development
   indicators
There have been important achieve-
ments in the area of human develop-
ment in Palestine over the last decades
and since the establishment of the
PNA. However, there are concerns
over the possibility of a decline in
development indicators, with
negative implications for various
aspects of life in health, education and
social affairs. Reasonable economic
growth will help to provide the
resources necessary to support
various human sectors. In addition,
the establishment of a sustainable
infrastructure suitable for develop-
ment will alleviate the burden facing
society in the future and the risk of
potential decline. Human develop-
ment, as measured by the index
proposed by UNDP, is not sufficient
to indicate the quantitative and
qualitative conditions of develop-
ment, as the Report demonstrates.
However, giving attention to the
indicators, and allocating sufficient
funds for capacity-building and for
upgrading the ability of people to
contribute to the development
process, will ultimately lead society
to move in a positive direction. Such
a move will bring about participation
both in the process of development
and in reaping its benefits.
º Future indicators
A large number of indicators can be
used for monitoring the development
process in Palestine. These indicators
point to progress or decline in the
development process under certain
changing circumstances and policies.
Following is a list of these indicators
(based on importance, data
availability and need for in-depth
studies conducted in the future):
The land area and size of the
population living in PNA-
controlled areas. This is related to
the nature of political solutions for
permanent status issues, including
the question of refugees and
Jerusalem. For this, the indicator
used would be the degree of
conformity of political agreements
with international legality.
The balance and separation of
authorities, the atmosphere of
democracy provided for political
parties and other NGOs, and the
extent of compliance with the
principles of freedom of opinion
and expression, as stipulated in the
draft Basic Law.
Holding of regular and scheduled
elections, and the percentage and
quality of participation in them.
Extent of integration of vital groups in
the development process, particularly
women, the disadvantaged, the poor,
the disabled and released prisoners.
1.
2.
3.
4.
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Numbers of political prisoners,
prisoners held without trial, and
cases of torture.
Size and distribution of poverty. The
decline in poverty rates (especially
in areas of Gaza, north and south of
the West Bank, and in camps and
certain rural areas) is an important
indicator for how balanced
development policies are, and how
far current policies achieve such a
balance. This is linked to
unemployment rates, the absolute
number of job seekers
(unemployed), and the decline in
unemployment and poverty rates
among those participating in the
labor force, especially among youth.
Real average wages.
Extent of legislation and compliance
of the executive authority with
legislation; its administrative and
financial abilities to implement
legislation; extent of compliance of
legislation enacted in Palestine with
the draft Basic Law, the Declaration
of Independence and international
conventions.
Extent of ability of society to
achieve gender equality in various
spheres of life, including enactment
of laws and particularly in personal
status laws; extent of participation
by women in decision-making,
including local councils, the PLC,
the judiciary and appointments to
PNA ministries.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Self-financing of the development
process as a  percentage of total
funding needed; other economic
indicators such as rate of change
in the balance of trade deficit.
Number of students per teacher in
schools; other qualitative indica-
tors related to responsiveness of
curricula to development require-
ments, and the establishment of a
modern independent Palestinian
state; the role of society and the
PNA in financing higher education.
Quality and quantity of health
services, specially in the area of
infant mortality and immunization
coverage; in addition, the number of
accidents among children, suicides
and "honor killings" must also be
monitored.
Monitoring cultural indicators
related to the number of artistic and
theatrical productions.
Monitoring population policies,
and how far they are compatible
with human rights and the rights
of women, and their effectiveness
in reducing unbalanced population
growth rates.
Percentage of households with
electricity, drinking water and
connected to sewage networks.
Percentage of communities that
suffer from pollution produced by
quarries and stone-cutters.
Reliability of official data,
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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particularly that relate to health
indicators.
These partial indicators point to
prevailing conditions in different
sectors in Palestine. Data and scientific
studies should be provided in all these
areas. Research studies should monitor
and analyze the interrelationship
between poverty, unemployment and
population policies, on one hand, and
the making of current economic, social
and political policies, on the other.
Limited foreign labor markets, and job
saturation of the public sector, make it
imperative that policies, be drafted
giving the private sector and civil
society a vital role in creating new job
opportunities. Among the most
important challenges facing Palestinian
development is the mainstreaming of
the interests of children and youth in
future development plans, and making
sure that their opportunities in political,
economic and social development are
not wasted.
º Conclusions and general
   recommendations
The Palestine Human Development
Report, 1998-1999 presents an
integrated conception of the necessary
bases to move Palestinian society
forward towards modern statehood. The
Report urges all parties to the
development process to make the
changes necessary to move to a state of
development based on institutions, with
stronger participation and
accountability. While the Report
focuses on social, economic and
political structures at the internal level,
it also stresses the importance of
achieving national goals, and the
relationship of the latter with the
process of development and
construction. The Report presents a set
of interrelated core issues that constitute
the general framework for sustainable
human development in Palestine, taking
into consideration the necessary
relationship between the limited
elements for and the realistic potentials
of development. In general, the report
focuses on the following issues:
The necessary link between
development and construction, and
completing the Palestinian national
project; the kind of development
desired is an emancipatory
development based on the right of
the Palestinian people to self-
determination and to statehood, its
right to development and to all the
other rights endorsed by interna-
tional conventions.
Building the institutions of society
should continue along scientific
bases inspired by the principles of
the rule of law, a Basic Law or a
constitution, the separation and the
balanced relationship between the
three authorities of government,
and human rights concepts.
Towards a Palestinian vision
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Institution-building should be
based on recognition of intellectual
and social diversity and the vitality
of pluralism, in order to effect
development that will be of benefit
to all sectors of society.
Development efforts in Palestine
should be based on a participatory
approach. The Palestinian specificity
in development requires interaction
and complementarity among all
sectors of society: governmental,
non-governmental and private.
Participatory development requires
empowerment of the public by
widening choices for individuals to
practice their rights in various
spheres of life, including the
economic, health and education
spheres. It also requires participa-
tion in the process of democratic
transformation, with a wider
sphere of participation in political
decision-making and within the
different institutions of society. The
Palestinians have demonstrated a
great desire to participate and have
demanded that the suitable
environment and mechanisms for
participation be provided.
PNA institutions have taken major
steps in the process of institution-
building. However, the lack of
clear objectives, the weakness and
inconsistency in organizational
structures and job descriptions, and
the overlap between institutions
and within the same institution, all
lead to an unnecessary waste of
resources.
The Palestinian private sector has
not taken up its role towards the
development process. This is due
to subjective factors pertaining to
the private sector itself, but it is also
linked to institutional factors
related to economic policies that
have not succeeded so far in
establishing an encouraging
investment environment. The role
of the Palestinian private sector
must expand to include its social
and national responsibilities.
The NGO sector has a long history
of activity in the development
process. Its accumulated experience
can be tapped in order to develop
realistic visions of development.
The role of the Palestinian NGO
sector should complement the role
of other sectors, taking into
consideration the special role of
some NGOs in being catalysts for
change and promoting human
rights. Political parties and unions
should also take up their role in the
development process.
A qualitative and courageous leap
is needed to devise suitable and
effective mechanisms for integra-
ting vital groups. The capabilities of
these groups are not invested in the
development process, and they do
not receive the benefits resulting
æ
æ
æ
æ
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from the process. It is important to
eliminate all forms of discrimination
against women, and to integrate
them along with other social groups
in the development process. Special
consideration should be given to the
strategic interests of the Palestinian
refugees and the residents of the
refugee camps.
It is possible to create a balance
between external funding and self-
support funding for the process of
development in Palestine. Develop-
ing self-reliance will have its
positive impact on Palestinian
conditions in general, and in
safeguarding the rights of future
generations.
Even though the Palestinian people
have made important achieve-
ments, there is real concern over
the possibility of deterioration in
their development status,
particularly in human development
indicators. Balanced efforts should
be devoted to economic and social
policies, with special focus on
appropriate budgetary allocations
for education, health and other
social functions, taking into
account the role of these policies
in achieving the Palestinian
national project.
A development vision for Palestine
will guide and unite efforts
towards the desired objectives.
Such a vision should be based on
the political right of the Palestinian
people to self-determination, and
on the effective participation of
individuals and groups in the
development process. It should
recognize the importance of
comprehensive development
based on the principles of equality,
justice and safeguarding the rights
of future generations, and on the
need to devise development
strategies that start and end with
human beings.
This chapter is based on papers presented in several workshops held under the title,  "What Kind of Development
for Palestine?" and particularly the paper presented by Mr. Ibrahim Dakkak. See the Appendix for a complete list of
participants.
Yusif Sayigh, Elusive Development, publesher? 1992.
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Human Development Indicators, Palestine
Human Development Report 1998-1999
(A) Aggregate Indicators in Palestine:
Human Development Index
Economic Indicators
Employment and Unemployment Indicators
Education Indicators
Health Indicators
Demographic Indicators
Gender Indicators
Social Indicators
Human Poverty Indicators
(B) Regional Indicators: The West Bank and Gaza Strip
Population, Family and Health Indicators
Employment and Unemployment Indicators
(C) Governorate Indicators
Population & Sex ratio
Students per Teacher and  Students per Classroom
Percentage Distribution of Employed Persons by Economic Activity 1997
Percentage Distribution of Employed Persons by Economic Activity 1998
Poverty Indicators
Monthly Household Expenditure by Expenditure Groups
(D) HDI Indicators: Comparisons with Neighboring Countries
Note: Statistics issued by the PCBS were used, after re-calculating some of them by the DSP to make them
consistent with the UNDP methodology (as indicated #). Only sources other than PCBS are indicated when
used. In addition to the PCBS statistics, other statistics that appeared in the Summary Report were adjusted
by the PCBS (letter of the PCBS director, 9/11/99). The data were checked by several statistical experts,
among them Dr. Yusif Daoud and Dr. Hazim Shunnar.
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List A : Aggregate indicators in Palestine
Life expectancy at birth
Adult literacy rate
Combined first-, second- and third level gross enrolment ratio
Per capita GDP
Adjusted real per capita GDP
Life expectancy index
Life expectancy index- rank (out of 175)
Education index
Education index- rank (out of 175)
GDP index
GDP index - rank (out of 175)
HDI value
HDI index- rank (out of 175)
Gender-related development index- value
Gender-related development index - rank (out of 104)
Gender empowerment measure- value
Gender empowerment measure- rank (out of 103)
(year) 1997
(%) 1997
(%) 1998/1997 #
($) 1997
($) 1997 #
Table (1): Human Development Index
71.5
85.5
72.4
1500
2286
0.77
74
0.81
94
0.52
115
0.70
100
0.638
96
0.290
85
141
Table (2): Economic indicators
Total GNP
Total GDP
Per capita GNP
Per capita GNP
Per capita GNP
GDP growth annual rate
Exports of goods & services
Imports of goods & services
Trade balance
Percentage share of economic sectors in GDP:
Agriculture
Industry
Building and construction
Services1
Inflation rate
Percentage of Palestinian trade with Israel out of total foreign
Commitments by donor countries2
Disbursements by donor countries3
Gross capital formation
Final consumption
Gross investment to GDP
Total liabilities and assets  in the banks4
Public expenditures5
Public revenues6
Budget deficit7
Tax revenues8
Poverty rate9
1.  Services include wholesale, retail trade, transport, financial intermediation, other services, public administration, and defense.
2.  MOPIC 1998
3.  Ibid.
4.  Palestine Monetary  Authority 1998.
5.  Ministry of Finance1998.
6.  Ibid.
7.  Ibid.
8.  Ibid.
9.  Poverty Report 1998
4900
4200
1763
1500
1537
-2.4
1069.1
3879.7
-2810.1
6.4
17.6
8.9
67.1
7.6/7.8
85
5160
3469
1571.2
5278.0
37.7
3336.65
1814.37
1777.5
-36.87
678.5
23
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1997 (in millions $)
1997 (in millions $)
1997 ($)
1997 ($)
1997 ($)
1996-1997
1997 (in millions $)
1997 (in millions $)
1997 (in millions $)
1997
(%) 1997/1998
1994-1998 (in millions $)
1994-1998 (in millions $)
1997 (in millions $)
1997 (in millions $)
1997 (%)
1998 (in millions $)
1998 (in millions $)
1998 (in millions $)
1998 (in millions $)
1998 (in millions $)
1997
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Table (3): Employment Indicators 1998
Proportion of the labor force over the age of 15
Proportion of women in the labor force
Percentage of the labor force according to economic activity:
Agriculture
Industry
Building and construction
Services10
Number of workers in Israel
Number of workers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Full employment rate
Underemployment rate
Unemployment rate
Reasons for remaining outside the labor force:
Old-age / illness
Housework
Education or training
Other reasons
Distribution of employed by occupation:
Legislator, senior officials and managers
Professionals, technicians and clerks
Services, shop and market workers
Skilled agriculture and fishery workers
Craft and related trade workers
Plant and machine operators and assemblers
Elementary occupations
Unemployment rate (15-24)
Percentage distribution of employed persons by employment status:
Employer
Self employed
Wage employee
Unpaid family member
Average monthly work days
10.  Services include commerce, hotels, restaurants, transportation, storage, communications, services and other branches.
41.4
11.3
12.1
15.9
22.0
50.0
82,000
478,000
79.1
6.5
14.4
10.5
54.9
25.1
9.5
3.9
16.5
6.4
9.2
24.7
8.3
31
22.6
5.8
21.0
65.3
7.9
23.0
143
(%)
1997
1997
 (%)
(%)
(%)
Table (4): Basic Education Indicators1997/199811
Adult literacy
Combined first-, second- and third level gross enrolment ratio
Enrollment in basic education
Enrollment in secondary education
Enrollment in higher education
Enrollment in secondary technical education from total secondary education
Enrollment in natural and applied sciences from total enrollment in higher education
Annual increase in school enrollment
Number of students per teacher in schools
Average number of students per class in schools
Illiteracy rate
Number of counselors (per 1000 students)
Number of students per computer in schools
Share of education from international assistance12
85.5
72.4
93.6
51.6
21.5
3.26
23.8
6.45
29.5
36.5
13.9
0.26
188
7.9
(%)
(%) #
(%) #
(%) #
(%) #
(%) #
(%) #
(%) #
(%)
#
#
(%) 1994-1998
11.  All education statistics are for the scholastic year 1997/1998.
12.  MOPIC 1998.
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Table (5): Health Indicators13
Life expectancy at birth (years)
Children vaccinated against:
Measles
BCG
HBV
OPV
MMR
DPT
Cases of AIDS (per 100,000)
Hospital beds (per 1,000)
Number of hospitals
Number of doctors  (per 10,000 people)
Number of nurses (per 10,000 people)
Health facilities ( per 10,000 people)
The handicapped as a percentage of total population
Number of people with governmental health insurance
Average maternal mortality (per 100,000)
Child mortality below the age of 5 (per 1,000 births)
Infant mortality (per 1,000) live births
Child mortality below the age of 5 (per 1,000 births)
Infant mortality per 1000 live births
Women who have received some form of health care during pregnancy14
Births under some form of health supervision
Fertility rate among women 15-19 of total
Localities (1-4 Km ) away from the nearer health clinic15
Households connected to public water networks
Households connected to public sewage networks
Smokers (over 15 years of age)
Percentage paid by government health insurance out of health expenditure
Percentage of expenditure on referrals outside the government sector from the budget
of the government health sector
Share of health from international assistance16
71.5
93.6
90.5
92.5
97.3
91.8
98.0
1.3
1.0
52
8.3
14.1
20.7
1.8
1,035,761
60-80
33.2
27.3
20
14.9
89.0
93.0
8.9
15.1
83.1
33.2
23
45.0
10.4
5.4
1998*
1998*
1998*
1998*
1998*
1998*
1998*
   1997
1998*
1998*
   1995
   1995
1998*
1998*
1998 (%)
1998* (%)
1997 (%)
1998 (%)
1997 (%)
1997 (%)
1997 (%)
1998*
1998*
1994-1998 (%)
13.  Source of data indicated by * is the Ministry of Health , 1998.
14.  HDIP 1998
15.  Ibid
16.  MOPIC 1998
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Table (6): Basic Demographic Indicators
Population 1998 (millions)
Population forecast 2008 (millions)
Date population doubles
Proportion of population below the age of 15
Proportion of population over the age of 65
Annual natural rate of population growth
Net migration
Average crude births (per 1,000)
Average crude death (per 1,000)
Total fertility rate
Percentage of women who have used contraceptives17
Average family size
Dependency ratio
Refugees as a proportion of population
Females headed household
Households by tenure of housing unit
Main types of family:
Nuclear family
Extended family
Composite family
Single individual
Palestinians 12 years and over by marital status:
Never or legally engaged
Married
Divorced
Widowed
Not stated
2.9
4.55
2015
47.0
3.5
4.08
3.45
42.01
4.65
6.1
44.8
6.4
101.2
41.4
9.0
78.1
73.2
23.0
0.5
3.3
40.8
54.5
0.7
3.8
0.2
1998
2008
1997 (%)
1997 (%)
1997
1997
1998
1998
1997 (%)
1998
1997
1997
1997 (%)
1997 (%)
1997 (%)
(%)
1997 (%)
17.  HDIP 1998
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Indicators
Population distribution
Life expectancy at birth
Average marriage age
Adult literacy ratio
Enrollment rates in the stages of education # 1997/1998:
Basic education
Secondary education
Higher education
Basic and secondary and higher education
Drop out rates of the secondary level
Share of adjusted real per capita GDP
Labor force from the total labor force over the age of
Unemployment rate
Distribution of workers according to profession
Legislators and higher administrative employees
Artisans, specialists, and clerks
Service employees and retailers
Skilled employees in agriculture and fishing
Handicraft employees and others
Machine workers and assemblers
Primary professions
Percentage of the labor force according to economic activity:
Agriculture
Industry
Building and construction
Services
Ministers in the Ministerial Council
Members in workers union
Judges (number)
Seats in local government18
Members in PLC
Ratio of females
to males(gap) #
96.93
104.6
78.3
86.0
101.0
99.4
83.3
99.5
193.0
9.3
16.1
105.6
10.3
44.2
8.5
75.0
8.6
1.5
5.9
49.3
16.2
0.6
17.5
3.4
8.3
4.6
1.0
6.0
18.  Ministry of Local Government, 1999
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Males
50.78
69.9
23
91.9
93.1
51.7
23.4
72.5
4.3
4127.9
70.3
14.4
2.9
9.5
4.7
4.4
18.5
6.6
23.8
6.7
11.1
17.7
34.8
29
92.36
65
3680
83
Females
49.22
73.1
18
79.0
94.06
51.4
19.5
72.2
8.3
385.5
11.3
15.2
0.3
4.2
0.4
3.3
1.6
0.1
1.4
3.3
1.8
0.1
6.1
1
7.64
3
40
5
Table (7): Gender and Human Development Indicators
1997 (%)
1997 (years)
1997
1997 (%)
(%) #
1997/1998 #
1997 ($) #
15%
 (%)
1998 (%) #
1998 (%) #
1999
1997 (%)
1999
1999
Table (8) Selected Social Indicators
Spending on Security (% of running governmental spending)
Spending on Ministry of Education (% of running governmental spending)
Spending on Ministry of Health (% of running governmental spending)
Spending on Ministry of Social Affairs (% of running governmental spending)19
Number of Security employees in security apparatus (per 1,000 people)
Number of Doctors (per 1,000 people)
Number of Teachers (per 1,000 people)
Palestinian abroad (million)
Population density  person / km2
Poverty rate20
Suicide attempts (number)
Suicide (number of cases)
Divorce rate
Number of reported rape attempts
Number of reported rape cases21
Political prisoners in Palestinian prisons22
Political prisoners in Israeli prisons23
1997
1997
1997
1997
1998 #
1998
1998 #
1998
1998 #
1997
1997
1997
1997
1997
1997
1998
1998
29.15
16.70
11.25
5.93
45
0.83
10.5
5.0
500
23.0
231
22
0.7
43
81
300
3000
Table (9) Selected Human Poverty Indicators 1997
Illiteracy rate
Unemployment rate
Poverty rate
Poverty gap rate
Poverty severity
Absolute Poverty24
14.5
14.4
23.0
6.0
2.3
14.2
19. Ministry of Finance 1998
20. Poverty report1997
21. Ministry of Interior1997
22. Palestinian Human Rights Organizations Reports 1998
23. Ibid
24. Poverty Report 1998
Human Development Indicators, Palestine148
Palestine  Human Development Report 1998-1999
List B: Aggregate indicators and differences between the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip
Table (1): Population, Health and Family Indicators
25.  HDIP 1998.
26.  Ministry of Health 1998.
27.  Ibid.
Indicators
Natural rate of population growth
Population growth (net migration)
Population
Percentage distribution of the population according to age
0-14
15-29
30-49
Over 50
Refugees as a proportion of the population 1997
Percentage of women who have used contraceptives25
Child mortality below the age of 5 (per 1,000 births)
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births)
Child mortality below the age of 5 (per 1,000 births)26
Infant mortality (per 1,000 live births)27
Average family size
Average crude births
Average crude death rates
Total fertility rate
Females headed Households
Main types of family:
Nuclear family
Extended family
Composite family
Single individual
Households by tenure of housing unit
Households with TV sets
Gaza Strip
4.4
3.45
1.022204
50.2
25.8
16.5
7.5
65.1
33.9
41
32
25.5
18.1
6.9
45.06
4.51
6.9
8.0
71.8
25.3
0.3
2.6
83.2
81.4
West Bank
3.9
3.45
1.873476
45.0
27.6
17.6
9.8
26.5
50.7
32
25
17
9.5
6.1
40.3
4.73
5.6
9.5
74.0
21.7
0.6
3.7
75.3
86.4
Palestine
4.08
3.45
2.895683
47
26.9
17.2
9.1
41.4
44.8
33.2
27.3
20.0
14.9
6.4
42.01
4.65
6.1
9.0
73.2
23.0
0.5
3.3
78.1
84.6
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1998
1998
1997 (million)
1997 (%)
1997
1998
1995
1995
1998
1998
1997 (persons)
1997 (per 1,000)
1997 (per 1,000)
1997 (%)
1997 (%)
1997 (%)
1997 (%)
1997 (%)
Indicators
Per capita GDP
Per capita GNP
Share of agriculture sector to GDP28
Participation rate in the labor force (15 and above) 1998
Unemployment rates
Share of women in the labor force
Distribution of workers according to the economic activity:
Agriculture and fishing
Mining, stone crushing
Building and construction
Services29
Distribution of workers according to the employment status:
Employers
Self employed
Wage employee
Family members without wages
Gaza Strip
1262
1388
8.0
36.4
20.9
5.9
8.0
13.6
20.5
57.9
4.0
19.7
71.0
5.3
Palestine
1500/1456
2229/1702
6.4/7.3
41.4
14.4
11.3
12.1
15.9
22.0
50.0
5.8
21.0
65.3
7.9
Table (2): Employment indicators
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28.  The three above indicators for West Bank do not include Jerusalem. As for the figures for Palestine, the first figure includes Jerusalem and the second figure
       does not.
29.  See footnote 10.
West Bank
1588
1915
6.9
44.2
11.5
14.3
13.8
16.8
22.7
46.7
6.5
21.5
63.0
9.0
1997 ($)
1997 ($)
1997 ($)
1998
1998 ($)
1998 ($)
1998 ($)
1998 ($)
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List C: Governorate Indicators
Table (1): Population distribution and sex ratio 1997
Governorate
Jenin
Tubas
Tulkarm
Qalqilya
Salfit
Nablus
Ramallah
Jerusalem
Jericho
Bethlehem
Hebron
North Gaza
Gaza
Deir al-Balah
Khan Younis
Rafah
Population
203026
36609
134110
72007
48538
261340
213582
328601
32713
137286
405664
183373
367388
147877
200704
122865
Sex Ratio(men/women)
103.8
103.1
102.2
105.7
103.6
103.3
100.4
102.1
101.7
104.8
104.9
103.7
103.6
102.4
102.5
102.0
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Table (2) : Average Number of Students per Teacher and per Classroom:
Governorate
Jenin
Nablus
Salfit
Tulkarm
Qalqilya
Ramallah
Jerusalem
Jerusalem Suburbs
Bethlehem
Jericho
Hebron
South Hebron
Gaza
Khan Younis
Indicator
year 97/98
32
32
29
33
32
30
29
---
31
33
35
33
43
44
98/99
27.4
28.1
26.1
29.7
28.8
24.9
20.9
23.2
25.7
27.1
29.1
28.9
35.2
34.9
98/99
31.8
32.7
29.6
32.9
31.2
29.9
28.5
28.3
31
32
34.6
33
42.8
44.2
97/98
27
28
26
28
27
24
20
---
25
28
29
29
34
34
Student per Teacher Student per Classroom
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Table (3) : Percentage Distribution of Employed Persons by Economic Activity 1997
Governorate
Jenin
Tulkarm and Qalqilya
Nablus
Ramallah
Jerusalem
Bethlehem and Jericho
Hebron
North Gaza
Gaza
Middle Gaza
South Gaza
Building and
Construction
17.3
20.2
14.0
28.1
13.9
16.4
22.3
18.1
16.2
14.7
16.6
Industry
10.4
16.8
21.9
15.3
13.1
22.6
19.0
17.5
18.0
13.4
8.2
Services
40.0
43.3
51.4
51.1
72
44.3
43.5
55.9
64
60.8
61.4
Agriculture
32.3
19.7
12.7
5.5
1.0
16.7
15.2
8.5
1.8
11.1
13.8
Economic activities
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Table (4): Percentage Distribution of Employed Persons by Economic Activity 1998
Governorate
Jenin
Tulkarm and Qalqilya
Nablus
Ramallah
Jerusalem
Bethlehem and Jericho
Hebron
North Gaza
Middle Gaza
Gaza
South Gaza
Building and
Construction
20.2
21.9
17.6
29.3
16.8
25.4
26.0
22.5
19.1
17.6
22.0
Industry
11.4
14.4
21.3
15.7
13.6
20.5
18.9
14.9
17.7
12.1
8.0
Services
41.1
44.8
50.3
48.8
68.9
40.1
40.8
55.5
61.5
60.5
54.3
Agriculture
27.3
18.9
10.8
6.2
0.7
14.0
14.3
7.1
1.7
9.8
15.7
Economic activities
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Table (5) Poverty Rates by Governorate 199730
Governorate
Jenin
Tulkarm and Qalqilya
Nablus
Ramallah
Jerusalem
Bethlehem and Jericho
Hebron
North Gaza
Middle Gaza
South Gaza
Total
Absolute Poverty
15.0
9.6
7.3
3.8
0.3
8.4
17.5
20.5
27.3
34.6
14.2
Poverty
27.6
16.5
11.5
9.1
2.7
16.3
24.4
30.8
39.5
50.8
22.5
Poverty Gap
6.4
4.0
3.1
1.7
0.2
3.8
7.1
8.2
12.7
14.4
6.0
Poverty Severity
2.3
1.4
1.2
0.5
0.03
1.4
2.9
3.1
5.6
5.6
2.3
30. Poverty Report 1997.
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Table (6): Monthly Household Expenditure by Expenditure Groups and Governorate 1997
Jenin
38.1
4.1
2.4
6.8
8
11
29.6
497.02
Governorate
Nablus
37.9
4.4
4.3
8.5
9.6
12.4
22.9
550.94
Tulkarm and
Qalqilya
41.4
4.2
2.6
6.7
8.6
10.9
25.9
519.40
Ramallah  and
Jericho
36.4
5.2
2.6
7.1
8.4
11.8
28.5
743.81
Jerusalem
39.3
2.7
3.6
7.7
9.7
9.2
27.8
810.34
Hebron
38.6
4.2
3.2
6.7
9.4
11.3
26.6
579.13
Gaza
37.1
3.1
4.5
7.0
7.3
9.4
31.5
490.32
Bethlehem
41.0
5.5
3.3
6.2
9.3
12.1
22.6
611.91
Groups of
Expenditure
Food
Medical Care
Education
Housing
Clothing
Transport and
Communication
Other
Total Expenditure in JD
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List D: Comparisons with Neighboring Countries
HDI Indicators31
HDI
Life expectancy at birth
Adult literacy rate
Combined first, second and third
level gross enrollment ratio 1998
Adjusted per capita GDP
Jordan
70.1
87.2
66
3450
Lebanon
69.9
84.4
76
5940
Egypt
66.3
52.7
72
3050
Israel
77.8
95.4
80
18150
Palestine
71.5
85.5
72.4
2286
Syria
68.9
71.6
60
3250
Life expectancy index
Education index
GDP index
HDI value
Gender-related development and index
value(GDI)
Gender empowerment measure
value(GEM)
0.75
0.80
0.59
0.715
---
0.220
0.69
0.59
0.57
0.616
0.603
0.275
0.88
0.90
0.87
0.883
0.879
0.496
0.77
0.81
0.52
0.70
0.638
0.290
0.73
0.68
0.58
0.663
0.640
0.317
0.75
0.82
0.68
0.749
0.734
---
31. Statistics are for the year 1997. Statistics for countries other than Palestine are taken from Human Development Report,
      UNDP 1999.
157
(years)
(%)
(%)  #
($) #
Methodological notes
B-1 General notes
Chapter One: General framework for human development in Palestine
A number of background papers were prepared for this chapter by:
Jamil Hilal ("Implications of the concept of sustainable human development on development planning
and research methodology in the Palestinian case");
Nader Said and Hadeel al-Qazzaz ("Human development: International and national experiences and
Palestinian orientations");
Ramzi Rihan ("Problems related to the concept and indicators of sustainable human development in
Palestine");
Mudar Kassis ("Problems of measuring human development in Palestine");
Mohammad Ghadiyah ("A comprehensive review of the literature on human development");
Faisal Awartani (A critique of human development indicators).
Chapter Three: PNA institutions and the management of development
A specialized study was prepared on the subject, based on the following research methodologies and techniques:
Questionnaire: A six-part questionnaire was designed focusing on the following: the vision, objectives,
role and values of the ministries through the researched group; management; productivity in the ministries;
relations with other parties, such as the various organs of the PNA, and institutions of Palestinian civil
society, the UN and donor countries; and general assessments of important issues inside the ministries,
and  relations with other parties.
The questionnaire was distributed to all operative ministries of the PNA (twenty-four ministries), and to
three other government institutions (Bureau of Public Employees, Commission of the Public Comptroller,
Commission of Public Intelligence). Questionnaires were distributed to 101 Directors and Directors-General
in these ministries and institutions, 31 of which were women. Over 50% of the questionnaires were sent to 10
ministries that are in greater contact with the public as service providers. The number of questionnaires filled
in and returned was 62, from 19 ministries and one public institution. The rest of the questionnaires were not
returned, and five individuals in the survey sample refused to complete the questionnaire.
Those surveyed were selected according to several criteria:
Position: they had to be in positions of responsibility-directors-general (43), directors (14) or heads of divisions (5).
Gender: 60% of those surveyed were males and 34% females, and 4% did not state their gender.
Place of work: 58% of those surveyed worked in the West Bank, 23% in the Gaza Strip, 11% had offices in
both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and 8% did not state the location of their work.
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Place of residence: Of those surveyed, 44% had formerly resided outside Palestine, 47% in Palestine, and 9%
did not state place of residence.
Interviews: interviews were made with Under-Secretaries and Directors-General in seven Palestinian
ministries that had a role in providing direct services (Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry
of Economy and Trade, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Youth and Sports, Ministry of Finance, and
the Ministry of Labour) to discuss issues of relevance to PNA institutional work.
A special questionnaire: Data was collected about the official position of each ministry on development
management, and statistical information on employees in the ministry, such as number, specialization,
ranking, educational attainment and other basic information.
Reports of different ministries: Bulletins and publications issued by the ministries were collected; in
addition to the organizational structure charts proposed for some of these ministries, and other documents
useful for research.
Background papers for this chapter were prepared by the researchers:
 Jamil Hilal ("The Historical and Political Context for the Establishment of PNA Institutions").
 Izzat Abdul-Hadi ("Visions, Objectives and Roles of PNA Ministries").
Chapter Four: Economic policies and human development
Six studies were prepared  to provide the background for this chapter:
  Omar Abdul-Razeq ("Investment and human development");
  Bassem Makhoul ("Growth and employment");
  Omar Abdul-Razeq and Bassem Makhoul ("The relationship between private and public sectors");
  Mohamad Nasr ("A conceptual theoretical introduction");
  Salah Abdul-Shafi ("Economic policies");
  Mahmoud Jafari ("Economic policies for development").
Chapter Five: Civil society organizations and human development
The following methodology was followed in the research:
A research questionnaire: A sample made up of 50 NGOs in the WBGS was selected for the study. A
cross-sectional sample was selected from a file including a list of all civil organizations, prepared by the
Centre for Palestine Research and Studies in 1988. A four-part questionnaire was designed, dealing with
participation inside the institution; relations between the institution and its beneficiaries; relations with
other institutions; and information about the institution.
Background papers for this chapter were prepared by the researchers: Jamil Hilal, Mudar Kassis,
Nader Said, Hadeel Qazzaz, Mohamad Mobayid.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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Chapter Six: Towards a Palestinian vision of development
The DSP held a number of specialized seminars to address the question: "What kind of development for
Palestine?" A number of leading pioneers in the field of development, and representatives of many sectors of
Palestinian society addressed these seminars, as a result of which a number of bases and orientations for a
Palestinian vision of development were drawn up. Papers were presented by 38 experts, and over 1,000
participants took part in the discussions.
Presentations were made by:
Ibrahim Dakkak
Ibrahim Abu Lughod
Ahmad Majdalani
Ahmad Dahlan
Bassam al-Salhi
Jamil Hamami
Jamila Saidam
Rawya al-Shawa
Zahira Kamal
Zainab Ghounaimi
Sami Abu Zarifeh
Saji Salameh
Sakhr Habash
Saleh Raafat
Salah Abdul Shafi
Adel Samara
Abdul-Karim Qais
Abdul-Rahim Mallouh
Abdul-Jawad Saleh
Atef Saad
Izzat Abdul-Hadi
Ali Shaath
Ali Jaradat
Omar Abdul-Razek
Omar Shaaban
Adnan Abu Amer
Ghazi al-Sourani
Lamia Qattineh
Mohamad Ghadiyeh
Mohsin Abu-Ramadan
Nader Said
Mohammad Dahman
Hadeel Qazzaz
Hisham Awartani
Mohammad al-Samhouri
Nizar Basalat
Mostapha Shehadeh
Haitham Halabi
B-2 Technical note. Computing the indices1
1. Human Development Index (HDI)
To construct the HDI, maximum and minimum values are determined for each indicator:
 Life expectancy at birth: min. 25 years, max. 85 years.
Index =
Life expectancy for Palestine: 71.5 years
Life expectancy index     =  0.77
Actual Value - min. Value
Max. Value - min. Value
71.5 - 25
85 - 25
 1.  These indices computed to fit the methodology provided by UNDP (Human Development Report 1999).
Methodological notes160
Palestine  Human Development Report 1998-1999
 Educational attainment
Adult literacy rate: min. 0%, max. 100%.
Total enrollment rate: min. 0%, max. 100%.
Adult literacy rate for Palestine: 85.5%
Total enrollment rate for Palestine: 72.4%
Adult literacy index         = 0.855
Rate of enrollment index      = 0.724
Educational attainment index2 (2(0.855) + 1(0.724))1/3 = 0.81
 Real per capita GDP: using PPP, min. $100, max. $40,000.
Adjusted real GDP per capita (PPP$): 2286
Adjusted real GDP per capita (PPP$) index3
            = 0.52
To calculate the HDI use
= (Life expectancy + educational attainment + per capita GDP)1/3
               (0.77 + 0.81 + 0.52) /3 = 0.70
2. Gender-related Development Index (GDI)
Population:
Total: 2,895,524
Females: 1,425,177
Males: 1,470,347
72.4 - 0
100 - 0
85.5 - 0
100 - 0
log(2286) - log(100)
log(40,000) - log(100)
Enrollment was calculated from the statistics for the scholastic year 1997/1998, the population of the same age group was taken from the PCBS population
projections for the year 1997.
The following assumptions were used to calculate per capita GDP Purchasing Power Parity in dollars, based on available data in ESCWA reports on income
calculations for the ESCWA region, in addition to available data about on income for Jordan in the Human Development Report  1998:
Per capita GDP PPP in Egyptian Pounds for Palestine compared to Jordan is 0.4927 for the year 1995 (ESCWA).
Per capita GDP for the year 1995 (PPP in dollars $2,063).
Percentage of nominal per capita GDP to GDP (PPP in dollars) for the year 1995 is 0.656.
Assuming this percentage remained fixed for the year 1997, per capita GDP (PPP in dollars) for the year 1997 was calculated to be $2,286.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
4.
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Percentage share of population (%):
Females: 49.22
Males: 50.78
Step One:
Computing the equally distributed life expectancy index
Life expectancy at birth (years):
Females: 73.1
Males: 69.9
Life expectancy index
Females:   = 0.76
Males:         = 0.79
Equally distributed life expectancy index:
{[Female population share X (female life expectancy index)-1]+[male population share X (male life
expectancy index)-1]}-1
{[0.4922X (0.76)-1] + [0.5078 X (0.79)-1]}-1
=(0.648+0.643)-1 = 0.774
Step Two:
Computing the equally distributed educational attainment index
Adult literacy rate (%):
Females: 79.0
Males: 91.9
Adult literacy rate index:
Females: 79.0 - 0/100 = 0.79
Males: 91.9 - 0 /100 = 0.919
Combined gross enrollment ratio (%):
Females: 72.2
Males: 72.5
73.1 - 27.5
60
69.9 - 22.5
60
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Combined gross enrollment index:
Females: 72.2 - 0 /100 = 0.722
Males: 72.5 - 0 /100 = 0.725
Educational attainment index:
2/3(adult literacy index) + 1/3(combined gross enrolment index)
Females: 2/3(0.79) + 1/3(0.722) = 0.767
Males: 2/3(0.919) + 1/3(0.725) = 0.854
Equally distributed educational attainment index
{[Female population share X (educational attainment index)-1]+[male population share X (educational
attainment index)-1]}-1
{[0.4922 X (0.767)-1]+[0.5078 X (0.854)-1]}-1
= (0.641 + 0.594)-1
= 0.809
Step Three:
Computing the equally distributed income index
Percentage share of economically active population:( Census 1997)
Females: 10.8
Males: 89.2
Ratio of female non-agricultural wage to male non-agricultural wage (0.750) (UNDP, global estimate)
GDP per capita: $2,286 (PPP$)
Total GDP PPP$): $2286 X 2.895683 million = $6619.53 million (PPP$)
Sf =        = 0.083
Female total GDP (PPP$) = 0.083 x 6619.53 million (PPP$) = 549.4 million (PPP$)
Male total GDP (PPP$) = 6619.53 million (PPP$) - 549.4 million (PPP$) =6070.13 million (PPP$)
Per capita female GDP (PPP$) = 549.4 million (PPP$) / 1.425177 = 385.5 (PPP$)
Per capita male GDP (PPP$) = 6070.13 million (PPP$)  / 1.470506 = 4127.9(PPP$)
Wyf =  = 0.0.225
Wym =   = 0.621
0.750 x 0.108
(0.750) x 0.108) + 0.892
log(385.5) - log(100)
log(40,000) - log(100)
log(4127.9) - log(100)
log(40,000) - log(100)
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Equally distributed income index:
({female population share X [W(yf)]-1} + {male population share X [W(ym)]-1)-1
({0.4922 X [0.225)]-1} + {0.5078 X [0.621]-1)-1
= 0.333
Step Four:
Computing the GDI
1/3(0.774 + 0.809+ 0.333) = 0.638
3. Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)
Population:
Total: 2,895,524
Females: 1,425,177
Males: 1,470,347
Percentage share of population (%):
Females: 49.22
Males: 50.78
Step One:
Calculating indices for parliamentary representation and administrative and managerial, and professional
and technical, positions
Percentage share of parliamentary representation:
Females: 5.7
Males: 94.3
Percentage share of professional and technical positions:
Females: 27.9
Males: 72.1
Percentage share of administrative and managerial positions:
Females: 13.6
Males: 86.4
Calculating the EDEP for parliamentary representation:
{[0.4922 X (5.7)-1]+[0.5078 X (94.3)-1]}-1
= 11.0
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Calculating the EDEP for administrative and managerial positions:
{[0.4922 X (13.6)-1]+[0.5078 X (86.4)-1]}-1
= 23.8
Calculating the EDEP for professional and technical positions:
{[0.4922 X (27.9)-1]+[0.5078 X (72.1)-1]}-1
= 40.0
Indexing parliamentary representation:
11/50 = 0.22
Indexing administrative and managerial positions:
23.8/50 = 0.476
Indexing professional and technical positions:
40/50 = 0.8
Combining the indices for administrative and managerial, and professional and technical, positions:
(0.476 + 0.8) / 2 = 0.638
Step Two:
Calculating the index for female and male income
Percentage share of economically active population:
Females: 10.8
Males: 89.2
Ratio of female non-agricultural wage to male non-agricultural wage: (0.750) (UNDP, global estimate)
GDP per capita: $2,286 (PPP$)
Total GDP PPP$: $2286 X 2,895,683 = $6619.53 million (PPP$)
Sf =       = 0.083
Female total GDP (PPP$) = 0.083 x 6619.53 million (PPP$)=549.4 million (PPP$)
Male total GDP (PPP$) = 6619.53 million (PPP$) - 549.4 million (PPP$) =6070.13 million (PPP$)
Per capita female GDP (PPP$) = 549.4 million (PPP$) / 1.425177 = 385.5 (PPP$)
Per capita male GDP (PPP$) = 6070.13 million (PPP$)  / 1.470506 = 4127.9(PPP$)
0.750 x 0.108
(0.750) x 0.108) + 0.892
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Index of female per capita GDP: 385.5 - 100 / 40000 - 100 = 0.007
Index of male per capita GDP: 4127.9 - 100 / 40000 - 100 = 0.101
Calculating the equally distributed income index
{[0.4922 X (0.007)-1]+[0.5078 X (0.101)-1]}-1
= 0.013
Step Three:
Computing the GEM
(0.22+0.638+0.013)/3 = 0.290
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C. Definition of terms1
 The economy
Gross National Product (GNP):
The market value of all the final
goods and services produced
during a specific period of time
(usually one year).
Net payments from abroad:
Payments to foreign factors of
production used locally minus
payments for Palestin-ian factors
of production used abroad.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP):
Gross National Product minus net
transfer payments.
Real per capita GDP in dollars
according to Purchasing Power
Parity: Per capita GDP of a
country conver-ted to US dollars
to equalize purchas-ing power to
the currency of a country. The
UNDP has used Purchasing Power
Parity for international GDP
comparisons. These comparisons
will be more accurate than
comparisons based on exchange
rates which are extremely unstable.
Real per capita GDP: Real GDP for
a given year divided by the
population of the country during
that year.
Rate of inflation: Measured by the
growth rate of the GDP implicit
deflator for each given period of
time.
Trade balance deficit: Occurs when
imports of goods and services
exceed export of goods and
services.
Purchasing power: The quantity of
goods and services that an amount
of money can purchase.
Remittances: Funds that workers
abroad send to their families living
in the WBGS.
Labor force: Total number of
people aged 15 and over and below
the age of 65 who are able and
willing to work (both the employed
and the unemploy-ed).
The employed: Whoever is aged 15
and over, and who has worked for
a wage for at least one hour during
the week prior to the survey, or who
has worked for no wages in a
family establishment or in a
voluntary institution.
The unemployed (or job-seekers):
Those aged 15 and over who do not
have work and are actively
searching for jobs.
Official employment in Israel:
Palestinian workers who are
working in Israel with permits.
Unofficial employment in Israel:
Palestinian workers who are
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
Definitions of terms were adopted from international
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working in Israel without permits.
Government expenditure: The
expenditure of all central and other
government offices,
administrations and institutions. It
includes current expenditure and
capital or developm-ental
expenditure, but does not include
regional, domestic or private
expenditure.
Public sector: Includes all
productive activities and services
provided by all branches and at all
levels of government (central
government, and local councils).
Gross capital formation: (or what
is known as investment) is the
combination of the following three
components: Gross fixed capital
formation, change in deposits, and
net holdings in valuables;
investment is measured by the
purchasing price, as is the case in
measuring consumption.
Final consumption expenditure:
The final consumption of families
(made up of expenditure on all
goods and services, with the
exception of expenditure on
construction of housing); the final
consumption of the government
and non-profit institu-tions
(measured by the value of
production minus the value of pay-
ments from sales).
Average consumption: Total
individual monthly consumption of
the following items:
Money spent on purchase of
goods and services for daily
consumption.
Value of goods and services that
the family receives from the
household wage-earner, and
which is used for the
consumption of the family.
Goods that are consumed during
a specific period of time, and
that are produced by the family.
Estimated house value (in the
event of ownership).
Average expenditure: Total
individual monthly expenditure on
the following items:
Money spent on purchase of
goods and services for daily
consumption.
Value of goods and services that
the family receives from the
household wage-earner, and
which is used for the
consumption of the family.
Expenditure on fees and taxes
(non-investment), charity
(Zakat), donations, gifts,
interest payments on debts, and
other non-consump-tion items.
Consumption of food as a percentage
of total family consumption:
Consumption calculated from the
details of GDP (expenditure at
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
1.
2.
3.
4.
æ
1.
2.
3.
æ
Definition of terms168
Palestine  Human Development Report 1998-1999
market prices at the national level)
specified in United Nations System
of National Accounts, mostly
included in the fourth (1980) and
fifth (1985) stages of the
International Comparison
Programme.
Percentage of poor families:
Percentage of poor families from
the population.
Abject poverty: As estimated in the
Palestine Poverty Report, for a 6-
member household (for the
year1997).
Severity of poverty: A mean
indicator for total consumption
deficit.
Poverty gap: The percentage of
decrease in the average income of
the poor from the poverty line.
Education
Literacy: A person is considered
literate if he/she can read and
understand a short and simple
paragraph on his/her daily life.
Basic education: The foundation of
education and the basis upon which
other stages of education are based.
Its duration is 10 years (age 6-15).
Secondary education: Scholastic
education which follows basic
education. Its duration is 2 years
(age 16-17).
Higher education: Education
provided in universities and
community colleges. The
prerequisite to enroll in higher
education is completion of the
secondary stage, or its equivalent,
and obtaining the General
Secondary Education Certificate
(Tawjihi), or its equivalent. It is
considered to be for the age group
of 18-22 (5 scholastic years).
Total enrollment rate: Number of
students enrolled in any
educational level, whether or not
they belong to the appropriate age
group, as a percentage of the
population who come under the
appropriate age group.
Health
Crude birth rate: Number of live
and still births per every 1000 of
the population for a given period
of time.
Crude death rate: Annual number of
deaths per every 1000 of the popula-
tion.
Infant mortality rate: Annual
number of infant (under 1 year of
age) deaths per every 1000 of the
population.
Child mortality rate: Annual
average number of child deaths
below the age of 5 per every 1000
of the population, who were born
live during the past five years. (the
probability of death during the
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
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period between birth and the fifth
birthday).
Life expectancy at birth: Number
of years that a newborn child is
expected to live, under the
prevailing mortality patterns at the
time of his/her birth.
Fertility: Actual reproductive
(childbearing) performance of an
individual, couple, group,
population or society. (The actual
number of births a woman had
during her reproductive life).
Total fertility rate: Average number
of live births a woman has during
her life, if she could reproduce at
each age period according to the
fertility rates prevailing for all
stages of life.
Miscellaneous definitions
Rest of the West Bank: The West
Bank, excluding East Jerusalem.
East Jerusalem: The eastern part of
the city of Jerusalem (the part that
was under Jordanian rule) occupied
by Israel in June 1967 and annexed
on June 28, 1967.
Zakat committees: Voluntary
institutions that collect the Islamic
alms tax (Zakat) and donations
from those able to contribute, and
distribute the alms to those in need
according to a specific social
survey mechanism.
Occupancy rate: Average number
of persons per room living in a
house. It is calculated by dividing
the number of people living in a
house over the number of rooms.
Dependency rate: Average number
of persons supported by a person
who works, or is able to work.
Gender: A term that indicates
social differences between males
and females.
Percentage of women to men
(gender gap): It measures the gap
separating what has been achieved
by men and women in the same field.
The participation rate in the labor
force (the percentage of women to
men) is 16.1%, which means that in
order to achieve equality, women
should accomplish achievements at
a rate of 84% to catch up with the
achievements of men.
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
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